

Huntington's Fears: "Latinidad" in the Horizon of the Modern/Colonial World¹

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I. Huntington's Maps of Fear

Latinidad has a long history before entering with force into the everyday life of the US in the twentieth century, and disrupting the US national imaginary in which the State and the nation are equated with Anglicidad. Huntington's national identity-politics in his recent *Who Are We*² complements his previous global one. While in the *Clash of Civilizations?* (1993)³ Huntington drew the line between the West and the rest of the world to assert the identity of the West in the global distribution of civilization, in *Who Are We?* (2004), he placed the accent on the continental distribution of identities. Underneath Huntington's thesis and fears (or the exploitation of fear to defend a modern idea of Western Civilization and of the nation-state) there is a loud rumor that comes from the historical foundation of the modern/colonial world. The repressed rumor in the *Clash of Civilizations* comes from the final victory of Christians over the Moors in 1492 and the triumph of the Church—that is, of Latinidad. The sixteenth century was the century of consolidation of Christian Latinidad.

Although the reformation and the counter-reformation created a schism in the very center of the Church, Catholics and Protestants could not escape their common roots: the moment when, in the third century AD, and under Constantine, the Roman Empire and Christianity came together in an alliance that established the brass tacks for the future of Western Christians and capitalist empires since the sixteenth century (e.g., Spain, England, and the U.S.) as well as the Eastern Christian Empire, Russia, in which Moscow was declared the "Third Rome" at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Eastern Christianity fell at the margins of Latin Christianity. Clearly enough, in the map that Huntington reproduced in the first and short version of his thesis (Huntington, 1996*a*, p. 8) the dividing line was traced, without equivocation, from the western margins of Russia, through the western sector of Belarusia, Ukraine, and Romania, to the southeast, separating Croatia from Bosnia and Serbia. The line that begins in the northeast frontier of Russia ends significantly in Montenegro, leaving Greece in no-one's land, since Greece remains as the historical foundation of Western civilization. If the line was not clear enough for the distracted reader, Huntington wrote at the top of the map, and to the left and right of the line: "Western Christianity circa 1500," and to the right: "Orthodox Christianity and Islam." Western Christians, circa 1500 are, as I already suggested, co-terminus with Latinidad. From mid-seventeenth century onward, and above all with the concentration of capital in Holland and England, a reconfiguration of imperial/colonial domination world order took place and power shifted toward Protestant Christians and Anglicidad.

While the article published in *Foreign Affairs* had as a title “The Clash of Civilizations?” with a question mark, the book’s title was assertive: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. And while the map just described illustrated the article, in the book version maps of the world in 1920, the 1960s, and post-1990 took the place of the dividing line “circa 1500.” One can see now that the rumor of the disinheritance that will become “The Hispanic Challenge” (in the article published by Huntington in *Foreign Policy*, a month or so before the publication of *Who Are We?* following a strategy similar to the article and debate on *The Clash of Civilizations* advanced in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, and the publication of the debate, by the same journal, in 1995), is already there, in the shade of the maps introduced at the beginning of the book: the Braseros Program started around 1920; “Hispanics” as the fifth leg of the ethno-racial pentagon (Hollinger, 1995—a book that appeared the same year as Huntington’s *The Clash...*), emerged in “the 1960s” when massive immigration from South America (and the Third World) into the US began, causing the end of the Braseros program. In the 1960s there also took place a massive immigration of Puerto Ricans when US made of Puerto Rico a “showcase of developing underdeveloped countries”⁴ and the project needed to re-locate thousands of Puerto Ricans in order to clean house when the investing visitors arrived. And finally “the post 1990” not only witnessed the end of the Soviet Union, but most definitively the increasing numbers of immigrants from South America and Central America, many of them running away from countries under dictatorial regimes (that started in Chile in 1973)

in conjunction with the advance of neo-liberalism in the South. Southern immigration was a consequence of political repression and growing economic marginalization parallel to the growing concentration of capital in the hands of Southern elites, both of which were direct consequences of US imperial designs. That is to say, one of the consequences of military, political, and economic invasion of the South by the US government and corporations, was what Huntington conceptualized as "the Hispanic Challenge." The "Hispanic Challenge," in other words, is a direct consequence of the "Anglo Violence."

II. The Way "we" Were

The coalition of Christianity with Anglicity had significant consequences (from the late seventeenth century onward) for the remaking of the world order, for the geo-politics of knowledge and for the future destiny of Latinity, in Europe. First of all, while England was taking over the economic and political dimensions in the legacies of the Spanish Empire, Germany was taking the intellectual lead in re-conceptualizing the world (e.g., Kant and Hegel geo-political imaginaries) and France saw the opportunity to take the lead of the Latin world in the south of Europe. "Latinidad" began to be displaced from the center of Christianity and equated with Catholicism, while Protestantism was linked with the changes from mercantile capitalism (mainly controlled by Spanish and Portuguese imperialisms and grounded in silver and gold) to free-trade capitalism

(mainly controlled by England and France and grounded in Caribbean plantations and African slave labor).

French intelligentsia, state officers, and the Church were in a privileged position to exploit and use “Latinidad.” The very notion of “Latinidad” as a secular and imperial identity-politics served France’s imperial designs well. In the first place, the separation of Church and State put France in a leading position *vis-à-vis* the ascending and competing imperial powers, England and Germany mainly. Secondly, the secularization of “Latinidad” allowed the French State to put itself in a leading position *vis-à-vis* previous and weak imperial powers (Spain, Portugal, and Italy—strong in its intellectual role, though less of an imperial power). And third, when French State politics, supported by its intelligentsia, promoted “Latinidad” in the ex-Spanish colonies in South America that had recently gained independence, it was because of the imperial conflict caused by the expansion of the U.S. toward the south, after buying Louisiana from Napoleon (in the 1800s) and prevailing in the war against Mexico in 1848.

Thus, “Latinidad” served France to place itself in the new imperial world order, in Europe, and in the Americas. By the end of the nineteenth century, “Latinidad” became more and more accepted by the self-colonized Hispanic American Creoles—and “Latin” America as the name of a sub-continent became indistinguishable from the political project of the Creole elite (land-owners and plantation managers in complicity with the State) in their efforts to build nation-states out of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial ruins without realizing the differences between the consoli-

dation of nation-states in imperial countries (France, Germany, England) and would-be imperial countries with a clear vision of its future (U.S.), and the consolidation of "dependent" countries, like those of "Latin" America, living under the spell of their recent "independence." The independence of "Latin" American countries in the nineteenth century was a political mirage: France was leading the imaginary of "Latinidad"; England—which had, after 1776, lost its colonies in the US and the economic control of several Caribbean Islands—re-directed its colonial ambition toward Asia and Africa and controlled the markets in South America and the Caribbean; the U.S., as I already mentioned, moved the frontiers several miles toward the south and took away from Mexico a vast territory extending from today's Colorado to California; which has been a vast "Hispanic/Latin" territory since the beginning of the sixteenth century, when it was still occupied by indigenous people of the Americas for several thousands of years before the arrival of the Spaniards. "Latinos" in South America, that is, "Latin" Americans, were re-colonized by emerging empires while believing in their independence. Since 1848, and above all since 1898, as the result and consequence of the Hispanic-American war (in which Cuba and Puerto Rico were sandwiched), "Latins" in America (that is, Creoles from European descent; and Mestizos who only recognize the Spanish or Portuguese past of their double descent), inaugurated a new imperial category that will be re-produced in independent countries in Asia and Africa after WWII: "the beneficiary-colonized (and numerically minority) elite." Members of this elite seldom leave the country, and if

they or their children leave for a while, to study in Europe or the U.S. most likely they return. They do not have anything to gain from migrating to Europe and the U.S. because their milking-cows are not in the U.S. It is this very elite that contributed to generating more and more marginalized people in their respective countries; marginalization that became obvious, clear, and loud since the 1970s, when in the U.S. the civil society and the State began to notice that there are more immigrants coming from the south. Who were these new immigrants?—mostly Mestizos from lower classes, sons and daughters of the large European migrations from the second half of the nineteenth century on. Since the 1990s a small number of indigenous people from the Andes and Central America were identified in Los Angeles. But, as far as we know, people from African descent living in the Andes (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) and the Caribbean Islands, who speak Spanish and Portuguese, form a significant number of the so-called “Hispanic Challenge.”

But then, what is “Latin” among Afro-Hispanics who practice Santería or Candomblé (instead of practicing Christianity) and of African—not European—descent? And what is “Latin” among the millions of indigenous people who have preserved traces of Christian symbols and rituals but without changing their basic religious beliefs? And what is “Latin” about people, though they speak Spanish, whose life and sensibility are crafted in Tojolabal, Aymara, Nahuatl, Quechua, Quichua, etc.? Not much, I believe, based on personal conversations with indigenous and Afro-leaders of social movements. Thus, in South America, “Latinidad” has several simultaneous functions in the imaginary of the mod-

ern/colonial world and in the structure of imperial/colonial domination. On the one hand, it served the goals of the beneficiary elite in the re-structuring of the modern/colonial world order after the U.S. and French Revolutions. The Creole elite linked with France, openly and with England in under-the-carpet negotiations of free trade and declared itself, in general, against the U.S. expansion toward the south. France took advantage of this moment and its circumstances.

The beneficiary elite was of course divided, as part of it remained faithful to the Spanish language, ideas, and traditions. They followed the lead of European "conservatives" (such as Donoso Cortés who, in 1852, published a book outlining the three major ideological frames after the French Revolution: Christianity, Liberalism, and Socialism (in its Saint-Simonian version, above all, but also of the early Marx). Colombia was one of the stronger defenders and followers of Hispanic traditions, as was Puerto Rico. In the Southern Cone, where Spanish influence was not strongly felt, the majority lined up with French ideas and against Spanish traditions. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a line of dissent sprouted from the ruling "Latin" elite. Although antecedents could be traced to the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the most remarkable was the Cuban José Martí. Caught in New York, during the preliminaries of the Hispanic American war, he felt and witnessed at its highest, Anglo-white supremacy-racism against Latin and Catholic (and also Mestizos) in the South, who began to lose their "Latin" American whiteness to gain the color of U.S. "Latinidad." In this regard, and without forgetting

1848, it was in 1898 that white supremacy discourse was consolidated in the U.S. And there are good reasons why it was so. The Mexico-U.S. war was a war between nations; while the 1898 war was between empires, one in decay and the other on the rise. Hispanics on both sides of the Atlantic lost their whiteness then, one guilty of mixing with the Moors; and the other of mixing with Indians and Blacks. José Martí was and continues to be a canonical figure of “Latin” American dissenters and the foundational figure of Cuban identity. For Cubans, Martí comes before Marx. Marx provided Cubans a tool for the analysis of the logic of capitalism and a socialist (modern and Euro-centered) rhetoric to fight against it. Martí provides Cubans with the arms and tools to fight the coloniality of being infringed upon them by Spanish colonialism first and by U.S. after the 1898 Hispanic-American War.

The second pillar of dissenting figures is Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui. There are some significant differences between him and Martí. When socialism entered “Latin” America at the end of the nineteenth century (with the wave of European immigrants) Mariátegui became very well acquainted with Marx and Marxism, while Martí was acting and thinking at the cross-road of a liberal imperialism on the rise (the US) and the legacies and emancipating ideals of liberalism inherited from the French Revolution. However, one could say that for Peruvians—and for different reasons—Mariátegui comes first and Marx second. Marx provided the Peruvian critical left (leaving aside the experience of Shining Path), with a tool for the analysis of the logic of industrial capitalism and to imagine beyond that and with a

socialist rhetoric to combat the rhetoric of liberal imperial modernity. However, Mariátegui's contribution comes not from applying Marx but from experiencing, sensing, and observing the colonial history of "Latin" America and of Peru. The crux of the matter here is the heavy legacy of Spanish Christian and Catholic colonialism, the deep-rooted, long-lasting, strong presence of indigenous history, language, knowledge, and ways of life and the first decades of the rise of U.S. imperialism after their victory in the Hispanic American War (Mariátegui's most influential writings date from 1920 to 1930 approximately).

Thus, the "Latino/a" in South America is mainly the history of the population from Spanish and Portuguese descent, Creoles and Mestizos who assumed European frames of mind and modes of living, followed in the periphery, the three major macro-narratives of the Enlightenment, in the background of the colonial period during the Renaissance (1500-1800). Creoles and Mestizos men built the nation-state and the economy, since the beginning of the nineteenth century following, in the margins, the guidelines of Liberal political theory (Botana, 1984)⁵ and of Conservatism (e.g., secular conservatism as well as the prolongation and adaptation of Catholicism to the secular changes; Donoso Cortés, 1852; 2000).⁶ José Martí battles all his life, from the age of 15, against Spanish colonialism in Cuba. Mariátegui faced both the legacies of Spanish colonialism engrained in the "republication" State, in Peru and in Latin America, and confronted the growing presence of the U.S. Although Mariátegui most often referred to Hispano-America and Martí to Nuestra America, the idea of "Latin"

America was floating. But it was floating not so much in the subjectivity of people who dwelled in the Spanish-speaking world of the Americas, as it was in the imperial rhetoric of French imperialism assumed by France's state men and the intelligentsia, as well as by their followers in the Spanish colonies or ex-colonies, for whom the transition from colonialism meant detaching from Spanish and Portuguese rules and to embrace British free-market economy and French post-Enlightenment thoughts. All that noise made indigenous people, as well as those of African descent, more and more invisible until the 1970s, a period in which Latino/as in the US began to make their presence felt. Today, the Creole, Mestizo, and immigrant population in South America and the Caribbean, who align themselves with the dissenting tradition inaugurated by José Martí and José Carlos Mariátegui, are already (or are likely to...) join forces with the indigenous movements, the emerging Afro-Andean movement, and with the long tradition of Afro-critical thoughts in the British and French Caribbean. Similarly, the strong presence of intellectual and activist women, toward the end of the 70s and 80s, like Domitila Vargas de Chungara in Bolivia and Rigoberta Menchú in Guatemala, began to break up the "Latinidad" as the logo of the culture, history, subjectivity and political goals a sub-continent that was founded in and by the Spanish colonization of the indigenous population, and the massive slave trade carried out by the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and the British.⁷ The "Latin" mentality of the nation-builders, imitators of European ideas and soldiers of British imperialism, since the nineteenth century (and since the 60s soldiers of U.S. imperialism), contributed

to burying the force of a history that Martí and Mariátegui began to uncover; that Domitila Vargas and Rigoberta Menchú⁸ put on the table from the perspective and experience of indigenous women; and that from CRL James to Sylvia Winters in the British Caribbean; and from the Haitian Revolution to Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon in the French Caribbean, *the embodied history of slavery began to surface*. There is a third line, the Latin American Marxist tradition, whose agents still have difficulty today in bridging a dialogue with indigenous and Afro-thoughts and activism (as demonstrated by the interventions of Carlos Regalado in the First Social Forum of the Americas, Quito, July 25-30, 2004) and with the variegated spectrum of indigenous and Afro-descendant women (as demonstrated by in the intervention of Liliana Hecker in the same Social Forum, Quito, July 25-30, 2004).

Interestingly enough, it is the dissenting line of thoughts, engrained in the colonial history of modernity, and in the Americas (inaugurated by Martí and Mariátegui, and continued by Césaire, Fanon, Sylvia Winters, Domitila de Chungara)—and not in the dissenting line grounded on Marxist thoughts—that make possible the productive dialogue between these complex traditions “beyond Latinidad” in South America and the Caribbean, and “Latino/as” in the U.S. that inaugurated a dissenting path based on the history of the U.S. with Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba.

From this short story one aspect shall be underlined. “Hispanics,” as the official classification from the State administration has it, keeps the links with Europe although, as I would venture, 98% of “Hispanics” are from Latin Amer-

ica. On the contrary, when “Latino/as” des-identified with Hispanics, and made 1848 (the displacement of the U.S. frontier to the South), 1898 (Spanish-American [that is, U.S.] War involving Puerto Rico and Cuba, and to a lesser extent the Dominican Republic) and 1959 (Cuban Revolution—with the added complicity of the case), the links with Europe were cut: Latino/as in the U.S. are from “Latin” American—and not European—descent. The Gordian knot has been cut and an additional “element” has been added to the “Hispanic Challenge” to Anglo identity in the U.S.

III. Why Hispanics Are not White?

For four years now, I have been teaching an undergraduate seminar titled “Why Hispanics Are not White? Globalization and Latinidad.” One of the goals of the seminar is to help students understand that, on the one hand, “Latinidad” in the U.S. is not a national but a global issue that has been configured by the racial matrix that structures the imaginary of the modern/colonial world. How does it work? As I mentioned before, in 1995, historian David Hollinger analyzed “post-ethnic America” and the formation of what he aptly called “the ethno-racial pentagon”: Whites, Hispanics, Native Americans, African Americans and Asian Americans.⁹ By 2004 a new post-9/11 category emerged. This is not the place to go into details, but at the same time it should be kept in mind that the ethno-racial pentagon changed by the emergence of a new social actor in the global and national distribution of racism. Suffice it to say, then, that the ethno-racial hexagon was already pre-announced in 1995, the same year

of Hollinger's book, by the dividing line in Huntington's (in)famous article in *Foreign Affairs*.

Where is the ethno-racial pentagon coming from? It is well known that the "Hispanic" category as the fifth ethno-racial leg was introduced during Richard Nixon's administration, when the immigration from the Third World significantly increased in the U.S. as a consequence of growing dictatorial regimes and the lowering of the poverty line in Latin America as it was increasing in Europe as a consequence of decolonization of Asia and Africa. The restriction of immigration from South America put an end also to the Braseros program that started in the 1920s as a solution for labor supply during and immediately after WWI. The key and interesting point of the ethno-racial spectrum, once "Hispanics" category was introduced, was that Hispanics—on the one hand—were not considered Whites and—on the other—that Hispanics did not belong to the same "foundational" logic of the ethno-racial tetragon: Hispanics did not enter into the spectrum as a "colored race" (whites, blacks, brown or red [Native Americans] and yellow) but as a "darkening brown, religion and language"; that is, as Mestizos, Catholics, and the Spanish speaking. But let's go back in time and trace the history of the ethno-racial configuration, how it became the foundation of the modern/colonial world racial imaginary and how it was transformed to end up with Latinos/as in the colonial horizon of modernity that Huntington perceives as the "Hispanic Challenge."

Between 1500 and 1850 there was no "Latin" America. The territory that was named Tawantinsuyu, Abya-Yala,

Cemanahuac by the people who inhabited it was renamed by Spaniards as “Indias Occidentales.” (According to current theories they came from all over the Pacific coast of what the Europeans, in their Christian cosmology, named Asia but which was not yet recognized as such by the people who were living in the European-invented Asia.) “Indias Orientales” was the name of the area in possession of the Spanish in the Philippines and Molucas. Interestingly enough, the “arrival” of the Spaniards and Portuguese to the coast of Asia, navigating through the Magellan Strait, covered up and silenced the history of the people who, thousands of years before, crossed the Pacific toward the East and populated what—at the moment the Spanish arrived—had its own name. The Spanish and Portuguese, and then the Dutch, French, and British, all contributed to populate Indias Occidentales and the Caribbean Islands with a massive population of African slaves.

Today it is accepted that the earth is divided into six continents, but there are two ways of cutting the pie. In one case, the Americas is one continent (thus, we have Africa, America, Antarctica, Asia, Australia, and Europe). On the other, Europe and Asia are combined (Africa, Antarctica, Australia, Eurasia, North America, and South America). And you too can probably come up with another possible division. It doesn't matter how you do the division; the real issue is that all forms of the division come from a single and basic root: the Christian continental Triad. To make a long story short, the Christian T/O map that Isidore of Seville (570-636) attached to his famous work *Etymologiae* (The Etymologies). In the Christian T/O maps of the Middle

Ages, the earth was divided naturally into three parts and each of them was attributed to one of Noah's sons: Asia to Sem, Africa to Sham, and Europe to Japhet. Obviously, for the Chinese, Indians, Persians, for people in the Mughal and Ottoman empires in the fifteenth century, etc., such a tripartite division of the earth was either unknown or taken as the Christian way to conceive the world. The reason that America became the fourth continent was simply because those who did not know about it and "discovered" it were Christians, and for them the globe was divided into three continents.

In the sixteenth century, America was "incorporated" into the Christian cosmo-graphy and the globe now contained four continents; the Christian triad was thus transformed into the Christian tetragon. Interestingly enough, Bartolomé de Las Casas included, at the end of his *Apologetica Historia Sumaria* (c. 1552), a classification of "four kinds of barbarians." Las Casas did not equate types of barbarians with particular continents, but it is interesting to notice the transformation of the triad into the tetragon in a classification of "barbarians" that was mainly motivated by the Christian encounters with people they did not know, and who were not contemplated in their cosmological schemes. However, who truly translated Las Casas's tetragon (whether intentionally or not) and corresponded races to particular continents, was Immanuel Kant. Kant re-interpreted Las Casas's tetragon and made it more or less coincide with continents and with the skin color of people inhabiting them. Thus, for Kant, yellow people were in Asia; Blacks in Africa; Red (referring to the Indigenous

people) in America, and White people in Europe. Consequently, Europeans in America, as well as their descendants were considered whites in Kant's scheme. His tetragon lasted until the Nixon Era when Hispanics transformed the tetragon into a pentagon. As we know, "Hispanic" classification, issued officially from the State, managed to create a new category of racialized people within the frame of the Kantian tetragon.

Not all people classified by the State as Hispanics, were happy and thankful for such identification. For how come it is the privilege of the State to decide who people are? Why did the State use "Hispanic" as the category for people who came mainly from Latin America and not from Spain? Reasons for such decisions are not always given. But one can guess, based on the history of South America and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean Islands: that either the classification was decided because the officers of the Nixon administration were thinking of Spanish as the official language of most of the countries in South America (although there are as many speakers of Portuguese in Brazil than of Spanish in the totality of Spanish-speaking countries, including the corresponding Caribbean Islands), or a des-identification came from the emergence of political projects (ethnicity, gender, and sexuality) that, from the start, linked des-identification with liberation. And I say *liberation* here instead of *emancipation* for a very particular reason.

The reasons of the State were colonial reasons in identifying a vast and heterogeneous population in the U.S., based on the assumption that all of them speak Spanish and, therefore, if one speaks Spanish as the first language then

one must be Hispanic (in the same way that speakers of English are assumed to be Anglo—which is the identity politics outlined by Huntington). This is the same logic that the Spanish state applied when it decided that those who lived in the lands that the Spanish Crown and Church took by assault were “Indians.” Instead, the reasons that underlined the des-identification with, and de-linking from, the State category of “Hispanics” (and therefore, to be detached from the fifth leg of the ethno-racial pentagon), were for liberation and, consequently, for de-colonization. “Liberation” and “de-colonization” both carry a meaning that “emancipation” doesn’t. “Emancipation” entered the vocabulary of secular Europe in the eighteenth century, and the abstract idea was, in Kantian terms (which he equated with Enlightenment itself), was “man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one’s own understanding without another guidance.” What Kant most certainly had in mind was the emancipation of a particular class, the European bourgeoisie, from the tutelage of the Church and of the Monarchy. But most likely he was also thinking about men and, deducing from his racial pre-judgments (Eze, 1997), white European men, particularly Germans, French, and British, who were for him at the center and the top of the species (see section four of his *Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime*). But “emancipation” acquired a second meaning linked to the “civilizing mission” of the second wave of imperial expansion of England and France, after Napoleon. “Emancipation,” linked to the “civilizing mission” had deadly consequences since the European men became the “giver” who, in his civilizing mission, was helping the “primitives” (the term was introduced by Joseph Francis

Lafitau who died in 1740), just a few decades before the time Kant was writing), to enlighten and emancipate. The “civilizing mission” was then taken around the world (and still continues) under the presupposition that the further away you get from the heart of Europe (which for Kant and then Hegel was Germany, England, and France—and in that order), the less people are “prepared” to reach the beautiful and the sublime and, concurrently, to reach the highs of “European” rationality. “Emancipation,” at that point, slips into genocidal reason, as Enrique Dussel has convincingly argued (Dussel, 1992).¹⁰ The introduction of the concepts of “liberation and decolonization” came precisely from those “primitives” (mainly from the Haitian Revolution and the independence of African and Asian countries after WWII) and, although not using these words, from Martí and Mariategui’s project; and more recently, Indigenous social movements as well as Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Andean). Latinos/as since 1970 began their own projects of liberation and de-colonization thus joining, directly or indirectly, a global network of conceptual (and, therefore, social, political, economic) liberation and de-colonization.¹¹ The main difference between emancipation on the one hand and liberation/de-colonization on the other, is that emancipation is what the White Man “gives” while “liberation and de-colonization” are what the racially, sexually, and economically des-enfranchised—or, better yet, the “damnes” of Fanon (Maldonado-Torres, 2004)—want and have the right “to take.”

Thus seen, Latino/as in the U.S. (and in the colonial horizon of modernity) are not exactly the people labeled as “Hispanic” by the State. According to the U.S. Census Bu-

reau there are around forty million Hispanics, which is a number larger than the population of Colombia or Argentina (around 35 million in each country), and close to the combined population of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. As is the case in all these countries, the Hispanic population is not homogenous in social status, political convictions, sense of self and the community. Not everybody in Bolivia, let's say, support the neo-liberal state, the Indigenous movements, or Marxist syndicalism. However, out of the struggle of Indian people for liberation and de-colonization (because the "generosity" of the State is still deep-rooted in the same logic of the "giver" that justified Christian salvation, Liberal emancipation, Neo-liberal freedom and democracy, Marxist socialist revolution and Islamic universalism), a series of projects for liberation and de-colonization emerged while rooted in the history of racialization and domination of the Indigenous experience, which doesn't assume a one-to-one relation between projects of decolonization rooted in Indian history and experience and Indigenous population. Part of the Indigenous population has joined the project of the Church (in a variety of different missions); others joined Marxist movements; still others work in complicity with peripheral Neo-liberal states. Same can be said about Latino/as. Latino/as project of liberation and decolonization does not necessarily "represent" the 35 million "Hispanics" of the national census!!!! It could or could not. On the one hand, it is up to those that had been classified as Hispanics to join Latino/as project of de-colonization as des-identification and liberation. It is not the task necessarily of Latino/as leaders, to preach the gospel as the Church, Marxists, Lib-

erals and Neo-liberals did and still do. Conversely, Latino/as contribution to decolonization in the U.S. and in their connection with other similar social movements around the world (for which the World Social Forum and the Social Forum of the Americas are becoming a place to “connect”), are not restricted to Latino/as. Here there are two common assumptions that must be dispelled.

One is that if a social movement and decolonizing project emerges from the historical experience of a racialized group it shall—of necessity—be limited to that racial(ized) group. Latino/as or Indigenous political projects are led by Latino/as and Indigenous people, but *not restricted to those who consider themselves Indigenous or Hispanics who see themselves as Latino/as*. I am sure that Huntington will be ready to embrace any non-Anglo volunteer who would like to join his identity-politic political project, in the same way that Neo-liberals will embrace anyone who is ready to accept their belief system as justification for action.

The second is that those who belong to a racialized group have no choice but identify themselves with the political projects of such groups. Thus, if you are Anglo and White, you cannot join a Black, Indigenous or Latino/as project and have no choice but to remain within the identity politics defended by Huntington. Both assumptions imply the need to un-couple political projects (which are elected and selected by the individual) from the social group “arranged” by the State by way of its language of classification, which serves to “manage” the population both nationally and globally. Latino/as, in this respect, are no longer a problem “just” of the U.S. but it is increasingly becoming a

global issue. In that respect, due attention shall be paid to the fact that in nine years, Huntington will have made a significant contribution to invent the Muslim as paramount "challenge" to the Western civilization and as he now is inventing the Latino/as as paramount "challenge" to the U.S.

IV. Back to Huntington's Fears

There is indeed good reason to expel Huntington's fears, whether they are deeply felt or strategically located. The emergence and growing presence of all kinds of Latino/as political and ethical projects present as good a reason to understand Huntington's fears as they help explain and understand the anonymous population he labels "Hispanics." And the real "fear" that Huntington would like to instill (paralleling the hegemony of fear we are living in) is perhaps returning to him as a boomerang, along with the hegemonic system of belief that underlies the rhetoric of neo-liberalism. For, what is at stake in Latino/as critical and political project is that *we* are moving away from the system of belief and the logic in which Huntington has cast both the "challenge" of civilization clashes (in the aftermath of the exhaustion of "civilizing mission" possibilities) and the "Hispanic challenge." We are *de-linking*. And we are *not* de-linking in the terms of Samir Amin who conceived the project several decades ago. Amin's de-linking was *no* more than a fracture; it was only a change of content but not an effort in building of an-other logic, which means telling of an altogether different story—an-*other* story.¹² Amin remained within the modern paradigm of the European enlightenment

and failed to understand that Marxism allows for a dissenting position within the same cosmology in which the dissent is thought out; but it cannot be truly a de-linking.

There is no point in entering Huntington's system and disputing his assertions and forecasts on his terms. It is always possible to make small changes in that mode but it only serves to maintain the existing rules. De-linking means that there are other games in town to play and *we* are no longer without alternative. We are no longer condemned to complaining while staying within the system, playing according to its set rules. The point now is that *other games* are starting to be played, *other rules* are being created and implemented. And that is more than a good reason for the fearsome State and "civil" society to take seriously the fears that Huntington has spelled out for *them*.

The recent events involving the denial of US visa to Tariq Ramadan is another case in point that contests, without entering the rule of the game, Huntington's propagation of fear. Ramadan is not an extremist engineer but a scholar who knows as well the Q'uran and Muslim thoughts, as he knows Western philosophy.¹³ His weapon is knowledge and his strategy is to play a different game. He, as the Latino/as in the U.S., is a Muslim scholar in the West who is contributing to build an-other logic beyond the trap of the cage in which Neo-liberalism and Islamic Fundamentalists (as well as Russians and Chechens) are trapped. Linking and connections between projects that attempt to de-link from hegemonic logic is the way to the future.

We have to recognize "Huntington's Challenge" but *we* shall not play into his logic and only contest his content. *We*

have to start (*we are starting*) from the fact that an-other-world is possible and that *we, engaged in Latino/as ethical, political, and epistemic project* (as well as constructive Islamic ones), have another soup to cook. To look at the future without fear and with courage, cutting the umbilical cord with all kinds of Huntingtons from the right and the left who still play in the post-Renaissance imperial and Christian logic as well as in their new secular, post-Enlightenment version, once again, from the left and from the right. Latino/as ethical, political and epistemic project is one among many, around the planet, working toward an-other world, an-other logic, an-other sensibility celebrating life and love instead of pre-announcing and enacting hatred and death.

Notes

1. The basic thesis of my argument here has been already advanced in previous publications. See, mainly, *Local Histories/Global Designs. Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking*. New Jersey: Princeton U.P., 2000; "The Larger Picture. Hispanics/Latinos (and Latino Studies) in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity," in Jorge J. E. Gracia and Pablo De Greiff, eds. *Hispanics/Latinos in the United States*. New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 99-124; "Coloniality at Large: The Western Hemisphere in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity." *The New Centennial Review*, v. 1, n. 2, p. 19-54, 2001.
2. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004. Of particular interest are Part II, on "American Identity" and Chapters 7 and 9, of Part III. The first is on "Challenges to American Identity" and the second on "Mexican Immigration and Hispanization." This chapter was published as an advance of the book under the title of "The Hispanic Challenge,"

Foreign Policy, March-April 2004, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?storyãid=2495>.

3. The article originally published in *Foreign Affairs* was reproduced with several responses as *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate*. New York: Foreign Affairs, 1996. The book published a couple of years after the article is titled: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
4. Ramon Grosfoguel, *Colonial Subjects. Puerto Rican in a Global Perspective*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
5. *La Tradición Republicana. Alberdi, Sarmiento y las Ideas Políticas de su Tiempo*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1984
6. *Selected Works of Juan Donose Cortés*, translated and edited by Jeffrey P. Johnson. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000.
7. There is by now an extensive bibliography in South America from the perspective of women, Creoles, Mestizas and a few immigrants based in different countries. Of all the work being done, the most interesting from my argument are the ones crossing gender and sexuality with racism. That is precisely where “Latinidad” as masculine and “white” category, began to break apart. See for instance one of the most important collections of articles in this respect is *Ser Mujer Indígena, Chola o Birlocha en la Bolivia Postcolonial de los Años 90*, edited by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui. La Paz, Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1996.
8. For instance, Sonia Saldívar-Hull, *Feminism on the Border. Chicana Politics and Literature*. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2000, in which book Saldívar establishes links with women politics in Latin America.
9. *Postethnic America. Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York: Basic Book, 1995.
10. *The Invention of the Americas. Eclipse of ‘the Other’ and the Myth of Modernity* [1992]. Translated from Spanish by Michael D. Barber, New York: Continuum, 1995.
11. Although not directly related to my argument here, the case of the ex-Soviet Union colonies shall be mentioned. The “socialist revolution” had the same logic than the “bourgeois emancipation” alt-

hough with different logic. The socialist revolutionaries with good "conscience" carried their own civilizing mission with a different content: to civilize the colonies meant for them to "convert" (or impose) socialism, as much as the British civilizing mission attempted to "convert" (or impose) liberal ideas that were being thought out and implemented in Europe. For reasons that I cannot explain here, liberating and de-colonizing projects are not yet visible in either the ex-colonies or States that remained under the Kremlin administration. The case of Chechnya is a particular case that deserves much more than a footnote. For my purpose here it should be kept in mind that, beyond the eighty years of secularism under Soviet rule, Chechens are Muslims in their majority in a State in which Orthodox Christianity has a long history of complicity with imperialism, as long as Catholicism and Protestantism has in the West.

12. There are many instances already around the world in which what I am saying can be substantiated, although this is not the place to expand on it. See Mignolo, "The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference," *SAQ*, v. 101, n. 1, p. 56-96 (Winter 2002); Catherine Walsh, "Interculturality and Coloniality of Power. An Other Thinking and Positioning from the Colonial Difference," in *Coloniality of Power, Transmodernity and Border Thinking*. Edited by Ramon Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and José Saldívar. Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming; Maldonado-Torres, "The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge. Modernity, Empire, Coloniality," in *City*, v. 8, n. 1, p. 29-56 (2004); and, of course, pioneering works such as Frantz Fanon, Abdelkhebir Khatibi, Sayyid Qutb, Gloria Anzaldúa etc.
13. See, for instance, his *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. London: Oxford U.P., 2004; and "Globalization.Muslim Resistances," Union Europea: Editions Tawhid, 2003.

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