

# The Ten Commandments of Good Practices in History of Education Research

**(Red.) Hermeneutik wurde im 19. Jahrhundert als Methode definiert, um den akademisch in Bedrängnis geratenen Geisteswissenschaften wissenschaftlichen Charakter zu verleihen. Später geriet die Idee des Geistes in Verdacht und wurde durch das Konzept des Diskurses ersetzt, dessen methodische Erforschung nun die Diskursanalyse war. Marc Depaepe erinnert jenseits dieser umfassenden Ansprüche daran, dass Forschung auch ein Handwerk ist, das sich besser an ein paar Regeln hält. Als Professor einer katholischen Universität formuliert er diese Regeln in Form von Geboten und stellt sie in dem virtuellen Konzil unterschiedlichster Exponenten der internationalen Bildungsgeschichte zur Diskussion.**

■ Marc Depaepe

1. Thou shalt remember that the history of education is history;
2. Thou shalt write about the educational past;
3. Thou shalt not fret excessively about presentism;
4. Thou shalt not write a history of the present, nor for the present;
5. Thou shalt discourse about discourses;
6. Thou shalt demythologize former narratives and discourses about the history of education;
7. Thou shalt interpret multi-perspectively;
8. Thou shalt develop theoretical and conceptual frameworks from within the history of education;
9. Thou shalt strive for pure wisdom within the context of a cultural approach;
10. Thou shalt teach people and especially teachers in that spirit.

## Explanation

At the request of the editors, I am stating here briefly what are, for me, the most important rules of thumb of good practices in the history of education research. This I am doing on the basis of my many years of research experience

as well as, on the basis of what I have published in several theoretical, methodological, and historiographical articles. I have called these guidelines, set down concisely in the form of propositions, somewhat provocatively «ten commandments» in the hope of stimulating a fruitful discussion. You can find these «commandments» as such at the beginning of the article.

## Proposition #1 The history of education is history

Historical research, including research into the history of education, can be nothing other than «historical». That is by far not so obvious as it may appear. Since the history of education arose in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century in educational training institutes, its objectives were far from the purely historical. History was used primarily for practical educational purposes, such as drawing inspiration and motivation from the examples of the past, as well as theoretical purposes, for example, by providing ideas and conceptions to be used as building blocks for a contemporary theory of education. This «educationalizing» dealing with history led to a kind of «historical pedagogy» [histoire de la pédagogie], conceived as history of educational thought and ideas, and being marginalized in the institutional field with respect to cultural and social historical research. Historians, therefore, generally looked down on the history of education and left it to «pedagogues», with the exception of the history of universities, history of science, and/or history of knowledge, certainly when it concerned the history of primary and pre-school education. Over the last few decades, research in the history of education has become noticeably more «historical», but the differentiations and tensions in the field – often the result of factors external to the science, such as the striving for prestige, status, and power – have, nevertheless, continued. That several historians have been employed over the years in educational institutes has, ultimately, not changed very much. Moreover, being an historian, as such, offers no guarantee at all for the quality of the research nor would it be a *conditio sine qua non* for it. Good research is assessed not so much by the *a priori* qualifications of the researcher but rather by the results. And they are generally related to the meaningfulness of a well-nuanced statement of the question, which, by

means of its possible operationalization in complex sub-questions, is best dealt with in an interdisciplinary team.

**Proposition #2**  
**Its content is the educational past**

What is «educational» in the educational historiography – a term I prefer, also in line with the name of this journal, to the old-fashioned «historical pedagogy» (which could be erroneously read as the striving for an educational theory or practice on the basis of history) – is thus not so much the research method but the content of the specialty. The material object (to express it in the already somewhat older history of science terminology) of our discipline obviously concerns the educational past (while the formal object – see proposition 1 – is precisely «historical» in nature). But since that past took place in a broader social context, the researcher may also not be blind to these wider social and cultural contexts. Education is, as a social institution, interwoven in so many ways with the ideological (by the values, norms, images of man) and intellectual (by the knowledge transmission but also by the production of knowledge and science about education), that collaboration of educators and historians often does not even suffice to chart all this adequately. In the Flemish interuniversity research team (Leuven, Ghent, and Kortrijk), which I have been allowed to lead up to now, there was, therefore, place for researchers of all sorts: historians, art historians, jurists, educational experts, philosophical pedagogues (or philosophers by training), orthopedagogues (special educationalists), anthropologists, theologians, sociologists, psychologists, philologists, cultural and even sports scientists. But even that is not a sufficient condition for good research. Above all, one must avoid shortsightedness and particularism in the starting questions. It is not good when the researcher or researchers are overly involved in the subject of the study. To my mind, a movement, an institution, a stock of ideas is difficult to map historically if the author is a participant. At the very least, a little distance is necessary to be able to look at the past critically. Ultimately, this also applies in relation to time. It does not seem sensible to me to want to take each historical study up to the present, for then contemporary educators, believers, and the proponents as well as their respective antagonists, will inevitably feel threatened.

**Proposition #3**  
**Presentism is not a methodological «sin» but rather an unavoidable condition of research in the history of education**

This is not to say that «presentism» – as contended in the first wave of American revisionism of the early 1960s – is a methodological

fault. Rather, it is the inevitable condition with which the history of education researcher has had to learn to live with. Obviously, we always look back to the past from the present, that is to say, from our biologically but also our culture historically, sociologically, psychologically rooted position. But that does not alter the fact that it remains our task to avoid as much as possible the presentistic and perspectivistic pitfalls that the «viewpoint» from which we look at the past inevitably involves. As researchers into the educational past, we may not let ourselves be led or seduced by the desire to score points.

**Proposition #4**  
**History of education must avoid being a history «of» the present, let alone «for» the present**

In order to be able to understand history, it must, first of all, be contextualized within its own time. And this voyage of discovery into the past assumes, just like that into a foreign culture, a willingness to dialogue with the culture of that past. Admittedly, from the present, frameworks of concepts and diverse conceptual keys have to be developed with which the past can be interpreted and understood. But that is not yet the same as wanting to write a history that interferes with the present and, as the orthodox Foucauldian model seems to prescribe, explicitly has intention of wanting to hazard our own way of being in the present. Intentionally writing in function of the present implies not only the danger of dealing «educationally» with the past – for it would ultimately again be didactic or pedagogical (see Proposition 1) – but also that of wearing blinders. The dialogical relation with the past intended here, proper to every «historiographical operation» (de Certeau) wants precisely, in my opinion, to let the past be fully the past.

**Proposition #5**  
**History of education is, like every history, a discourse about discourses**

With it, injustice is not necessarily done to what Foucault has meant for history in general and for the historiography of education in particular. Quite the contrary. By drawing attention with him to the linguistic aspects of the historiographical operation (what linguistic ideas and concepts really mean, how they arise and evolve, to what the modes they are subject, what power relations they imply, and so on), it becomes clear not only that history is, above all, a narrative science but that it also possesses its own discursive power. It is, often unconsciously, the bearer of a message, the externalization of a social, political, or ideological striving. History is not, as the 19<sup>th</sup> century empiricism and historicism wanted to present it, a reconstruction of how it «really» was but the

endless construction of new, contemporary stories about the past. And as the present changes, these stories are unavoidably filled in differently. Each generation has the task, with all of the means at its disposal (sources, literature, interpretation methods and techniques, historical criticism) of producing from the contemporary position the best story about the past and that obviously implies the «deconstruction» of the existing, often worn-out stories about history. In this sense, the Sisyphean labor of the historical enterprise is always also a little relativizing, sobering, and often even humiliating.

#### **Proposition #6**

**Therefore, demythologizing seems to be a never-ending task in the history of education**

With the deconstruction of existing stories about history, dearly cherished myths about the past are inevitably destroyed. Historical research is, therefore, always a little disturbing because it supposes a critical dealing with what is past. Historical researchers not only pose awkward questions to the comfortable interpretations of the present but they also ultimately show that, in the framework of the behavioral sciences, there is little reason for triumphalism. In contrast to the unchallenged assumptions from contemporary disciplines, which, in their own historical reflections, generally freeze at a kind of «preface history», that is, at a history that presents the development of their won conceptual structures as continuous progress, the history of educational thought and of the educational sciences shows that the route the past has taken took very many inconsequential detours. And that not all of the roads taken have produced boundless improvements. Historical researchers are not the best speakers at jubilees or celebrations because they do not at all say what the party goers or guests of honor want to hear. It is for this reason that they are also readily seen and/or labeled as foulers of their own nests.

#### **Proposition #7**

**The most important aim of the history of education remains interpretation, but interpretation from a multi-perspective point of view**

As such, the educational historiography does not want to judge, let alone to condemn the past. Its primary task is and remains the interpretation of what has occurred in that past, not to call the actors from that past to account, to accuse them, or to make them look ridiculous, or whatever, but to be able to have their thinking and doing better understood. Moreover, this understanding is a necessary condition for being able to «forgive» any «errors» from the past – consider, for example, damaging ideological choices – but I leave

this aside for the moment. In order to expand the interpretation possibilities of the researchers, it is advisable for them to take up as many diverse standpoints as possible in the study of the past. Different «ways of seeing» can lead to multi-layered frameworks of interpretation. Such a change of perspective, moreover, not only yields to an epistemological necessity – our knowledge is necessarily limited by its perspectivism – but also witnesses to intellectual maturity (if, for example, we may believe the developmental psychology of Piaget). All of this ultimately seems so obvious that no learned treatises need to be written about it. The methodology of historical research is, perhaps even more than that of other approaches, pre-eminently that of commonsense. Here, too, applies the adage that the best proof of the quality of the pudding is in the eating.

#### **Proposition #8**

**The interpretative qualities of the research may be improved by developing theoretical and conceptual frameworks from within the history of education**

Rather than continuing to produce countless articles on the nature of research in the history of education, it seems to me to be important that the interpretative qualities of it be enhanced through a greater degree of theoretical awareness. Generally speaking, research into the history of education is still often characterized by a high degree of description of facts. Which need not surprise us, for the idiosyncratic and the special nature of certain developments inevitably attract the attention. Still, a certain striving for theory formation about the structural processes that occurred in the history of education is called for. In certain cases – as in Latin America, for example – this theoretical awareness is there more or less, but for the theoretical models used, it is all too easily plucked out of the existing history of science and cultural historical interpretations that have come about outside of the domain of education. This generally leads to very rough generalizations whereby the empirical material amassed has only to serve to «prove» the value of those coarse-grained models (such as, for example, the Foucauldian normalization paradigm). What the need requires, I would hold, is the production of more fine-grained explanatory models on the history of education from within: specific interpretative schemas that are not at all intended to serve as manuals for contemporary interventions but to introduce more structure (and thereby more insight) into the chaos of the educational past.

**Proposition #9**

**The added value of such a history of education consists of nothing more than pure wisdom – there are no concrete lessons to be drawn from the educational past**

Such a history of education does not envision wagging a finger or providing moralizing wisdom. It ignores the strict performance demands of professional educators and teachers and is, therefore, difficult to be trapped into learning objectives, final educational objectives, developmental objectives, and the like that are to be determined and operationalized beforehand. Its surplus value is situated on another, a higher, more abstract, and, *de facto* also more individual level. The history of education shows in its research not only the relativity of the often overblown rhetoric with respect to the «educational» but also provides impetus to deal with generally complex, sometimes paradoxical or ironic, and often problematic outcomes of the past. The problem is that it is difficult to strive intentionally for this advance in learning, the penalty being making history something other than history. For when history is placed in front of the cart of one or another ideological, political, or educational program, it ceases to be history.

**Proposition #10**

**Nevertheless, such a (cultural) history of education has a place in the education of people in general and in the training of teachers in particular**

The argument that counts in our neo-liberal society is one of economic profitability and utility. This makes the position of cultural historical research, and also education itself, particularly difficult. Investing in it does not yield immediately visible results, certainly not in the terms of practical utility or professional advantage. Still, the historical approach and way of thinking are far from superfluous for our society. It makes itself into a possible dam against the terror of the immediately useful. Historical research, also in the historiography of education, transcends the shortsightedness of our own time by making it clear that this prevailing drive for utility is an element of the long-term process of modernization and thereby, at the very least, holds the door open for a critical corrective that could consist of the cultivation of the culture of the non-utilitarian. Whereby history itself will demonstrate the extent to which this wish does or does not belong to the realm of illusion.

## The gospel according to St Marc

• Gary McCulloch

Marc Depaepe's «ten commandments» of good practices in history of education research are, despite appearances, not tablets of stone but rather the historical gospel according to St Marc. There is much wise counsel here with which I am happy to agree, but I would be tempted to take issue and try to develop a number of points further, including the idea of «history» that he commends as well as the potential contribution of the history of education.

I support Proposition #1, that the history of education is history, but this in itself only takes us so far because there are many types of history and a large number of approaches to it. Depaepe does not clearly define what he means by history, but his preferences become evident at several stages in the argument. Some of these are fairly commonplace, but others are disputed, and when put alongside each other they form a rather curious mixture.

One of the assertions made by Depaepe about the nature of history would be criticized by many historians. For example, under Proposition #2 he notes that: «To my mind, a movement, an institution, a stock of ideas is difficult to map historically if the author is a participant. At the very least, a little distance is necessary to be able to look at the past critically. Ultimately, this also applies in relation to

time.» There are some historians who have taken such a view, but there are many others who have not and do not, and there is a great deal of important and good historical work that examines the recent and contemporary past up to the present. In Proposition #5 Depaepe insists that «History is not, as the 19<sup>th</sup> century empiricism and historicism wanted to present it, a reconstruction of how it «really» was but the endless construction of new, contemporary stories about the past.» Here, though, there is much debate among historians about the nature of historical truth and explanation, and Depaepe is posing the issue only in terms of the more extreme and opposing viewpoints. Proposition #9 asserts that «when history is placed in front of the cart of one or another ideological, political, or educational program, it ceases to be history»; again this would be disputed by many historians.

In other cases, Depaepe's notions of history are fairly conventional but do not seem to link very clearly to his argument as a whole. Proposition #4 suggests that «In order to be able to understand history, it must, first of all, be contextualized within its own time. And this voyage of discovery into the past assumes ... a willingness to dialogue with the culture of the past.» This «dialogical relation with the past» would indeed I think be widely endorsed

among historians, but not all would agree that it necessarily implies an avoidance of the present. Proposition #6 notes that historical research supposes a «critical dealing» with what is past, leading to «deeply cherished myths about the past» being destroyed; again this is a fair point about history, although it does not necessarily follow from Proposition #5 despite the use of the word «therefore» to introduce it. Under Proposition #7, Depaepe argues that «The methodology of historical research is, perhaps even more than that of other approaches, pre-eminently that of commonsense.» In this case, Depaepe is echoing many historians who have been somewhat impatient with methodology, but hardly takes the argument forward in a reasoned manner. Finally, in Proposition #10, the historical approach and way of thinking are held up as «a possible dam against the terror of the immediately useful», which Depaepe argues is prevalent today. This view would be shared by many other historians, although it does not seem to follow comfortably from Proposition #9 which holds that the history of education should not «envison wagging a finger or providing moralizing wisdom».

Depaepe's constructions of history when put together in this way do not appear particularly coherent or consistent, and should certainly not be accepted as representing history as a settled body of knowledge or understanding. It is important for us to remember that the nature of history is problematic and contested, and that in appealing to history we should as historians of education be prepared to engage in the arguments around it. The more standard notions of history that Depaepe puts forward are also not entirely of a piece with each other and do not always follow logically from each other. Moreover, his more contentious claims are in one respect on the conservative wing of current historical thinking and in another way on the radical fringe. His stern warnings about separating the past from the present echo the stentorian tones of old-fashioned types such as the English Tudor historian

Geoffrey Elton. On the other hand, his enthusiasm for the endless construction of new, contemporary stories about the past suggests a flirtation with postmodernist critiques of traditional history. Such divergences heighten a general impression of eclecticism in the overall account.

Depaepe's «ten commandments» deploy history not as an analytical and methodological framework so much as a rhetorical device that provides a stick and a carrot for historians of education. It is a stick to provide warnings and chastisement, and a carrot to raise hopes of redemption. The original sin here is the tradition of «historical pedagogy». It seems that the history of education was tempted to stray from the path of righteousness and has been wandering in the wilderness ever since, further undermined by the associated sins of «the striving for prestige, status, and power». Apparently also we are «led or seduced by the desire to score points». These are strictures that suggest a necessity for us to atone for the sins of our ancestors and to live down our past if we are to be admitted into the promised land. In reality, they are evidence of emotional scarring in a field of study that is driven by insecurities about its identity and its future direction.

I would prefer less of the sackcloth and ashes, and a more inclusive vision. If there is much in our history as a field that might be criticized, we might also point to its successes and achievements, of which there are many. We could also remind ourselves that there is a grand tradition in the history of education that reaches across the diverse constituencies of education, history and the social sciences. This might indicate a common and integrated mission for our field, with a potential to contribute to education, history and the social sciences alike, rather than divergent and competing paths or frameworks. Depaepe does a passable impression of Moses or Isaiah, but surely it is time for the history of education to move on to a New Testament.

## Do we need commandments?

• Rebecca Rogers

As I began to read Marc Depaepe's «Ten Commandments», my first reaction was to wonder whether such assertions were really necessary. Commandments suggest crisis, a need for guidance, the sign of a beleaguered subfield, seeking legitimacy. Do we need to be reminded that the history of education is history, and that the content of this history concerns the educational past? Do we need to be reassured that concern for the present is unavoidable, but that our task is not to study the present? Do we need to be told that the history of education, like all forms of history, is a

discourse about discourses whose interpretation requires a multi-perspective point of view? As I pondered these different propositions, however, and especially as I moved toward the final three, my puzzled expression gradually dissipated. I had, to an extent, seen the light. Not perhaps the light of God, but rather, I saw the usefulness of the exercise. To understand my puzzlement and ensuing illumination a few words of context are necessary.

When I began my graduate work in Paris in 1982, I saw myself as an apprentice historian, interested in education, working on the educational past of

19<sup>th</sup>-century French girls. If I was aware of commandments, they were not these. Instead, I felt more or less consciously, the weight of a specific historiographic tradition and a specific moment: that of the Annales school and its social historical method. Thou shalt quantify, certainly guided me in my initial years in the archives. And, then, as cultural history assumed a greater sway: thou shalt not forget individuals. Thou shalt question identities. When I went on the job market in the United States, newly clothed as a woman's historian, I added: Thou shalt compare girls with boys. When I moved back to France to teach European history at a French university, I changed my historical clothes back to that of the historian of education. My reasons for doing so speak a great deal to my initial puzzlement reading «The Ten Commandments of Good Practices in History of Education Research».

In the United States in the 1990s, women's and gender history was all the rage. I quickly learned North American academics found women's history far more sexy than the history of education. Best then to recognize identities are multiple and adopt the one that provoked interest and debate. Back in France, I discovered a very different institutional and academic environment. Most scholars politely ignored the existence of women's and gender history, and the word «genre» in association with history provoked mere puzzlement. Gender was grammatical not an analytical category to all but a few. Far better then to speak of my interest in education in a country that still basks in the achievements of the Third Republic educational reformers. All French schoolchildren learn who Jules Ferry was and believe he created the conditions for a democratic society thanks to free, secular, and obligatory schooling. I can't think of a single educational reformer whose initiatives made their way into my consciousness during my schooling in the United States, and there is no associated conviction that democracy begins with access to public education.

Claiming authority as a historian of education in France positioned me in a grand tradition. When Pierre Nora published the imposing collection of essays about French *Lieux de Mémoire*, the first volume on the Republic devoted an entire section to «pedagogy», with articles by some of the most prominent French historians of the time. Nora contributed two essays, about the historian and textbook writer Ernest Lavissee and Ferdinand Buisson's dictionary of pedagogy, while Jacques and Mona Ozouf interpreted the classic Republican textbook, *La Tour de la France par deux enfants* (Nora 1984a+b; Ozouf/Ozouf 1984). Later volumes about the Nation pursued this interest in objects of the educational past, be they textbook classics, the *khâgne* (the preparatory programs to enter the grandes écoles), or once again Lavissee as author of *L'Histoire de France* (Nora 1986; Milo 1986; Sirinelli 1986). A cursory perusal of these volumes makes very clear the French have a visceral relationship to

their past and that education plays an important role in that relationship.

As a result, many famous French historians have devoted part of their careers to aspects of the history of education. François Furet worked on the history of literacy, Mona Ozouf has written extensively about the Republican school, and Pierre Nora has done much to write educational figures and educational texts into the grand narrative of French history. Moreover, well known historians of education have made their mark on the profession as a whole. Antoine Prost, probably best known as a specialist in education, is the author of *Douze Leçons pour l'histoire*, that like Depaepe's commandments, seeks to distill for students the rules of the profession (Prost 1996). When I first started teaching the history of education in a French history department, I felt no need to justify the subject of my class, no need to apologize or defend. In short, initially, I felt no need to have recourse to commandments specific to the history of education. Increasingly, however, I referred to Prost's lessons, recognizing many students were not in fact very clear that history is in fact the product of historians, «an endless construction of new, contemporary stories about the past,» as Depaepe writes.

Why then my sense of illumination reading these ten propositions? Why think seriously about the specificity of our task as historians of education today in 2010? I would argue that institutional positioning provides a powerful incentive to defend a method and a positioning with respect to the present. My move from teaching in an American department of history to a French department of history taught me a great deal about the politics of subfields within history. Ironically perhaps, the French disinterest or disdain for women's history is what caused me over the past ten years to reclaim that label more and more; my own writing about theory, method and historiography has been very focused on defending women's and gender history since this continues to be a battle for legitimacy (see Rogers 2007). So while I felt no need for commandments teaching the history of education, the opposite was true for women's history.

But I now teach in an education department, the lone historian among sociologists, philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, or colleagues trained in the «sciences de l'éducation», as the French have baptized the group of academics who work on education. I quickly realized this new setting, and the disciplinary uncertainties that characterized this setting, required new teaching practices. It's from this positioning that I now wish to reexamine why we might very well need commandments to guide us as scholars and teachers.

For the first time in my academic life, I find myself teaching exclusively the history of education. For students studying education in my department, history is a minor field, represented only by me. Moreover, it is a field that is disturbingly unmethodical.

odological compared to sociology and psychology. Grounded in a commitment to empirical research, I adhere to Marc Depaepe's vision when he describes a methodology of «common sense»; I frequently refer in my classes to the historian as artisan, as Marc Bloch argued, or indeed the historian as poacher (thinking of de Certeau). But for students seeking *Science* and method in their study of educational phenomenon, this plea for common sense often does not make sense to them. Increasingly, I have realized I need to be far more clear about what history is and its relationship with time. In this case, however, my concerns are related to teaching history, not specifically the history of education.

For these un-historically minded students, however, there are a number of problems related specifically to education that make certain of Depaepe's commandments highly useful. Most arrive in my class with a set of convictions about the history of education in France imbibed at the bottle, so to speak. Notably they cherish a belief in the republican myth the school has done much to construct: Jules Ferry as champion of the people, liberating schooling from the tyranny of religious ideology; universal schooling and meritocracy as the key to France's grandeur. Their ability to read this historical narrative as interpretation is limited, at best. Oddly, many have no problem repeating the lessons of Bourdieu's sociology of education alongside a portrayal of an inegalitarian past over which the Third Republic triumphed some 130 years ago, thanks to its educational reformers. Although I strive in my lessons to demythologize this vision, most of my students still desperately need to recite commandment number six: thou shalt demythologize former narratives and discourses about the history of education.

Teaching in an education department with scholars and students mostly interested in the present also brings home daily the necessary distance from the present which was much less apparent in a history department. So, for those of us in education departments or teacher-training institutions these commandments make good sense, as they remind us of the ideological power of educational systems and the need to unmask the working of this power in our teaching and scholarship.

My final remarks would like to move beyond good sense, questioning what Depaepe means when he calls for the development of theoretical and conceptual frameworks from within the history of education, and then suggesting the addition of one more commandment that might usefully guide us as researchers and teachers. Since I believe firmly that the history of education is history, I wonder what fine-grained explanatory models he envisions that would be specific to the history of education. This makes me think, for example, of the effort made over thirty years ago by Detlef Müller, Fritz Ringer and Brian Simon to provide such models with respect to secondary education (Müller/Ringer/

Simon 1987). I read about systematization and segmentation with considerable interest at the time, because aspects of these theoretical frameworks helped to make sense of broad changes in educational systems in the past. But ultimately I did not find these frameworks particularly useful in my own work on the emergence of a secondary school system for girls in France. Or rather, I borrowed aspects of their framework, along with frameworks elaborated in other scholarly contexts and argued that this theoretical bricolage helped me make sense of my empirical material. Ultimately, however, the informed reader of my latest book certainly sees more traces of scholarship on gender, and the enduring influence of Foucault and Bourdieu than of segmentation or systematization.

More generally, it strikes me that the areas of research that fall under the title «history of education» are so diverse, including such objects as childhood, schools, teachers, academic disciplines, textbooks, extracurricular organizations, adult education, that I wonder what theoretical framework forged within the history of education could possibly offer the structure Depaepe argues for in our efforts to make sense of the «chaos of the educational past». If Müller, Ringer and Simon attracted attention at the time, it is because their object of analysis was restricted to a specific time period, 1870–1920, and to a specific level of education, the secondary school system. Can one really imagine explanatory models forged within the history of education that would serve broadly the needs of our very diverse constituencies as both scholars and students?

This goal might be justified, I think, if we were to add an eleventh commandment to the list: thou shalt resolutely compare. Boys and girls (of course), but also across national borders, between metropole and colony, between able and disabled, young and old, poor and rich, black and white. The need for comparison, which is inherent to the exercise of history, emerges most clearly, I believe, in teaching when the need to make sense of complexity becomes a form of categorical imperative. Certainly, it is in the classroom that I find myself most consciously reaching for explanatory models that will enable students to anchor overwhelming quantities of information to some sort of interpretive framework. Through comparison, I find students often understand more clearly; without comparison, including with the present, they tend to flounder, particularly when their background and interests are not really historical. In proposing this final commandment I realize I am not exactly breaking new ground. Back in 1903 the sociologist and economist François Simiand, published a famous article *Méthode historique et science sociale* where he wrote: «seule la comparaison rend la détermination et le classement praticable et l'intelligence possible» (Simiand 1903/1987, p. 146). Common sense perhaps, but sometimes common sense bears repeating.

In France today, as the government dismantles teacher training and the future of «les sciences de l'éducation» as departments committed to producing educational research seems threatened, I fear for the future of the educational system. As we spend our time filling out tables indicating how our classes open professional doors and teach professional competencies, I'm more than ever convinced of the need for cultivating non-utilitarian skills (commandment # 10). Yes, the (cultural) history of education has a place in the education of all, and in the training of teachers in particular. Not because the «lessons of the past» can guide us in the present, but because those lessons can tell us about the weight of ideology, the risks of silences becoming discrimination, the importance of reading critically. Now all good history should do this, but the history of education, by its subject, allows us to communicate to our students a form of critical thinking about the historicity of the skills, institutions, teachers, and directives they are experiencing which in the end, I believe, is the most useful lesson we can transmit. And so, yes, we may indeed need commandments, not because the history of education is in crisis, but because education is in crisis.

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## Keine Regel ohne Ausnahme

• Karin Priem

«Das wird sowohl durch eine Untersuchung historischer Episoden als auch eine abstrakte Analyse des Verhältnisses von Denken und Handeln gezeigt. Der einzige allgemeine Grundsatz, der den Fortschritt nicht behindert, lautet: Anything goes. Die Idee einer Methode, die feste, unveränderliche und verbindliche Grundsätze für das Betreiben von Wissenschaft enthält und die es uns ermöglicht, den Begriff «Wissenschaft» mit bescheidenem, konkreten Gehalt zu versehen, stösst auf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten, wenn ihr die Ergebnisse der historischen Forschung gegenübergestellt werden. Dann zeigt sich nämlich, dass es keine einzige Regel gibt, so einleuchtend und erkenntnistheoretisch wohlverankert sie auch sein mag, die nicht zu irgendeiner Zeit verletzt worden wäre. Es wird deutlich, dass solche Verletzungen nicht Zufall sind; ... Einer der auffälligsten Züge der neueren Diskussionen in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftstheorie ist ja die Erkenntnis, dass Ereignisse und Entwicklungen ... nur deshalb stattfanden, weil einige Denker sich entweder *entschlossen*, nicht an gewisse «selbstverständliche» methodologische Regeln gebunden zu sein, oder weil sie solche Regeln *unbewusst* verletzten.»

Paul Feyerabend, *Wider den Methodenzwang*, 1986, S. 21

Paul Feyerabend charakterisiert sein Buch *Wider den Methodenzwang* als provokativen Brief an seinen Freund Imre Lakatos, dessen Tod dazu führte,

dass eine Antwort ausgeblieben ist. Die ursprüngliche Idee, anarchistisches Denken mit rational-strukturiertem Denken in einen Wettstreit treten zu lassen, konnte so bedauerlicherweise nicht mehr verwirklicht werden. Paul Feyerabends Ausführungen, oben in einem kleinen Ausschnitt beispielhaft festgehalten, können dennoch für jedes Regelwerk, auch für ein Regelwerk, das sich teilweise gegen Regeln wendet, eine gute Diskussionsgrundlage sein. Dabei möchte ich gleich beichten (um die religiöse Sprache ebenfalls zu bedienen), dass ich den von Marc Depaepe aufgestellten zehn Geboten im Grossen und Ganzen zustimmen kann. Ich versuche lediglich aus Gründen der intellektuellen Beweglichkeit, gelegentlich Widersprüche und Kommentare zu formulieren. Dabei lese ich Marc Depaepes provokative Enzyklika auch als eine Art paradoxe Intervention wider erstarrte Formeln.

### Zum ersten Gebot

Diesem Gebot stimme ich nicht uneingeschränkt zu. Denn Bildungs- und Erziehungsgeschichte kann auch dazu beitragen, Grosstheorien zu korrigieren und systematisches Wissen zu erzeugen. Dies geschieht vor allem durch die Auswertung höchst unterschiedlicher Quellengattungen. Die Analyse autobiographischer und visueller Quellen kann zum Beispiel dazu beitragen, die Annahme einer Deter-



minierung der Subjekte durch gesellschaftliche Strukturen zu relativieren. Umgekehrt muss aber auch davon ausgegangen werden, dass in den Vermittlungs- und Aneignungsformen kultureller Praktiken – wie zum Beispiel Lesen und Schreiben – strukturelle Bedingungen einer Gesellschaft ebenfalls implizit eingeübt werden. In beiden Fällen stehen aus meiner Sicht durchaus systematische Kernprobleme erziehungswissenschaftlichen Denkens zur Diskussion.

#### *Zum zweiten Gebot*

Das zweite Gebot ist als Arbeitsprinzip der Historischen Bildungsforschung uneingeschränkt zu unterstützen. Gegenstand der Bildungs- und Erziehungsgeschichte ist die Vergangenheit, die wiederum grundsätzlich als fremd und unbekannt anzusehen ist. Um eine reflexive Distanz zu wahren und ideologischen Missbrauch zu vermeiden, ist Methodenvielfalt sowie internationale und interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit in der bildungs- und erziehungshistorischen Forschung wünschenswert (vgl. erstes Gebot).

#### *Zum dritten Gebot*

Es ist richtig, dass wir unsere Forschungsfragen in der Gegenwart finden und dass wir unsere methodologischen Entscheidungen angesichts des vorhandenen Quellenmaterials und aktueller erkenntnistheoretischer Debatten und methodologischer Orientierungen treffen. Wissenschaftliche Beobachtung und Aufmerksamkeit sowie entsprechende Operationen wie zum Beispiel ordnen, einteilen, strukturieren und vergleichen unterliegen häufig aktuellen Forschungsparadigmen, sozialen und politischen Kontexten sowie zeitgenössischen ästhetischen und kulturellen Formeln (vgl. Daston/Galison 2007).

#### *Zum vierten Gebot*

Das vierte Gebot betont erneut, die distanzierte und offene Haltung, die wir gegenüber der Vergangenheit einnehmen sollen. Marc Depaepe postuliert hier ein Prinzip des Dialogs gegenüber dem Fremden sowie ein prinzipielles NEIN zu einem mit dem Lineal gezogenen Verlauf der Geschichte. Sehr überzeugend finde ich den Hinweis auf Michel de Certeau. Dieser Querdenker regt dazu an, dass wir unseren Umgang, unsere Gebrauchsweisen der Historie und ihrer Überlieferungen sowie unsere Fabrikation der Geschichte kritisch hinterfragen.

#### *Zum fünften Gebot*

Hayden White hat mit seiner *Metahistory* (1973, dt. 1991) zeigen können, wie stark Geschichtsschreibung einer «Poetik der Geschichte» unterliegt und damit einen «fiktiven Charakter» aufweist (White 1991, S. 15). Geschichtsschreibung bedient sich einer bestimmten Sprache, sie weist bestimmte Narrative auf und muss sich insofern immer ihrer normativen und strategischen Implikationen bewusst

sein. Darüber hinaus führt natürlich auch Methoden- und Quellenvielfalt zu einer Vielfalt der Geschichten. Dennoch: der Wettstreit der Geschichten, ihre Umformulierungen und Neuinszenierungen des Vergangenen dürfen nicht zum blossen Spiel reduziert werden. Denn es sind Machtfragen und Essentialismen, die Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung wie ein roter Faden durchziehen. Der Wettstreit der Geschichten ist daher nicht beliebig, sondern sollte gerade Analysen der vielfältigen Formen der Macht zum Gegenstand haben.

#### *Zum sechsten Gebot*

Es steht für mich ausser Frage, dass Geschichtsschreibung der ununterbrochenen Befragung von Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung dienen sollte. Dazu gehört auch die Einsicht, dass Geschichte keiner aufsteigenden Linie folgt, dass sie keine geschlossene Logik kennt und dass wir uns ihren Erscheinungsformen immer wieder neu nähern müssen. Siegfried Kracauer kritisiert in seiner 1969 erstmals in englischer Sprache erschienenen *Geschichte – Vor den letzten Dingen* die Einseitigkeit des «deterministischen Prinzips» in der Geschichtsschreibung, welches sich bei genauer Betrachtung «nicht verifizieren» lasse (Kracauer 1969, S. 37). Er spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von der «Magie der Chronologie» (ebd., S. 47), von einer «Fata morgana» (ebd., S. 37), von Verzerrung, Anmassung und einem Ersatz für die «theologische Interpretation der Geschichte» (ebd., S. 44). Dem gegenüber stellt er die Vorstellung von Geschichte als «Reich» des Unvorhergesehenen, Nicht-Kausalen (ebd., S. 39). Geschichtsschreibung ist in den Augen Kracauers daher immer ein «zweischneidiges Unternehmen» (ebd., S. 54), bei dem es intellektuell sowohl um Muster und Zusammenhänge als auch um Widersprüchliches und Unerwartetes gehen soll.

#### *Zum siebten Gebot*

Keine Gegenrede: Eine multiperspektivische und interdisziplinäre Interpretation der Erziehungs- und Bildungsgeschichte und ihrer Quellen ist absolut wünschenswert.

#### *Zum achten Gebot*

Erziehungs- und Bildungsgeschichte soll, das wird hier zum Ausdruck gebracht, weder reines Faktenwissen ausbreiten noch ausschliesslich sozial- oder kulturwissenschaftliche Grosstheorien bestätigen. Es bedarf, und hier möchte ich Marc Depaepe unterstützen, einer theoretischen Aufmerksamkeit, die stärker auf die Eigenart erziehungs- und bildungshistorischer Forschung gerichtet ist. Hier sehe ich in der Erforschung kultureller Praktiken einen Ansatzpunkt, da hier Vermittlungs- und Aneignungsprozesse kultureller und struktureller Bedingungen unmittelbar im Zentrum stehen. Curriculare Inhalte, didaktische Formen, epistemologische Lehren und ihre sozial distinktiven Implikationen, dies sind die Inhalte, an denen die Historische Bildungs-

forschung ihr theoretisches Bewusstsein schulen kann.

#### Zum neunten Gebot

Diesem Gebot habe ich nichts hinzuzufügen (vgl. dazu auch Koinzer/Loeffelmeier 2009).

#### Zum zehnten Gebot

Bildungs- und Erziehungsgeschichte sind Marc Depaepe zufolge Mittel gegen den «Terror des unmittelbar Nützlichen» in einer neoliberalen Epoche, in der Nutzen, Gewinn und Verwertbarkeit an erster Stelle stehen. Geschichte kann insofern die Gegenwart relativieren und – so möchte ich hinzufügen – sie kann zeigen, dass die Bedingungen der Gegenwart veränderbar sind.

#### Kurzes Resümee und elftes Gebot

Keine Regel ohne Ausnahme. Diese Aussage sollte sowohl die Analyse der Vergangenheit leiten als auch unsere Loyalität gegenüber wissenschaftlichen Schulen immer wieder in Frage stellen.

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## Die Zehn Gebote und das Dilemma der Adressaten

• Bernd Zymek

Wer könnte den Zehn Geboten widersprechen? Aber wie bei den Zehn Geboten vom Berge Sinai, die unsere Moral im Alltag bestimmen sollen, so ist es auch bei den *Ten Commandments* aus Leuven, die wir in der Praxis der *History of Education Research* beachten sollen: Sie werfen für die Gemeinde der Gläubigen und die akademische Gemeinde der Bildungshistoriker trotz ihrer Eindeutigkeit durchaus Fragen auf. Wie können die Geboten in den Widersprüchen des Alltags eingehalten werden, was bedeuten sie in konkreten Situationen, wie müssen sie im Wandel der Zeit neu verstanden werden? Zum Glück enthalten die Zehn Gebote einer guten *History of Education Research* aus Leuven auch noch Erläuterungen, die weiter helfen und vieles noch überzeugender machen. Aber wie das so ist bei allen Geboten: auch bei denen, die sie verstehen und beachten wollen, bleiben dennoch ständig Fragen und Zweifel. Hier sind meine:

Wenn ich nur Bildungsforschung (*History of Education Research*) betreiben würde, dann hätte ich es leichter. Dann würde ich mich nur von meinem Berufsethos als Forscher leiten lassen. Dann würde ich immer neue Quellen und Daten sammeln, die alten Quellen immer besser zu verstehen versuchen, dann würde ich multiperspektivisch vorgehen, dann würde ich die Quellen und Daten immer im Kontext interpretieren, dann würde ich mir immer bewusst machen, dass ich Teil eines Diskurses über historische Diskurse bin. Dann würde ich nur in diesem Sinne forschen und diejenigen kritisieren, die das Berufsethos des Forschers nicht (immer) beachten, die an alten Mythen und Interpretationen hängen.

Ich würde mich gern auf diese reine Forschungsarbeit beschränken (und hätte dann ein gutes Gewissen), aber sobald ich nicht mehr nur forsche, sondern meine Forschungsergebnisse in Texte fassen oder gar im Zusammenhang erzählen muss, wenn ich also vom Forscher zum akademischen Schriftsteller werde, dann habe ich Schwierigkeiten und Gewissensnöte, denn dann schaffe ich es nicht mehr, einen lesbaren Text zu verfassen, in dem ich alle ethischen Standards des Forschers beachte. Ich bin hin und her gerissen: Ich würde mich deshalb gern auf die Rolle des Forschers zurückziehen, aber gleichzeitig weiss ich, dass es nicht nur um mein gutes Gewissen als Forscher geht, sondern auch um den Kampf um die Erinnerung, um das kollektive Gedächtnis, also um Konflikte, die in der (akademischen und professionellen) Gemeinde ständig ausgetragen werden. Dann geht es nicht mehr nur um Forschung, sondern auch um Identitätsbildungsprozesse in der akademischen Gemeinde und in den Professionen unserer Studierenden, um Hilfen für deren Orientierung im Berufsalltag. Wie kann ich so schreiben, dass ich den Forscher nicht verrate und doch in diesen kulturellen Kämpfen Gehör finden und verstanden werden kann?

Verschlimmert wird dieses Dilemma noch dadurch, dass in der grösseren Gemeinde, bei den Nicht-Experten, bei vielen Studierenden und in der breiten Öffentlichkeit, weiterhin historische Erzählungen über die Bildungsgeschichte populär sind, die ich (und andere) als Forscher längst als Mythen entlarvt, als fehlerhaft kritisiert haben. Ich leide darunter, dass naive Geschichten, erbauliche Geschichten von wohlmeinenden Männern, tapferen Frauen

und armen Kindern lieber gehört und gelesen werden, als meine Tabellen und Zahlenreihen, die ich mühevoll zusammengestellt habe, obwohl sie (nach meiner Überzeugung) ein treffenderes Bild der Erziehungsgeschichte bieten. Ich kann doch nicht, um in den Konflikten um die kollektive Erinnerung mitmischen zu können, auch solche naive Geschichten erzählen – oder muss ich es doch, damit wir in der akademischen und weiteren Gemeinde noch gehört werden? Und jetzt sollen die Geschichten auch noch so erzählt werden, dass sie in multiple-choice-tests abgefragt werden können? Ich möchte mich am

liebsten in den Elfenbeinturm zurückziehen, so wie die Kollegen der anderen grossen Fraktion, die früher noch der Auffassung waren, dass ein «heiligenmässiges Leben», also ein Leben im Sinne der Gebote, nicht im Alltag, sondern nur im Kloster möglich ist.

Lieber Marc Depaepe, Sie haben mich zwar durch ihre *Ten Commandments of Good History of Education* in meinem Berufsethos bestärkt, aber meine inneren Konflikte im Alltag der kulturellen Kämpfe bleiben.

## Rethinking History of Education: Historiological Issues

• Rosa Bruno-Jofré

It is an opportune time to address not only the place of history of education in the various currents within main stream history, but also the place of theory in history of education. The understanding of what is acceptable to the requirements of standards of historical criticism has been debated vigorously by historians in the last twenty years in a search for a richer understanding of the past. The impact of anti-racist approaches, social semiotics, cultural studies, post-structuralist positions, feminist theories, post-colonial theories, and others, on history of education led not only to new questions, but also to emerging methodological issues to be discussed. Thus, for example, history of education has not been alien to the movement to a generalized attachment to discursiveness that gained prominence in the 1980s.

The rather recent relativist challenge to the basis of historical knowledge under the banner of post-modernism has lost momentum. The main issue in historiology (approaches, themes and concepts underpinning the study of history) is why it is important to know the past – in this case in relation to education – and not whether or not historians can know the past. I am glad a leading and most distinguished historian of education, Marc Depaepe, decided to open the debate on good practices in history of education.

The provocative title *The ten commandments of good practices in history of education* reminds me of the eleven educational creeds, which included Dewey's famous *My pedagogical creed*, published at the end of the nineteenth century, following the request of Ossian Herbert Lang, in *The School Journal* (Bruno-Jofré/Jover 2009). At the time, the notion of belief had been seriously questioned and the scientific method had emerged strongly while religious views still had an important presence in the United States educational scene; all of this in the process of modernization. *The ten command-*

*ments* don't, in my reading, have a religious connotation, but convey with a sense of authority the urgency to rethink what we do in history of education now. This is a time when education once more is profoundly affected by utilitarian policies, faculties of education are abandoning the teaching of history of education in teacher preparation programs in most North American Faculties of Education, and there is a need to develop theoretical tools out of the uniqueness of history of education. Not so long ago, history itself went through a critical process that questioned the very possibility of historical knowledge.

I will address each one of the ten propositions.

Proposition 1, «The history of education is historical», deals with one of the major issues in educational historiography. I wrote somewhere else, relying on Christian Lorenz, that history has a reflexive character and historical narratives define us, but doing and teaching history cannot be subservient to various agendas and goals at the expense of evidence and methods (Bruno-Jofré/Schiralli 2002). It is problematic when the writing of history appears subordinated to ulterior political contemporary goals such as the definition of Canadian identity or national unity or the creation of an European consciousness. The issue here is that the social functions of education may permeate the writing of history of education.

Proposition 2, «And its content is the educational past», raises two important points. One is the relevance of the context when analyzing educational matters and the richness that interdisciplinary approaches bring to history of education. I consider that this is a claim for analytical positions, which have been *often* neglected in favour of a fin-de-siècle militant particularism and, in some cases, the adoption of a somewhat vulgar discourse analysis. The other point addressed in proposition 2 leads us to the various dangers that emerge from lack of

neutrality (which Thomas Haskell differentiates from objectivity, vgl. Haskell 1998) and to the need to distinguish between propaganda and historical scholarship. This proposition encourages a discussion of detachment in the historical enterprise. I think that it would be important to open a dialogue on the postmodern ethnocentric attack on objectivity.

Proposition 3, «Presentism is not a methodological «sin» but rather an unavoidable condition of research in the history of education», deserves more analysis and seems related to proposition 2 and my previous reference to the distinction made by Thomas Haskell between objectivity and neutrality. Furthermore, I would include here a discussion on empirical considerations, evidence and methodological rules, distinction between science and ideology or what Fay refers to as the dialectical tension between the rhetorical and the scientific attitudes in historiography (Fay 1998). While the historical conjuncture will influence our interrogation of the past, a situation which is unavoidable since history has a reflexive character as indicated above and any interpretation is perspectival, history of education may easily be concerned with explaining the present. The latter (an approach normally motivated by the profound political character of education) may lead to a collection of topics, disconnected histories, and to a consequent presentism that neglects processes, continuity, discontinuities, and ruptures – in other words the temporal and spacial dimensions. Paradoxically, consideration of those processes may indeed lead to a rich connection with the present.

Proposition 4, «History of education must avoid being a history of the present, let alone for the present», touches the issue we have been discussing in previous lines. Depaepe puts it in the best possible way: «let the past be fully the past». However, historians should be able to communicate better with the wider public and encourage the public to analyze issues and question historical claims made by the press or by politicians.

Proposition 5, «History of education is, like every history, a discourse about discourses», opens the door for further discussion on the ways Foucault's ideas are integrated as interpretative theories in history of education. It would be pertinent to further the debate on the notion of historical account as the product of a specific discourse as well as on Foucault's understanding of power and knowledge given its impact on history of education. Without this discussion this proposition is somewhat ambiguous. It can be read as a theoretical engagement with discursiveness. The proposition can also be understood as one of the qualities of interpretation in the sense that all interpretation is done from a particular point of view or a particular position, hence its revisability. The latter is not necessary related to discursive theories.

Proposition 6, «Therefore, demythologizing

seems to be a never-ending task in the history of education», is powerful and reinforces the relevance of the role of the historian of education as a public intellectual who, of necessity, will not please her audience, but encourage a critical understanding of the past.

Proposition 7, «The most important aim of the history of education remains interpretation, but interpretation from a multi-perspective point of view», provides a good piece of practical wisdom. I agree with Depaepe that given the nature of education, history of education calls for a multi-perspective, multi-layered framework of interpretation.

In proposition 8, «The interpretative qualities of the research may be improved by developing theoretical and conceptual frameworks from within the history of education», Depaepe attacks one of the major issues in history of education. I would further say that theorization is often reduced to attempts at «proving» the value of models built on simplified Foucauldian discourses of the self and its governance without a critical reading of Foucault's theory of knowledge and science and his notion of truth. However, we need to acknowledge some work in history of education that shows an intelligent integration of Foucauldian theories. The point made by Depaepe is extremely important. We need a theorization rooted in history of education having as an important reference the nature of education and its many facets and inter-relations.

I have addressed Proposition 9, «The added value of such a history of education consists of nothing more than pure wisdom – there are no concrete lessons to be drawn from the educational past», when discussing proposition 4. I would like to add that increased attention to methods of historical inquiry would help avoid subservience to pressing political agendas.

Proposition 10, «Nevertheless, such a (cultural) history of education has a place in the education of people in general and in the training of teachers in particular», is particularly relevant at a time when history of education is practically disappearing from teacher education programs particularly in Canadian Faculties of Education. Stressing generic thinking skills absent from the complex contexts within which historical problems emerge, while suitable for economic purposes and in line with an instrumentalist approach to educational research, can actually have undesirable intellectual weaknesses and politically disempowering consequences.

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## Historians and the Present: On Marc Depaepe's Decalogue

• Toshiko Ito

The year 2009 was packed with commemorations of historical landmark events: the Versailles Treaty, the outbreak of the Second World War, the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall, all had their claims on remembrance. Accordingly, Europe was in a commemorative mood and its media were busy reporting on history and probing related questions of national and European identity. I attended elder statesman Richard von Weizsäcker's reading on the occasion of the publication of *Der Weg zur Einheit (The Path to Unity)*, which reminded me of his celebrated speech of 1985: «anyone who closes their eyes to the past is blind to the present». Weizsäcker holds younger generations accountable not for the past, but for its historical consequences. Deeply impressed, I was reminded of how important it is to connect the past with the present. At the same time, I remain convinced that every historical period is unique and must be understood on its own terms; the historian Leopold von Ranke's observation still holds true that hasty connections between the past and the present need to be resisted. Today, I am as ambivalent about the relation between the past and the present as I was a quarter of a century ago.

In the autumn of 2009, I received the *Ten Commandments of Good Practices in History of Education Research* issued by Marc Depaepe, on which I would like to make a few comments because they caused me to re-consider the relation between the past and the present, and because they also have a bearing on the discussion about historians and the present in Japan. Depaepe urges in the sixth commandment: «Thou shalt demythologize former narratives and discourses about the history of education». Historical researchers, if they stick to their analytical task, cannot be «the best speakers at jubilees or celebrations because they do not at all say what the party goers or guests of honor want to hear». Thus Depaepe embraces von Ranke's position on the relation between the past and the present and reiterates the need to focus on the past, as emphatically distinct from the present, in the first four commandments:

1. Thou shalt remember that the history of education is history

2. Thou shalt write about the educational past
3. Thou shalt not fret excessively about presentism
4. Thou shalt not write a history of the present, nor for the present

These commandments do not, however, alleviate my ambivalence towards the relation between the past and the present, and the tenth commandment, if anything, actually reinforces it: «Thou shalt teach people and especially teachers in that spirit». I don't believe that educators will ever seek a complete separation between the past and the present. How can the tenth commandment be reconciled with the first four commandments?

In real life, a considerable number of educational historians do not only research the history of education, but also teach the history of education to students, who are frequently teacher candidates and occasionally in-service teachers. This occupational duality begets conflicting demands. In their research into the history of education, historians should draw a sharp line between the past and the present. They should respect the past as the past, accept that the past is over, and have the humility to make their analyses answer the spirit of the times they investigate. Students should learn from researchers how to keep a sober distance from the past and how to put the facts of the past into proper perspective. Yet in their teaching, historians also should consciously relate the present to the past. They should be able to perceive the past as the seed from which the present sprang. Students are expected to be aware of the continuity between the past and the present, and apply its lessons to the present. Researchers need to respond to the demands of their fields, while educators need to respond to practical demands. The demands on researchers, thus, can never be reconciled with the demands on educators.

In my own specialisation within the Faculty of Education at a Japanese state university, eighty percent of the students obtain the teacher's certificate (but only approximately thirty percent of them will become teachers), and twenty percent of the students aspire to enroll in the master's course to study further. I feel keenly that the majority of the students expect their courses to be oriented towards practical goals. The students are encouraged in this

expectation by the course evaluation form, which asks them if the contents of a course addressed or spoke to present problems. The evaluation form for courses in the liberal arts explicitly asks if the contents of a given course were related to the present, and in courses that are mandatory for the teacher's certificate, the evaluation form even includes the question if the contents of a course contributed towards improving teaching practices. It is hard not to conclude that the students' preference for utility is aided and abetted by a corresponding institutional bias.

In Japan, the history of education was first introduced as a discipline to educational training institutes in 1872: Every teacher training facility has since been required to offer courses in the subject. *The Normal School Act* of 1886 stipulated that the history of Japanese education and the history of education abroad were required subjects in any teacher training curriculum. In 1892, the contents of these subjects came to be described in detail and included the outline of the history of education as basic knowledge for the teaching profession, famous educators' biographies as a motivational model for the teaching profession, and principles and methodological ideas as a practical basis for the teaching profession. The *Teacher Certification Act* of 1949, however, downgraded the history of education from compulsory to elective status, which means that teachers nowadays can enter their profession without ever having taken a class in the history of education. In actual fact, while the demands of practical relevancy tend to deter prospective teachers from studying the subject, its defenders, in the spirit of the law, claim the subject to be irreplaceable for three reasons:

1. Students will take pride in their future position if they are familiar with the thoughts and practices of great educational thinkers and great educators.
2. Students will develop greater analytical acuity when dealing with today's educational problems if their perspective on the future of education has been enriched by an understanding of its past.
3. Students will attain greater sophistication, which stands them in good stead in the teaching profession, if they understand the history of education and didactics.

Researchers have been engaged in this discussion for a while. In 1956, Japan saw the founding of the *Society for Historical Research of Education*, originally presided by Arata Osada (1887–1961), an internationally renowned researcher on Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. The society started out small, with 104 members, and its purpose of research into the history of education worldwide has branched into three fields since 1960: historical research into Japanese education, Asian education, and Western education. The society has since grown to over 900 members, and its researchers are now supposed not

to deal exclusively with the past, but to relate the past to the present, to look not only for answers to the questions of origin, but to address future directions and current policy making as well. According to the official view, the past continuously and seamlessly evolves into the present. The appropriate understanding of educational problems in the past is, therefore, the unquestionable prerequisite for solving educational problems in the present. It is true that the *Society* has been trying to establish the history of education as an independent academic discipline, but it has pursued its work almost exclusively within the framework of teacher training.

The *Society* reviewed half a century of its work in its fiftieth bulletin, in 2007, and found that the history of education as a discipline has been too dependent on teacher training curricula. The history of education as a subject is secure within the framework of teacher training, as it is protected, in a sense, by the legislation that governs teacher certification. But having been downgraded to elective status and suffering from lack of interest by practically-minded prospective teachers, attendance in courses on the subject has dwindled, and the weight attributed to it continues to diminish. In step with the decline of the subject, the discipline is now looked down upon as synonymous with ivory-tower scholarship. The *Society* recently declared its intention to decouple the history of education from its traditional association with teacher training and join the social sciences and the humanities, but the outcome of this initiative is dubious: while the *Society* boasts an increase in its membership, the number of university positions in the discipline keeps diminishing.

In 1991, a new society was founded, the *Society for the Study of Modern Educational Thought*, which renamed itself to *History of Educational Thought Society* in 1997. In 2008, this new society organized a symposium dedicated to reviewing its activities and positions. Opinion at the symposium turned out to be divided into two main camps.

One party held that the discipline should resolutely resist practical demands. In their opinion, they need to give in to practical demands only if they want to hold on to their power to dominate the educational discussion. However, researchers should not necessarily aim to hold that power; they should courageously decide to be the opposition party. As researchers in the history of education, they should remain free from the practical demands of the present, including the perceived need to determine the course of educational policy-making. Today, historians need to have the courage of their conviction to keep a determined distance from the present. History of education does not aim to learn from the past, but to analyze the past. Future and incumbent teachers can, however, profit greatly from it, because it strengthens their ability to analyze the contemporary situation. In other words, the discipline does not deal with the present direct-

ly, but it can contribute to teacher training indirectly by sharpening the ability to think in historical dimensions.

The other party stressed that the discipline must not betray its obligation to respond to practical issues, but should abandon its subservient relationship with the world of practical affairs. Historians should not continue to play junior partner to the practical realm and offer specious historical disquisitions on issues dictated to them, but grasp the initiative and locate current problems on their own. Once their subservience is abandoned, historians can discover problems of which there is no awareness yet in the practical realm and that otherwise might have gone unnoticed. This party contends that historians engaged in unprejudiced academic research can offer fresh perspectives to the practical realm.

The two parties reason from opposing premises: One party dismisses the demands of the practical realm so that they can tend to their own academic business. The other party welcomes the demands of the practical realm as a touchstone of their ability to set the political agenda. Both parties, however, propose the same strategy: historians simply need to keep their distance from the present, because this distance enables them to contribute to the common good by virtue of their original perspective.

In his Decalogue, Depaepe summarily rejects presentism. He does not regard presentism as a methodological shortcoming, but classes it among the

«unavoidable conditions of research in the history of education» and encourages researchers to «avoid as much as possible the presentistic and perspectivist pitfalls» while devoting themselves to understanding the past on its own terms. In his tenth commandment, however, the reference to the present does not have any negative overtones. This modulation rests on the belief that the devotion to the past – counter-intuitively in the eyes of many – does not lead to the exclusion of the present, but will actually be serviceable to it: «Historical research (...) transcends the shortsightedness of our own time by making it clear that this prevailing driver for utility is an element of the long-term process of modernization and thereby, at the very least, holds the door open for a critical corrective». Depaepe is unwavering in his faith that true dedication to the past, unprejudiced by the needs of the day, will be beneficial to the present.

Regardless, my ambivalence towards the relation between the past and the present remains undiminished. The conflicting arguments for keeping the past and the present apart complicate the relation between the past and the present rather than solve it. What is clear is this: the age in which the history of education had its remit defined by the needs of the teaching profession is over. Are we entering an age in which research, no longer tethered to utility, will be able to contribute all the more effectively to educational policy-making? Hope springs eternal in the human breast.

## An Atheist('s) Manifesto

• Daniel Sergio Friedrich

As the Divine Tables descend upon educational historiography, the Commandments demand a reflection about our practices, while at the same time, about the need for commandments as such. At the risk of already starting with a heresy towards the Divine, I suggest historicizing the terms in which the Commandments engage us, that is, ironically in light of their warning, to historicize their present (and presence).

Perhaps the most salient feature of the Commandments in need of questioning is the clear-cut division they present between past, present and future. The Commandments stipulate that the past shall remain the past, and while presentism is unavoidable, doing a history of the present in order to produce certain effects in the now falls certainly into the realm of sin. Now (pun intended) this presents a problem, as what is considered to be the (educational) past is intimately related to the problems facing the (educational) present. Contrary to the Divine Law, the past is never just the past, and thus it cannot be left to be fully the past.

As the Commandments dutifully note, the (educational) past is chaotic, a space undefined and indefinable in itself. However, the introduction of structure into that past is not merely the effect of the creative genius and disciplinary rigor provided by the historian, but the necessary consequence of his or her intervention. In fact, the past becomes the past as the historical discourses operate upon it, since one of the structures being introduced is the particular notion of temporality that allows the historian to place people and events within a historical narrative. Let us not forget that the past was not always the past, at least not in the ways modern societies understand it, as evidenced by cyclical conceptions of temporality framing the thought and action of different societies past and present. The intervention of a subject that embodies the qualities of the modern agent is a condition of possibility for the establishment of history as a disciplinary field.

Furthermore, it is not only a temporal structure that historians impose upon the «raw material» of

the past. As much as the Commandments may want to avoid a history for the present, it is hard to imagine looking at the past responding to no particular problem. What triggers historical research is always a problem in or of the present, calling on the past in helping to provide interpretations about, for example, the historical limits of the grammar of schooling in the possibilities of reform, or the ways in which the pedagogization of society becomes possible through schooling. I would even go as far as saying that the search for «pure wisdom», the only «added value» of educational historiography, is nothing but a problem of the present, a motivation seeped deep in the need to know in ways that are unique to contemporary epistemological conditions. The task of demythologizing that Depaepe argues for is also composed by a set of problems in the present and a historically inscribed assumption about what is real and what is false. The myths, sometimes central to the conceptions of schooling that circulate both inside and outside academia, can only be understood as in need of refutation as long as they present a problem for the researcher. As Foucault demonstrated with the case of madness, among others, the constitution of an epistemological problem cannot be separated from its constitution as a political problem, and from the production of knowledge and categories that shape both the problem and the field. In this sense, «pure» wisdom is never pure, as «purity» is a political category as much as it is an epistemological one. The myth of maintaining clear disciplinary boundaries is not merely a Commandment but a political-epistemological problem of the present!

All of this is not to say that the past should be the source of moralizing lessons for the present. As the Commandments dictate, embedding history with a sense of morality, be it progressive or regressive, a story of salvation or damnation, transforms history into something different. It is in this sense that the pedagogization of the educational past becomes dangerous, since the search for the morals in the story only allows for a very particular type of narrative to be told, one that continuously confirms these morals. The «cultivation of the culture of the non-utilitarian» is thus a tempting path to virtue. It results from the historicizing of utilitarian epistemologies, exposing them as part of the modernizing process, and provides a salvation from the «terror of the immediately useful». Amen.

But to join the pulpit, however, is not sufficient, for the «useful» travels on different planes that do not necessarily imply utilitarianism. Producing «pure wisdom» could be seen as useful in regards to the purpose of having a more accurate idea of the past under the particular assumptions discussed above. The publication of the Commandments, it is implied, would be useful in achieving an epistemologically sound educational historiography. And a history of the present, I would argue, can be useful in intervening in the present without a moralizing

or prescriptive pedagogy. (Actually, not intervening in the present is not an option, as the production of knowledge in itself is an intervention).

The difference between doing a history of the present, that is of intentionally wanting to «hazard our way of being in the present» – a present that does not present us with a fair, just way of being some of us would happily leave un-hazarded –, and the pedagogization of the past Depaepe is concerned about is of utmost importance. Educators that look at history seeking the morals of the story transform the past into ingredients for a recipe that needs to be followed in order to achieve the perfect future. Through their lens, these lessons are inherent components of the past, and it is just a matter of inverting George Santayana's statement, now barely more than a cliché: «Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it» (Santayana 1905, p. 284). If we remember the past, then and only then will we be able to move forward.

Doing a history of the present does not offer such certainties. The «hazard» introduced by the history of the present that I am speaking about is in the potency of understanding our own selves as products of a multiplicity of «inconsequential detours», the crossing of discursive practices coming from the most disparate sources, and random events that we, within our historically constructed subjectivities, attempt to shape into a meaningful narrative. Its usefulness lies in the possibilities that are opened up upon the process of troubling of those narratives and the shattering of the boundaries that those narratives hold on us. However, there is never a promise of «moving forward», never a certainty about the direction of the future. This is clearly a non-utilitarian usefulness, yet it serves to intervene in the present by means of disruption.

Finally, should historians accept the will to organize knowledge under the assumption that there exist certain rules and standards aimed at protecting its disciplinary purity? I recognize that this is one of the main discursive practices that frame current thought. To evoke Commandments, even if said in a form that mocks prevailing sentiments, may re-inscribe what Benjamin called an «empty time» (Benjamin 2007), that is a sense of progression that is devoid of the presence of the now. This is not to suggest that one can live outside of disciplinary rules and standards, but the very usefulness of the disciplinary guides in the practice of producing knowledge is that they continually require historicizing. That historicizing is to make visible the consensus that demarcates, encloses, and interns what is considered valid and what is not. A set of commandments that descend from above, even with evoking uncertainties within its certainties, allow simple mortals to focus just in the correct following of said commandments, without having to worry about the conditions under which these commandments are intelligible. Yet, if one was to find the knowledge and epistemological practices need-



ed to disrupt or «hazard» the present, one must allow for the playfulness of mind that pushes and denaturalizes the boundaries set in place by the disciplinary rules. That is the paradox of the Commandments: while they may lead some to a prescription on ways of thinking, they also open up the space for the discussion on those very rules. And this is the type of discussion that accepts no Divine law.

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## Zehn Gebote – aber wer schreibt den Katechismus?

• Heinz-Elmar Tenorth

Es mag ein wenig sehr ambitiös (oder zu selbst-ironisch) sein, einige sehr plausible und wahrscheinlich konsensfähige Hinweise zur guten Praxis in der bildungshistorischen Forschung durch Zählweise und Benennung in biblische Höhen zu heben. Einige Rückfragen sind ja sofort unvermeidlich: In welcher Rolle spricht M.D. – als Gott oder Moses, von welchem Berg ist er herabgestiegen, wie sehen die Tafeln aus, die er trägt (droht irgendwo das goldene Kalb und wird er die Tafeln zerschmeissen), verheißt er uns mit den Geboten, wie in der Bibel – Exodus 20,1-21 ist ja der locus classicus – auch für die historische Bildungsforschung den Einzug ins Gelobte Land, schliessen wir mit ihm den Bund? Die Sinai-Pose, das merkt man dann, ist auch für den Historiker eher beschwerlich, man wird wahrscheinlich die Tafeln niedriger hängen müssen. Aber als Provokation mag es durchgehen.

Akzeptiert man nämlich, für einen Kommentar, den Dekalog als Metapher für strikte Regelvorgaben und historisiert man diese Sprech- und Zählweise, dann provoziert der neue belgische Historiographie-Dekalog zunächst einige sehr schöne, gattungsspezifische Fragen. Zehn Gebote sind gut – aber wie sorgt man dafür, dass sie eingehalten werden? Reicht ISCHE und das Review Verfahren von Paedagogica Historica? Auch den Kontext von Sünde, Beichte und Busse werden nicht nur alte Katholiken vermissen. Aber, wer zählt die sieben Todsünden der historischen Bildungsforscher? Ich würde etwa Quellenarmut, Archivvermeidung, falsche Kausalsuggestionen, kontextfreie Analysen, national-kulturelle Fixierungen, Ableitungsargumentation oder Erzeugung narrativer Langeweile als solche vorschlagen<sup>1</sup> (und nebenbei: offenbar hat man bei zehn Geboten drei Übertretungen frei – bleibt also Präsentismus erlaubt?). Vor allem aber bleiben ja das hermeneutische Problem und die damit angesprochenen Fragen; denn selbst der Dekalog versteht sich nicht von selbst (Du sollst nicht töten vs. Du sollst nicht morden?). Insofern: Wer schreibt den Katechismus, den die Kirche bereithält, damit der gute Gläubige sich im Verständnis der

Gebote nicht irrt? Und wenn schon der Laie Bedarf an Erläuterung hat: Wer übernimmt die Rolle der Theologie, nicht nur kirchenhistorisch, sondern dogmatisch?

Marc's knappe Sätze, kaum mehr als dreieinhalb Seiten, können ja schwerlich die Rolle ausfüllen, die sich die Gebote geltungstheoretisch anmassen. Man erkennt zwar den Hintergrund mancher Debatten, Michel Foucault und seine unhistorischen Anhänger kriegen zu Recht ihr Fett ab, Johann Gustav Droysen und Leopold von Ranke, ohne Namensnennung, auch, aber nach langen Diskussionen zwischen Hayden White und Arthur Danto (et tutti quanti), dem alten und neuen Revisionismus, Sammelbänden von Manfred Heinemann bis Sol Cohen, editorischen Leistungen von Frank Simon bis Antonio Novoa sind diese vier Seiten zu wenig. Berühmte Katechismen der jüngeren Zeit, beispielsweise der holländische, den vielleicht der flämische Belgier M.D. in seinem Bestand führt, hat (in der deutschen Übersetzung) 566 Seiten und er geht zu Recht davon aus, dass auch der Dekalog die «Umschreibung, Anwendung, Deutung immer nötig» (Glaubensverkündigung 1966/1968, S. 418) hat (und er nennt zum Glück für die religiöse Praxis nicht die ganzen Bibliotheken, Konzilien und Beschlüsse, die auf 566 Seiten kondensiert verarbeitet werden). Das, was hier für «das Gewissen der Menschheit» (ebd., S. 417) gilt, das darf man für das bessere Ich der pädagogischen Historiographie natürlich auch erwarten. Dogmatische Arbeit, Metahistorie, vielleicht sogar Klassenkampf in der Historiographie-Theorie ist nicht entbehrlich, wenn man zehn Gebote formuliert, sondern notwendig. In zwei Richtungen will ich einen solchen Kommentar versuchen, allerdings ganz pragmatisch, nur an guter Praxis orientiert, und dann eine kleine Randbemerkung für die Praxis und die Praktiker der Bildungshistorie anfügen; denn auch die Dogmatik, die Theologie belegt es, lebt ja vom ständigen Kommentar der Einfälle der anderen.

Meine erste Frage beim Lesen war. Worüber spricht er gar nicht? Erstaunlicher Weise spricht M.D. nicht von den Quellen, die für die pädagogi-

sche Historiographie – oder sagen wir heute doch besser: historische Bildungsforschung, nachdem wir die «Geschichte der Pädagogik» zu den Akten der Identitätstiftenden professionellen und nationalen Narrative abgelegt haben? – notwendig sind. Das ist vielleicht zu nahe am Handwerk, aber an sich hatte ich den gebieterischen Verweis auf die Quellen ziemlich früh erwartet, vielleicht sogar als eigenes Gebot unter den ersten drei (die bekanntlich im Dekalog von Gott handeln, also der ersten Referenz der Gebote, bevor es zum Menschen übergeht, also zur Theorie, wie bei M.D.). Ich riskiere einfach einen Vorschlag (elf wäre dann auch nicht mehr so eschatologisch belastend): Erschliesse systematisch neue Quellen und Archive, solche, die für dein Thema wichtig sind, denn erst damit beginnt bildungshistorische Forschung (nicht schon mit der ableitenden Illustration theoretischer Sätze, die Philosophen in *armchair research* erfinden). Man könnte, im erläuternden Text zu diesem Gebot, in den notwendigen katechetischen Erörterungen, die Erfolge der letzten Dekaden in Erinnerung rufen, den Wert von Zahl und Bild und Material neben Texten unterschiedlichster Gattung (Normen, Reflexionen, Ego-Dokumenten) erläutern und den Sinn für Differenzen und Problemhinsichten schärfen – *good practice* könnte die Konsequenz sein. Der Verweis auf die diversen *turns*, natürlich auf den *linguistic turn*, den ich jetzt im Text erkenne, ist mir schon zu theorienah. Historiographie ist doch zuerst der mühsame Versuch, über eine verstreute, lückenhafte, in sich disparate Überlieferung eine plausible Geschichte zu erzählen und die Überreste so zum Sprechen zu bringen, dass sie gute Quellen werden. Selbstverständlich, sie sollen gute Quellen für ihre Zeit werden, man bringt sie nicht zum Sprechen, wenn man sie in unseren Kontext stellt, obwohl man sie natürlich nur zum Sprechen bringt, wenn man sie nicht nur in ihren Eigenwerten und -welten liest, sondern in einen, ihren historischen Kontext stellt (wobei der Singular sich kaum empfiehlt, weil es angesichts der Überdetermination historischer Ereignisse wohl immer mehrere Kontexte geben dürfte).

Meine zweite Frage angesichts solcher Probleme war: Kann man seine theoretischen Grundannahmen teilen, das, was er über «History» sagt oder über die Vergangenheit? Man nimmt dankbar zur Kenntnis, dass er den Präsentismus als Problem früh einführt, aber dann doch sehr rasch für offenbar unvermeidlich hält. Darüber, über Zeitschematisierungen, lohnt aber die weitere Diskussion. Es geht um die Zuordnung von *Vergangenheit*, *Gegenwart* und *Zukunft*, das ist nicht strittig, aber kontrovers ist doch die Bedeutung der drei Kategorien. Soll man die Pädagogen fragen, die das alltäglich ja auch für ihr Geschäft reklamieren (z.B. Klafki 1958)? Das würde ich eher nicht empfehlen, weil man sich dann sehr rasch die normative Aufladung und pragmatische Recodierung einhandelt, die in diesem Milieu bei Zeitproblemen dominiert: *Tradition*, *Aufga-*

*be und Utopie* lauten zumeist die pädagogisierenden Übersetzungen der Zeitschemata und man landet unweigerlich in der historiographisch wenig sinnvollen Situation, Vergangenheiten binär zu codieren, gute Traditionen von einem belastenden Erbe zu unterscheiden oder Utopien als einzulösende Zukünfte neu ins Recht zu setzen.

Der Umgang mit den Zeitschemata wird leichter und zugleich für präsentistische Aneignung komplizierter, wenn man sich der etwas knappen Rede über die Vergangenheit noch einmal annimmt und sich einiger Vorschläge für Zeitschematisierungen erinnert, die zum Beispiel von Niklas Luhmann vorliegen (Luhmann 1973/1975). Das grundlegende Problem des Historikers steht dabei im Mittelpunkt, dass er es mit vergangenen Gegenwarten zu tun hat, die selbst noch ihre eigenen Vergangenheiten und Zukünfte hatten, ohne dass ihre Zukünfte alle zu noch realisierten Zukünften in späteren Gegenwarten oder gar zu heute noch gegenwärtigen Vergangenheiten wurden; denn natürlich gibt es einen Bruch von Entwicklungen und das Nichteintreten denkbarer Zukünfte genau so wie kontinuierende Entwicklungen, die eine längere Gegenwart haben als viele Zukünfte, die sie begleitet haben. Man rekonstruiert deshalb immer, narrativ, Vergangenheiten als je gegenwärtige Vergangenheiten, auch dann, wenn sie ihre gegenwärtige Vergangenheit nur für den Historiker haben, der über sie schreibt.

Besser als der absteigende Blick in die Geschichte, der immer nur die Vorgeschichte der eigenen Gegenwart sucht, ist deshalb der aufsteigende Blick, der von historischen Vergangenheiten und deren Vorgeschichten und Zukünften, als ihren Nachgeschichten, erzählt – und sich gelegentlich dadurch überraschen lässt, dass die Zukunft einer vergangenen Gegenwart ausgerechnet in die Realität unserer eigenen Zeit mündet. Das mag artifiziell aussehen, besonders dann, wenn man zusätzlich noch berücksichtigt, was notwendig berücksichtigt werden muss, dass nämlich die Zeiten der Objekte der historischen Forschung – Menschen, Institutionen, Diskurse, Materialien, Klassen, Ungleichheit, Fortschritt (etc.) – noch ihre je eigene Zeit haben, die in der jeweiligen Gegenwart als Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen identifizierbar ist. Angesichts solcher Fragen und der erkennbaren Komplikationen, die sie in der Arbeit des Historikers auslösen, sollte man sich vielleicht auch noch einmal der Enthaltsamkeit in Sachen Theorie erinnern, die M.D. zeigt. Neben dem natürlich richtigen Hinweis, diese Theorie im eigenen Revier, das heisst in dem der Analysen des Aufwachsens in Gesellschaften zu suchen, bleibt M.D. doch sehr vorsichtig. Das mag man begrüßen, weil das Erzählen von Geschichten sich offenbar doch nicht in reiner Form als Umsetzung einer historischen Sozialwissenschaft verstehen lässt<sup>2</sup>, aber weitere Suche lohnt bestimmt.

Das führt zu meinem abschliessenden kleinen Hinweis, der angesichts von zehn Geboten vielleicht etwas blasphemisch klingt, aber ernst gemeint ist,

ohne ihn zum Gebot zu erheben. *Pecca fortiter* war in Zeiten der Reformation dann erlaubt, wenn man nur gebührend Busse tat. Sich der Freuden der Abweichung von Geboten zu erinnern, ist deshalb mein letzter empfehlender Hinweis. Gelegentlich präsentistisch denken und sich inspirieren lassen, das kann so viel Freude machen, wie eine Zeit lang nur an Theorie zu denken, und erst dann wieder an Geschichten. Auch nur Quellen zu edieren kann schön sein, ohne eine Interpretation, nur zum Vergnügen des Betrachters, der seinen Sinn darin selbst suchen mag. Es ist doch kein Zufall, dass die Todsünden immer mehr Anhänger haben als die Gebote, und natürlich ein Glück, dass es neben der Busse auch das Vergessen gibt. Gelegentlich muss man deshalb auch aktiv am Vergessen arbeiten. Wer sollte uns, durch besseres Verstehen natürlich, von der Last der Vergangenheit befreien können, wenn nicht der Historiker – das als Vorschlag für das zwölfte Gebot, als Dank an M.D. und zur Befreiung vom Psychoanalytiker, den er zum Glück auch nicht bemüht hat.

#### Anmerkungen

- 1 Unkenntnis oder bewusstes Ignorieren der Forschungslage ist eine wissenschaftlich weiter als in der Historiographie verbreitete Sünde, deshalb zähle ich sie hier nicht – obwohl die Historiker natürlich am besten Hermann Heimpels Grundsatz zu verbreiten wissen «Lesen schützt vor Neuentdeckungen!».
- 2 Man lese für diese Differenz Baberowski 2009.

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An outline built around a THESIS AND SUBTHESES will do the job much better than one that only categorizes information or puts it into chronological order--although topical analysis and narrative also have their uses. In any case, whether you organize by thesis-subthesis, topic, or narrative, your central task is to ask penetrating, interpretive questions of your sources. Therefore structure your outline to let incidental facts recede as supporting evidence, and to emphasize answers to intelligent questions.Â Draw your reader's attention to the points you are making, not to yourself and all the misery and sweat of your process of research and writing. Keep the focus on what you have to say, not on the question of how you hope to develop and say it.