

Course Bibliography

I. Citations for readings on the syllabus

Many of the readings on the syllabus come from one of the assigned collections:

Michael DePaul and William Ramsey. *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*. Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols. *Experimental Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, 2008.

The remaining readings, in the order they appear on the syllabus, come from the following sources:

Descartes, selections from *Meditations and Objections and Replies* from: René Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Donald Cress, Hackett, 2006.

Locke, "Clear and Distinct Perception" from *Theory of Knowledge*, edited by Julius R. Weinberg and Keith E. Yandell, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1971.

Melchert, "Analysis" from Norman Melchert, *The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy*, 4th edition, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Ayer, "Are Mistakes about One's Own Immediate Experience Only Verbal" from *Theory of Knowledge*, edited by Julius R. Weinberg and Keith E. Yandell, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1971.

Sellars, "Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" in Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim, editors, *Epistemology: A Foundation*, Blackwell, 2000.

Goodman, "The New Riddle of Induction" from Nelson Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, Harvard University Press, 1983.

Quine and Ullian, from *The Web of Belief*, from W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian, *The Web of Belief*, 2nd edition, McGraw Hill, 1978.

Rawls, selections from *A Theory of Justice*, from John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, 1971.

Chomsky, from *Knowledge of Language* from Noam Chomsky, *Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use*, Praeger, 1986.

Stich and Nisbett, "Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning," from *Philosophy of Science* 47: 188-202.

Frankfurt, "Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," from *The Journal of Philosophy* 66.23: 829-839, 1969.

II. Further readings or readers that cover several topics on the syllabus

Carruthers, Peter, Stephen Laurence and Stephen Stich, eds. *The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents*, Volumes 1-3. Oxford University Press, 2005, 2006, 2007.

Harman, Gilbert. *Change in View: Principles of Reasoning*. The MIT Press, 1988.

Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds. *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*. Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Murphy, Dominic and Michael Bishop, eds. *Stich and His Critics*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009

Nichols, Shaun, ed. *The Architecture of the Imagination*. Oxford, 2006.

- Nisbett, Richard and Lee Ross, eds. *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment*. Prentice-Hall, 1980.
- Stein, Edward. *Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science*. Oxford, 1996.
- Stich, Stephen. *The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation*. The MIT Press, 1993.

III. Secondary and Background Readings

There are two distinct kinds of secondary readings for this course. The first kind are elaborations and extensions of topics we will cover in class, readings that I might have included had there been more time. The second kind are background readings for the philosophical topics discussed, mainly in Part II of the course. The following are just a few suggestions; feel free to talk with me about further readings.

Class	Topic	Further Readings
1-2	Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and X-Phi	Brown, James Robert. <i>The Laboratory of the Mind</i> . Routledge, 1991. Gutting, Gary. <i>What Philosophers Know: Case Studies in Recent Analytic Philosophy</i> . Cambridge University Press, 2009. Sorensen, Roy. <i>Thought Experiments</i> . Oxford University Press, 1992. Williamson, Timothy. <i>The Philosophy of Philosophy</i> . Oxford University Press, 2007.
3	Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle	Ayer, A.J. <i>Language, Truth, and Logic</i> . Dover, 1952. Carnap, Rudolph. <i>The Logical Structure of the World</i> . Open Court Press, 2005. Goodman, "The Significance of <i>Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt</i> ", from <i>The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap</i> , Paul Arthur Schilpp, editor, Open Court, 1997. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i> . Routledge, 1981.
4	The Myth of the Given	Chisholm, "The Myth of the Given" in Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim, editors, <i>Epistemology: A Foundation</i> , Blackwell, 2000. Chisholm, "The Problem of the Criterion" in Steven M. Cahn, editor, <i>Philosophy for the 21st Century</i> , Oxford, 2003. Sellars, Wilfred. <i>Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind</i> . Harvard University Press, 1997. Sosa, Ernest. "The Raft and the Pyramid." In Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim, editors, <i>Epistemology: A Foundation</i> , Blackwell, 2000.
5	Reflective Equilibrium in Science	Bates, Jared. "The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium." <i>dialectica</i> 59.3: 347-356, 2005. Bates, Jared. "Reflective Equilibrium and Underdetermination in Epistemology." <i>Acta Analytica</i> 19: 45-64, 2004. Goldman, Alvin. <i>Epistemology and Cognition</i> . Harvard University Press, 1986.

Class	Topic	Further Readings
6	The Scientific Method	Hempel, Carl. "Laws and Their Role in Scientific Explanation." In Hempel, <i>Philosophy of Natural Science</i> , Prentice-Hall, 1966. Quine, W.V. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In his <i>From a Logical Point of View</i> , Harvard University Press, 1980. Quine, W.V. <i>Word and Object</i> . MIT Press, 1960.
7	Reflective Equilibrium in Ethics	Daniels, Norman. "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> 76.5: 256-282, 1979. Rawls, John. "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics." <i>The Philosophical Review</i> 60.2: 177-197, 1951. Rawls, John. "The Independence of Moral Theory." <i>Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association</i> 48: 5-22, 1974.
8	Reflective Equilibrium in Linguistics	Cappelen, Herman and Douglas Winblad. "'Reference' Externalized and the Role of Intuitions in Semantic Theory." <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> 36.4: 337-350, 1999. Daniels, Norman. "On Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics." <i>Philosophical Studies</i> 37: 21-36, 1980. Hintikka, Jaakko. "The Emperor's New Intuitions." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> 96.3: 127-147, 1999. Jackman, Henry. "Intuitions and Semantic Theory." <i>Metaphilosophy</i> 36.3: 363-380, 2005.
9	Problems with Rationality	Cohen, L. Jonathan. "Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" <i>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> 4: 317-370, 1981. Stich, Stephen. "Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity." Chapter 6 in DePaul and Ramsey. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." <i>Science</i> 185: 1124-1131, 1974.
10	Practical Reasoning	Tversky, Amos, Paul Slovic, and Daniel Kahneman. "The Causes of Preference Reversal." <i>The American Economic Review</i> 80.1: 204-217, 1990. In addition to the other references in Shafir's article, see the popular books listed in §IV, below.
11	Epistemic Relativism	Dretske, Fred. "Epistemic Operators." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> 67.24: 1007-1023, 1970. Gettier, Edmund. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge." <i>Analysis</i> 23.6: 121-3, 1963. Nagel, Jennifer. "Epistemic Intuitions." <i>Philosophy Compass</i> 2.6: 792-819, 2007.

Class	Topic	Further Readings
12	Descriptivism and Direct Reference	Kripke, Saul. <i>Naming and Necessity</i> . Harvard University Press, 1980. Searle, John. <i>Intentionality</i> . Cambridge, 1983. For further readings on descriptivism and direct reference, see any reader in the philosophy of language such as: Martinich, A.P. <i>The Philosophy of Language</i> 5th ed. Oxford University Press, 2008.
13-16	Free Will and Moral Responsibility	Cummins, Denise Dellarosa. "Evidence for the Innateness of Deontic Reasoning." <i>Mind and Language</i> 11.2: 160-190, 1996. Kane, Robert, ed. <i>Oxford Handbook of Free Will</i> . New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Milgram, Stanley. <i>Obedience to Authority; An Experimental View</i> . New York, Harper & Row, 1974. Watson, Gary, ed. <i>Free Will</i> , 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2003.
17	Prospect Theory and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing	Foot, Philippa. "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect." <i>Oxford Review</i> 5: 5-15, 1967. Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk." <i>Econometrica</i> 47.2: 263-291, 1979. Quinn, Warren. "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing." <i>The Philosophical Review</i> 98.3: 287-312, 1993. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty." <i>Journal of Risk and Uncertainty</i> 5: 297-323, 1992.
18	Self-Trust	Cavell, Stanley. <i>The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy</i> . Oxford, 1999. Putnam, Hilary. <i>The Many Faces of Realism</i> . Open Court, 1991. Rorty, Richard. <i>Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature</i> . Princeton University Press, 1979.
19-20	Intentionality	Adams, Fred and Annie Steadman. "Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding?" <i>Analysis</i> 64: 173-81, 2004. Adams, Fred and Annie Steadman. "Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic." <i>Analysis</i> 64: 173-81, 2004. Knobe, Joshua. "Intentional action and side-effects in ordinary language." <i>Analysis</i> 63:190-94, 2003. Knobe, Joshua. "Intention, intentional action and moral considerations." <i>Analysis</i> 64: 181-87, 2004. Knobe, Joshua. "Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation." <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> 16.2: 309-324, 2003.

Class	Topic	Further Readings
21	Philosophical Intuition and Psychology	Gopnik, Alison. <i>The Philosophical Baby: What Children's Minds Tell Us About Truth, Love, and the Meaning of Life</i> . Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009. Kripke, Saul. <i>Naming and Necessity</i> . Harvard University Press, 1980. Putnam, Hilary. "Meaning and Reference." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> 70.19: 699-711, 1973. Searle, John. <i>The Rediscovery of Mind</i> . The MIT Press, 1992.
22	Reflective Equilibrium and the Scientific Method	Fodor, Jerry. <i>Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong</i> . Oxford, 1998. Putnam, Hilary. "Meaning and Reference." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> 70.19: 699-711, 1973.
23-4	Defending Intuition I	Bealer, George. "On The Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge." <i>Philosophical Perspectives</i> 10 (Metaphysics): 1-34, 1996. Burge, Tyler. "Individualism and the Mental." In David Rosenthal, ed., <i>The Nature of Mind</i> , Oxford, 1991. Jackson, Frank. "Epiphenomenal Qualia." In <i>Philosophical Quarterly</i> 32: 127-36, 1982.
28	Intuitions and X-Phi	Sosa, Ernest. "A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy." In Murphy and Bishop, <i>Stich and His Critics</i> .

In addition, for all topics, there are three useful encyclopedias available.

1. The comprehensive and excellent Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) is aimed at professional philosophers. It often has excellent further links. <http://plato.stanford.edu/>
2. The sparser Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) is aimed at graduate students and advanced undergraduates. If you can find a suitable article, it is likely to be more accessible than the corresponding SEP article. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/>
3. In contrast to the SEP and IEP, which are open-access, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy is available only by subscription, so you must get to it through the library's website, if you are not on a campus computer. It is closer to the level of the SEP. <http://www.rep.routledge.com/>

IV. Some recent popular works on rationality and decision-making that might be interesting

- Ariely, Dan. *Predictably Irrational*. Harper Collins, 2008.
 Brafman, Ori and Rom Brafman. *Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior*. Doubleday, 2008.
 Cialdini, Robert. *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. Collins, 2007.
 Marcus, Gary. *Kluge: The Haphazard Construction of the Human Mind*. Houghton Mifflin, 2008.
 Mlodinow, Leonard. *The Drunkard's Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives*. Vintage Books, 2008.
 Schwartz, Barry. *The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less*. Harper Perennial, 2004.
 Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein. *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. Penguin, 2009
 Van Hecke, Madeleine. *Blind Spots: Why Smart People Do Dumb Things*. Prometheus, 2007.

In 2009, we decided to share these ideas with the community as an open source project. The immediate feedback was extremely positive and the project gained a lot of traction. Today - after two years of active development - Play has several versions, an active community of 4,000 people, with a growing number of applications running in production all over the globe. The whole web architecture is fast moving towards real-time processing, and the emerging requirements of today's project profiles mean SQL no longer works as the exclusive datastore technology. At the programming language level we've witnessed some monumental changes with several JVM languages, including Scala, gaining popularity. That's why we created Play 2, a new web framework for a new era. This course is a survey of moral philosophy in the Western tradition. What makes right actions right and wrong actions wrong? What is it to have a virtuous rather than a vicious character? What is the basis of these distinctions? Why should we care about morality at all? Our aim is to understand how some of the most influential philosophers (including Aristotle, Kant, and Mill) have addressed these questions, and by so doing, to better formulate our own views. No prior familiarity with philosophy is required. Fulfills the Ethical Reasoning requirement. Instructor: Prof. Tamar Schapiro schapiro This apparent diversity in intuitions about philosophical matters has been used to challenge the use of intuitions in philosophy to tell us about the nature of things like knowledge and reference. If intuitions about knowledge turn out to exhibit diversity between populations, then this looks to put pressure on a traditional philosophical project.

2.3 Impact of Moral Judgment.

It is common to distinguish between two kinds of judgments that people make about morally significant situations. On one hand, people can make straightforwardly moral judgments (e.g., judgments about moral wrongness, about obligation, about blameworthiness).