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IDEOLOGICAL CHANGES IDENTIFIED IN AND THROUGH
LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS: WHAT SHOULD STAND FOR
KOREA IN CHINESE, *CHAOXIAN*¹ OR *HANGUO* ?

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Abstract

This paper presents an attempt to explain changes of China's dominant ideology, the socialist ideology identified in and through linguistic expressions. By analysing from a historical perspective the meanings potential of the word Korea with its correlated expressions in Chinese, it highlights how deeply the way of referring to two Koreas has been influenced under the traditional ideology of the Chinese society, manipulated by the communist ideology in socialist China and challenged by less powerful yet emerging ideologies in market-oriented China. With the major linguistic references in Chinese to two political entities in the Korean peninsula, North and South Korea, the paper studies the relationship between ideological changes in modern Chinese society and linguistic expressions that, as part of the system of language, reflect ideological investments in and political implications of the changes. Added with a translation-related case study with a focus of emphasis on the word Korea, it concludes that with a flourishing of cultural pluralism in China, usually a forerunner of political pluralism, less dominant ideologies do compete with the official ideology in various ways and forms, and the competition can be traced and identified in and through linguistic expressions. In other words, given the political and economic dynamics of

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China in the past half century, change of linguistic expressions may indicate, in one way or another, the wax and wane of the Chinese dominant socialist ideology in a dialectical sense.

Keywords: ideology, South Korea, North Korea, linguistic expression, translation

Introduction

China has embarked upon a nation wide project to transform its socialism into a market economy for almost 30 years. The three decades see a gradual but bumpy ideological movement from the hardline socialist ideology to one that endorses a market-based socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. Since change of ideology can be identified in and through language (Kress, 1979, Thompson, 1984, Fairclough, 1989 and Simpson, 1993), the process of ideological change must surely be reflected in or refracted from changes of linguistic expressions.

In the system of language, linguistic expressions as with words in general have histories, which record semantic changes, provide clues to meaning potential in action, and bring out the ideological dimension as one of the factors that have brought about these changes. This paper studies changes of China's dominant ideology, the socialist ideology reflected in and refracted from linguistic expressions. By analysing from a historical perspective the meanings potential of the word Korea with its correlated expressions in Chinese, it highlights how deeply the way of referring to two Koreas has been influenced under the traditional ideology of the Chinese society, manipulated by the communist ideology in socialist China and challenged with the emergence of less powerful ideologies in market-oriented China. A particular focus of this paper is placed on the word choices of the base-word Korea against and along the progress of China's ideological evolution from Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, through Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Important Thought of Three Representations of Jiang Zemin², to socialist market economy with 'Chinese characteristics'.

With the dominant references in Chinese to two political entities in the Korean peninsula, North and South Korea, the paper is intended to shed light on the relationship between ideological change in modern Chinese society and linguistic expressions that reflect ideological investments in and political implications of the change. The central task is to find out, between two different references – *Chaoxian* (Choson) and *Hanguo* (Han Nation) – to Korea, why, when and which one should be ‘selected’ in Chinese society as a legitimate *base word* not only with geopolitical implications but for the ideological purpose.

To explore the intrinsic ideological dimension of its meanings potential, which is a prelude to understanding the complexity of the word and its correlations, the study provides a rundown of Korean history, a history of the word Korea and a summary of the bilateral dynamics between China and Korea to facilitate the comprehension of the investigation. With the groundwork thus laid, the paper is intended to specifically answer the following questions against the changes of China’s ideology: Why was *Chaoxian* (Choson) selected for North Korea and *South Chaoxian* (South Choson) for South Korea from the 1950s to the 1980s? What has constituted the tendency of using *Hanguo* Han Nation instead of *Chaoxian* (Choson) as a base-word in reference to North Korea now? More importantly, how did linguistic confusion over the choices between *Chaoxian* and *Hanguo* occur during the late 1980s and the early 1990s and what did they imply?

The findings are multi-fold, boiling down to four major conclusions that 1) to vie for political and cultural legitimacy and control, different socio-political systems, though under the same cultural umbrella such as two Koreas on one hand and Mainland China and Taiwan on the other, tend to arrive at different linguistic choices for same things; that 2) selection of linguistic choices is part of the process of ideological investment made to control and manipulate people; that 3) the change of a dominant ideology from one status or variation to another does not immediately translate to a corresponding change of linguistic expressions across society thanks partially to inconsistent application of the linguistic expressions involved, and that 4) the presence of

linguistic inconsistency indicates ideological confusion that comes up with resistances from part of the society long overwhelmed by the dynamism of the dominant ideology and challenges by less powerful yet emerging ideologies. The paper argues, based on the findings, that given the fact that the meanings potential of a word not only have an inherent ideological dimension due to its historicization, but also are subject to further influence by social practices and changes, the word Korea and related linguistic expressions can help to identify the trajectory of a dominant ideology, along which its status, whether on the rise or on the decline, can be spotted in a less dissatisfying manner.

Added with a translation-related case study with a focus of emphasis on the word Korea, this study concludes the important role language-in-action plays, which, given its interrelationship with ideology, can either help push forward an ideology or arrest it. Any change of a dominant ideology indicates the change of status quo in ideological struggles, particularly when a society is under transition. Change of linguistic expressions shapes to the no lesser degree social changes, since many of these social changes do not just involve language, but are constituted to a significant extent by changes in language practices (Fairclough, 1992, p. 6). Given the political and economic dynamics of China in the past half century, change of linguistic expressions may indicate, in one way or another, the wax and wane of the dominant ideology in a dialectical sense.

Ideology and Linguistic Expression

By ideology I refer to Simpson's definition that ideology is a set of the tacit assumptions, beliefs and value systems which are shared collectively by communities and social groups (Simpson, 1993, p. 5). From a cultural perspective, however, ideology should also be defined as any attempt to approach politics in the light of a system of ideas or any action-oriented theory that involves assumptions about the "value" of experiences, things, or people or the value on prestige, power, desirability or centrality (Gee, 1999). As the content of thinking

characteristic of an individual, group, or culture, ideology exists in all aspects of our life, social, cultural, economic or political. Fairclough (1989) pithily states that ideology is closely linked to language and the exercise of power is increasingly achieved through ideology in modern society, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language. After all, language is a social reality that “actively symbolizes the social system, representing metaphorically in its patterns of variation the variation that characterizes human cultures” (Halliday, 1978, p. 3).

Shaped in, through and by assertion, negotiation or contest, ideology is manifested in the form of ideas or perspectives, which are more often than not expressed in utterances of words or linguistic expressions. Given the historicizing characteristic of words that gives rise to meanings potential, linguistic expressions, however neutral and apolitical on the surface, encompass an ideological dimension often hidden or unnoticed. Projected onto a right context and from a right angle, its ideological nature can be brought out and its ideological investment exposed.

While the power of ideology shall not be overstated, it inevitably affects no less those who wish to deny its existence than those who openly acknowledge the interests and values intrinsic to various ideologies (Hatim, 2001). The meanings of words or linguistic expressions are integrally linked to social and cultural groups in ways that transcend individual minds (Gee, 1999). Istvan (1989) identifies ideology as a specific form of social consciousness, materially anchored and sustained in social practices, claiming that a “dominant ideology of the established social system forcefully asserts itself at all levels, from the coarsest to the most refined”(p. 10). This assertion points to the fact that more powerful individuals or groups in society can influence less powerful groups through language because “ideology is rather a process than a product, and its function is to produce power in different social domains” (Decker, 2004, p. 7). When an ideology is unequivocally dominant it is accepted as common sense whereby the use of language is standardized to the extent that little discrepancy in linguistic expressions can be observed. On the contrary, linguistic inconsistency

particularly in those political sensitive words and expressions is an indication that the so-called dominant ideology is somehow less dominant, if not strongly challenged by other ideologies.

As language is ideologically oriented for the purpose of both communication and control (Kress, 1979), so are words or linguistic expressions ideologically invested in meanings potential. A linguistic expression, however small as a linguistic component, has the potential to turn itself into a product of ideology. While language-in-action is an active building process in which people uphold, negotiate, or contest ideologies created in and through social activities (Gee, 1999), every member of society seems to hold or accept, to varying degrees, allegiance to competing and conflicting ideologies at the same time and in the same social environment, thus accounting for the reason why the prevalence of a dominant ideology can never remain perpetual. Ideological changes are a consequence of the fact that a dominant ideology is now effectively challenged by one or a group of less powerful ideologies that are on the rise in the social, cultural, economic and political contexts.

“Ideology involves a systematically organized presentation of reality... which, in or through language, involves selection” (Kress, 1979, p.15). Selecting linguistic expressions is an activity of ideological investment as well as presentation; it is part of ideological creativity, which is a material and social fact forced into the framework of the individual consciousness (Thompson, 1984). Given that the meanings of words are uttered as a specific form of social consciousness, which shifts along with social evolution and varies depending on changes of the social, political and economic status of an individual, group or society at large, any change or selection of meaning of words may take on something that in turn takes us to understanding something else. Any change in decision-making about what linguistic choices are to be selected or accepted changes the meanings potential of those particular words, thus representing a change of individual or collective perception of reality where the words are used. Because of the relationship between linguistic expression and ideology, shifts or turns of political ideology

can thus be reflected and identified in and through language or linguistic expressions. Any change of linguistic expressions may indicate, in one way or another, the wax and wane of the dominant ideology of China, which is in transition.

A Few Historical Aspects of the Word Korea

A thumbnail of Korean history

Korea has a long history fraught with dynastic changes, foreign invasions and efforts for reunification. Chronologically, GohChoson (Old Choson) is regarded as the oldest Korean kingdom in Korean history, of which Tan'gun, who emerged from the shadowy prehistoric past around 2333 B.C., is regarded, together with Kija, as one of the two greatest founders. After the sequential demises of the kingdoms ranging from the confederated kingdoms of Samhan (Three Han Nations: Manhan, Chinhan and Pyonhan), down to Three Kingdoms (Shilla, 57 B.C.–A.D.935, Koguryo, 37 B.C.–A.D. 668 and Paekche, 18 B.C.–A.D. 660), to Kaya (42-562) and Unified Shilla Kingdom (618-935), Koryo Kingdom once again unified the peninsula in 918.

In 1392, Koryo Kingdom crumbled, giving way to Choson Kingdom, which held the reins until 1910. Teetering on the verge of Choson Kingdom's collapse Taehan (Great Han) Empire took over in 1897. However, this empire proved ephemeral as in 1910 the whole Korean peninsula had been annexed by Japan. It was not until 1945 when Korea's independence was restored (Radio Korea International).

However, the occupation of Korea in 1945 by the Soviet Union and the United States for the purpose of disarming the Japanese forces at the peninsular north and south of the 38th parallel gave rise to South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948, which, as political products of the time, pitched the camps ideologically different to each other. In Chinese the official name of North Korea is *Chaoxian minzhu renmin gongheguo* (the Democratic People's Republic of **Choson**) which is

shortened for *Chaoxian* (Choson) while that for South Korea is *Dahan minguo* (Great Han Nation), of which the abbreviation is **Han Nation (Hanguo)**. With DPRK standing together with the Soviet Union and China and ROK with the United States, both names were used to claim legitimacy not only for representation of the Korean people and the Korean peninsula, but also for ideological prevalence in the context of Chinese politics.

The story of the word Korea

Words record history with their own histories. Just as Gee's general observation of words at large, the word Korea brings with it as potential situated meanings all the situated meanings it has picked up in history (Gee, 1999). Korea, which generally refers to the Korean peninsula in a geographic sense, appears to be politically neutral *in English*. Without "add-on" directional words such as *north* or *south*, its ideologically situated meanings are kept to a minimal. However, only when this word, together with its correlations, is confronted in Chinese and particularly in the context of Chinese politics, the ideological nature of meaning the word possesses becomes distinct and active.

As for the word Korea, what deserves appreciation first is the prominent linguistic difference in referring to the peninsula between China and the West. In Chinese, there are three legitimate yet competing expressions for Korea in modern times: *Kaoli*³, *Hanguo* and *Chaoxian*, each taking root in different kingdoms along the historical line of Korea⁴. *Kaoli* is the Chinese pronunciation of Koryo, which, as a kingdom, unified the peninsula in its own name and whose ruling house was so intimate with China, the suzerain state, that the Chinese selected and used that name and called it *Kaoli* or Korea in English (Rutt, 1972). Today, though it cannot compete with the other two expressions in contemporary Chinese society, linguistically as well as culturally, Koryo or *Kaoli* is as important as Gohchoson, Choson and Samhan⁵.

While *Hanguo* derives from Taehan Empire and Confederated Kingdom of Samhan, *Chaoxian* as the Chinese name for Korea first

appeared in Chinese historical annals written by late Confucian historians. With Tan'gun long regarded as half a human and half a bear, Kija seems to be a real human, thus becoming the centre of contemporary debates over Korea history. According to the Chinese annals, Gohchoson Kingdom was originally set up by a Chinese called Kija (Qizi).⁶ Kija was great in Korean history because all the cultural achievements that Korea had made pale before his coming (Rutt, 1972, pp. 92-5). The myth of Kija was so eulogized in both histories and ceremonies of the Choson court that Kija's role in introducing civilization was highlighted throughout the history of Korea (Schmid, 1997)⁷.

This said, under the surge of nationalism that swept across the peninsula since the 1970s, the thesis has been popularly accepted, particularly in South Korea, that while Kija Choson and Weiman Choson took up the north of the peninsula with its territory stretching into Manchuria and bordering with Yan State in China, the Samhan – the three Han Nations – came into existence in the south *at the same time*. In other words, Kija Choson and Weiman Choson coexisted with Manhan, Chinhan and Pyonhan that occupied the south of the peninsula. However, Hyung Il Pai (2000), a prominent Korean scholar, has recently put an interesting spin on this part of Korean history in her research as to the co-existence of the kingdoms. With the benefits of other scholars' discoveries, she points out that it was only during the early twentieth century that the sequence of the earliest Korean states – the Samhan (Three Han) of Tan'gun, Kija Choson, Weiman Choson – was introduced in Korean history textbooks. In her words,

In the earliest dynastic sequence, Korea's designated ancestral founders, Tan'gun and Kija, were both introduced as the first sacred ruler and as the Chinese sage of learning. Because Tan'gun and Kija were estimated to have lived at the end of the Shang dynasty, these placements made the chronology of the "Great Han Nation" (*Taehan*) over three thousand years old. (p. 9)

Here unfold one more dimension of the debates over the legitimate yet contesting choice between *Chaoxian* (Choson) and Samhan, the predecessor of *Hanguo* (Han Nation). Both names inherit part of Korean history that is closely intertwined with Chinese history in a linguistic sense, highlighting an on-going ideological struggle that goes beyond the national borders. In other words, the choices of the word in Chinese are invested with nationalism in relation not only to China and Korea on one hand, but also to North Korea and South Korea on the other, thus directly having bearing on China's diplomatic relations with the two entities today. From the perspective of critical culture, the simmering debates show how powerful expressions with their inherent meanings potential can be in evoking social consciousness once their inherent ideological nature is brought out to the fore.

Korea and China

The word Korea is an index of dynamic relations between China and Korea. To appreciate it, one must understand that the two nations could never have developed independent of the other. Korean history is intertwined with Chinese history, and Korean society has long been under the influence of Chinese culture, which was more imported willingly than exported by force. Rutt (1972) succinctly summarises the Chinese influence in Korean culture and throughout Korean history:

As the Korean runs his finger down his spiritual ancestry he comes to Yao and Shun ... , probably the two most famous names in East Asia. Yao was king of China and a contemporary of Tan'gun. Tan'gun was a Korean, and Yao a Chinese, and yet the Korean mentions Yao a hundred times to Tan'gun's once. (p. 98)

Even during the period when the Three Kingdoms at time made bold decisions to launch military assaults against China itself in vigorous pursuit of their expansionist policies of conquest, they showed no

hesitation “in adopting whatever elements of Chinese culture might be needful for its own development” (Lee, 1984, p. 45).

The Korean peninsula has always been considered vital to China’s national interest and security. Chinese emperors had sent troops time and again to crack down those forces, internal or external, mobilized to overthrow the native ruling classes. In the Qing Dynasty, Korea was not only a tributary state to China but a buffer zone against the growing presence of foreign powers, particularly Japan. The Korean government was under the strong influence of Qing China particularly with regard to economic matters and foreign relations (Lee, 1984, p. 275). After Japan had annexed Korea and Chinese troops beat the retreat back to China, many Korean nationalist activists fled to overseas havens. Those who advocated that Korea should attempt to recover its independence by diplomatic means exiled in Shanghai and maintained a covert relationship with China. They organized the New Korea Youth Association and sent its representative to the peace conference in Paris to make an appeal for Korean independence. In April, 1919, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established in Shanghai, China (Lee, 1984, pp. 327-45). All these activities were either condoned or championed by the then Chinese nationalist government, which was later overthrown by the Communist and exiled itself in Taiwan.

To China, the annexation of Korea eventually turned the peninsula into a springboard for Japan’s invasion of China, which is regarded in modern Chinese history as one of the most humiliations suffered at the hands of foreign powers. Later on, the Korean War once again highlighted the strategic importance of Korea and formulated China’s two-Korea policy, which remained more or less unchanged until 1992 when China established diplomatic relations with South Korea. While the Chinese nationalist government in Taiwan kept a close relationship with South Korea, the ties between Communist China and North Korea were forged largely during the anti-Japanese war in the 1930s and 1940s and the Korean War in the early 1950s, which helped reinforce the linguistic prevalence of *Chaoxian* (Choson) over *Hanguo* (Han

Nation) in China.⁸ China's significant geopolitical considerations of the peninsula demonstrate its strong historical attachment, and vice versa. This dichotomy of linguistic development for the two Koreas after World War II is a viable sign that the two divergent social systems worldwide, which, having dominated the two global political camps during and after the Cold War, continue to assert its influence in those involved countries, particularly in China. Taking into account the Chinese historical complex over Korea, it is not hard to comprehend why the Chinese always preferred the expression of *Chaoxian* (Choson) to that of *Hanguo* (Han Nation).

Ideological Choices between *Chaoxian* and *Hanguo*

Politics expressed in language shall never be decoupled from historical and cultural contexts. With changes taking place in both history and culture, the way in which politics is expressed linguistically shall change accordingly. Ideologically, China has arguably experienced three periods since the Communist took power in 1949: Mao's era (1949-1976), Deng's era (1978-1996) and Post Deng's era (1996-present).

While the political ideology of China was Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought in Mao's era, Deng Xiaoping Theory was upheld as the guideline to build up a socialist economy with Chinese characteristics between 1978 and 1996. It was not until 2002 when the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party was revised and updated that a new ideological variation came out in the trio of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and Important Thought of Three Representations. Under its guideline, the party must represent: the most advanced economic forces in society, the most advanced elements of Chinese culture, and the basic interests of the people. The three representations mean in essence that private sector business leaders, once denounced as "capitalist roaders" and terrorised under Mao Zedong in the 1960s, are now seen as an important source of influence. President Jiang Zemin argued that if the Communist Party were to survive, it would have to recruit

capitalists into the Party (BBC News Tuesday, 21 May, 2002, 14:28 GMT 15:28 UK).

The terminological mix-up clearly betrays the three-staged ideological evolution since 1949. The linguistic representation of ideological changes reflected in Korea-related words over the years has thus tagged along the following sequence: the ideological crisis of the late 1970s, which led to the ideological confusion throughout the 1980s, which, in turn, gave rise to ideological contradictions or competitions in a limited yet yawning scope in the 1990s. With each stage overlapping the other and embracing more or less all the ideological elements, the sequential development indicated a prolonged process of consensus building on the top echelon within the Party. Generally speaking, each ideological variation has encountered two divergent attitudes with the changes perceived either as an outrageous departure from Marxism by the left or a disappointment by the right for its failure to grant more freedom across the spectrum of the society (Mohanty, 2003).

However, in the last twenty years, while North Korea is more totalitarian and its economy in tatters China has undergone tremendous economic reforms, in which the orthodox ideology, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought is so diluted that it only remains as an ideological symbol. Just as Joffe describes, "In the era of reform, Marxist ideology has become a dead letter as China moves to a market economy. As a result, ideology is widely disregarded by cadres and people alike, and the prevalent attitude toward it is cynicism" (Joffe, 1999:144). With the growing market economy in China and China's ever-strengthening relationship with South Korea, *Hanguo* as an expression for South Korea, has not only been widely accepted but is becoming popular among younger generations. So popular that it shows a tendency to replace *Chaoxian* as the base-word when the whole peninsula is referred to. People now use 北韓 (North Han) for North Korea, a linguistic phenomenon in a sharp contrast to that of the past where South *Chaoxian* must be used for South Korea.

Given the historical, cultural, geopolitical and ideological reasons, the different expressions for Korea, when used in Chinese and in China,

can not only reflect the Chinese attitude towards Korean history, but, more importantly, manifest China's own ideological behaviour towards the political reality both at home and abroad. In other words, the selection or adoption of one expression over the other, or both of them at different points of time, reflects the extent of the ideological penchant with which modern China has pursued domestic and international politics, particularly in relation to the peninsula. In a broader sense, the choice between *Chaoxian* and *Hanguo* mirrors the historical consciousness, general political attitude and ideological perceptions, considerations and changes of Chinese society.

Chaoxian: a symbolic sign of the communist ideology (1949-1976)

Regarded as the Chinese version of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought trumpeted the prevalence of the East wind over the West, claiming that imperialism was on the brink of total collapse and socialism was crushing through it towards a worldwide victory. The core ideology of Mao was in full swing in China from the 1950s to the 1970s, which freed the Chinese people from what Townsend calls the massive political isolation of the past (Townsend, 1967). In the waves of political campaigns, the masses jettisoned the tradition of political apathy and developed an unprecedented craze for direct political participation, which culminated in the Cultural Revolution.

One of the characteristics of the period was that the press system and the media were placed under the control of the Communist Party. With the power for imparting ideological education, the party and state tried – through a combination of interpretive strategies and administrative regulations – to encode the ideological nature of meaning in linguistic expressions in general and Korea-related words in particular. People were inclined to process these semantic representations merely for political inferences. When referred to the ROK, South *Chaoxian* was the term one must use on public occasions and in private conversations. So politically mesmerized, the masses were bewildered into such a semantic impression and ideological logic

that since the ROK was *South Chaoxian*, it should naturally be part of *Chaoxian*, namely part of the DPRK. The official political attitude in the employment of the word or correlated expressions was explicit: the ROK should not be recognised as a legitimate government. There is no statement more concise and to the point than that made by Kress and Hodge (1979: 23) in highlighting the powerful effect of these “stable expressions” on the public perception:

Here language determines perception in two ways, by creating an alternative world which can only be ‘seen’ in language and by imposing this alternative world, with its apparent solid reality, on the material world, so that we no longer see or believe in the world of physical event.

The semantic mediation and manipulation was further enhanced by derogatory rhetoric in reference to the ROK such as Syngman Rhee’s regime (*zhenquan*), Rhee’s clique (*jituan*) or the US puppet (*kuilei*). The use of the words became so politicised that any incorrect use might be treated as an ideological hazard or political incident and the utterer would face political disgrace. By the same token, the choice between *Chaoxian* and *Hanguo* might also betray or help to identify a special agent dispatched by the exiled nationalist government in Taiwan to undermine China’s ‘socialist construction’. In movies about the Korean War during and after that period of what Saunders calls the “Cultural Cold War” (Saunders, 1999 and Armstrong, 2003), the people of high political consciousness always used phrases such as *Chaoxian zhanzhen* for the Korean War while the anti-communist both at home and abroad were shown using terms such as *Hanzhan* (*the Han War*). The sensitivity of the word adds argumentative force to the statement that, with a potential to evoke social consciousness, words can be used as instruments of power and deception (Sornig, 1989). So linguistically, the selection of the choice between *Chaoxian* and *Hanguo* presented then a kind of demarcation of ideology between communism and anti-communism.

It was not until the end of the 1970s after Mao died and Seoul wooed Beijing for several years (Qian, 2000), the disparaging phrases such as the “Park Chung-hee puppet regime” or the “*so-called* Republic of Korea” gradually disappeared from the Chinese media. Instead, some new expressions such as “South Korean authorities” found their way in. Though less harsh, the expression did not fail to give away the intensity of the political control and ideological orientation by the Chinese government. “South Korean” was still written as South *Chaoxian*; and the word “authorities” reminded Chinese people of and ran a close parallel to “Taiwan authorities”. The implication is stark-naked in that the “authorities” was only qualified in legitimacy as a local government at its best and should logically be under the direct jurisdiction of the central government, which is the DPRK government in Korea’s case and the Communist government in cross straight relations.

Chaoxian or Hanguo: China’s ideological confusion (1980-1990)

The ideological crisis occurred in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, when pragmatism was becoming the dominant ideology in China. Despite his decisive rejection of Mao’s class struggle philosophy, however, Deng retained the core principles of Mao’s theory of New Democratic Revolution: China was in the initial stage of socialism, the central task of which was to develop economy. As a result of Deng’s prescription of Four Cardinal Principles in 1979 as an ideological tool, Mao Zedong Thought was still considered as the orthodox ideology.⁹

Hallmarked by socialist market economy and building socialism with Chinese characteristics, pragmatism focused on state-to-state ties, economic development, national interest and *Realpolitik*. The ascendance of pragmatism advocated by Deng Xiaoping inevitably triggered ideological confusion, which, among other reasons, explained why the development of the bilateral economic relationship between China and South Korea was kept as a “secret,” apart from the fear of provoking North Korea¹⁰. Consequently, the linguistic vagueness in expression of Korea began to emerge, allowing the public more latitude in addressing South Korea in a less ideology-oriented manner. For

instance, after a South Korean sports delegation refused to accept the Chinese translation of its organization, which referred South Korea as *South Chaoxian*, the Chinese host had to hold several rounds of negotiation before coming up with *Kaoli* or *Koryo*, the original Chinese pronunciation of Korea, thus breaking the linguistic impasse in the late 1970s (Hu, 2000).

When the ideological line of Deng Xiaoping was gradually accepted nationwide, the expression *Hanguo* began to tiptoe into a limited number of reference dictionaries as well as internally circulated publications such as the Reference News (*Cankao xiaoxi*) and *The Dictionary for Current International Affairs* (EDGDCIA), one of the few dictionaries designed to enhance cadres' knowledge on international affairs. Written from a typically critical perspective, the dictionary explains that, among other international organizations and related political and economic terms, the agreements and treaties in relation to the Republic of Korea¹¹. The noticeable difference as compared with the past is that the entire names of these agreements and treaties were faithfully translated into Chinese with the ROK written as *Dahan minguo* (Great Han Nation). That aside, *Chaoxian* was still employed as a base-word for both North and South Korea throughout the official media and press.

In fact, Marxism was never officially abandoned in the 1980s as the orthodox ideology lest an overall rejection of it might throw China into social chaos. Swaine (1999) very well analysed the situation then:

The complex process of systemic change that has taken place in China largely under the reforms, has had a major adverse impact on the capacity of the centre to develop the kind of innovative policies needed to overcome its enormous problems, thus casting doubt on the applicability of either the "totalitarian revival" or the "irresistible reform" paradigm. (p. 115)

China was still highly vulnerable to Deng Xiaoping's personal authority and the influence of leaders of the old generation, albeit the prevalence of pragmatism. The vital importance of Deng's role was fully demonstrated in the course and aftermath of the crackdown of the 1989 student demonstration. In the face of the US threat to impose sanctions against China, Deng underlined the fighting spirit of the Chinese Communist. He reminded the Chinese leaders that China was not founded until after twenty-two years of civil wars and three years of the Korean War. The Korean War was, as Deng stressed, a war fought in actuality between China and the United States (Deng, 1993).

Unlike in western countries, the Korean War has never been regarded as the 'forgotten war' in China. Contrarily, the war has been enshrined in contemporary Chinese history as the one in which China ended a century of humiliation dating from the first Opium War and opened a modern era in itself (Tang Tsou, 1963). Deng's speech was immediately interpreted as a call for the Chinese people to believe in socialism and maintain revolutionary optimism to confront the United States (Qiu Guang, 2000). Deng's speech inspired many historians as well as Korean War veterans. Retired or semi-retired high-ranking officers, most of the veterans of the Korean War embarked on writing their memoirs, of which one of the most important chapters was always devoted to the war. Instantly, the works on the Korean War mushroomed across China. The ideological nature of the word Korea, which was just about to fade away, was once again brought back to the political forefront.

In 1992, when China finally agreed to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, Sino-South Korean relations began to help tilt China's two-Korea policy in favour of South Korea. However, the influence of Mao's ideology, which took root both in words and people's minds so deeply and for so long, proved to be too intractable to be eradicated from linguistic expressions. Books, movies and artefacts still doggedly clung to the discourse tinted with yesterday's ideological flavour. Dictionaries can best exemplify the viability of the ideological vestige of the past which, given certain conditions, may put up fights with any competing ideologies, thus leading to more confusions.

The following are just a few examples demonstrating how dictionaries can preserve the influence of the official ideology on the reader a lot longer than expected. In Wang Li's *Ancient Chinese Dictionary* published in 2000 (Wang Li), Korea is defined as nothing more than the title of the Korean nation (1897-1910) or Choson nation. In *A New English-Chinese Dictionary* (EGANECD, 1991), Korea is translated as Choson in Chinese and referred to only as the *Democratic People's Republic of Korea*. In *The English-Chinese Dictionary* (Lu Gusun) which was published in 1993, a year after China established diplomatic relations with the ROK, Korea is defined as 1) the Korean peninsula; and 2) the country (*guojia*) on the peninsula. The semantic meaning of the definition becomes a kind of political guesswork to the reader thanks to the grammatical ambiguity of the word 'country' that doesn't reveal whether the word is in singular or plural form and 'the country' also fails to indicate which country, North Korea or South Korea? In accordance with *A Great Dictionary of Modern Chinese Language*, Korea means *Chaoxian*, which means the combination of both North and South Korea (Wang Tongyi, 1992). The political implications are as consistent and ideological inclination as obvious as before. The definitional quality of linguistic expressions, ensured by such linguistic means as dictionaries and books, is always subject to challenge even though China has changed in all aspects including politics since 1978.

In the 1980s, a civil society, in the broadest sense of the term, was taking shape in China. The development of cultural pluralism was manifested by a variety of cultural/ideological ideas that flourished and competed with the official ideology (Gu, 1999). As a result, the 1990s witnessed another dichotomy of linguistic development in relation to which should be the appropriate expression for Korea. The ideological tolerance for cultural freedom in the decade was unparalleled with the deepening of market economy in China. As Mohanty (2003) observes, though the political process was believed to serve the need for social stability, which was necessary for economic development of China, there was no doubt that political reforms for

greater democracy at every level were very much a part of the contemporary discourse in China.

Putnam (1975) has long argued that meaning is not in the head at all, but in the world. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, imported pop culture noticeably featured by the entertainment media and investments, joint ventures, cars, electric and electronic products, clothes and foodstuffs from South Korea has strengthened the ROK's presence in China, which completely eclipses that of the DPRK. The young Chinese embraces *Hanguo*, both as a national title and as something associated with quality commercial goods and entertainment. The meaning of *Hanguo* is becoming more commercial oriented than ideological. To many, *Hanguo* is a symbol of better life. As a result, South *Han* is used to refer to South Korea in Chinese rather than South *Chaoxian*. Being part of the history, the expressions about Korea are no longer couched in semantic vagueness or ambiguity. Even though the people at the grass roots began to embrace *Hanguo* by disusing South *Chaoxian*, the official presses, largely in the form of veterans' memoirs, official-sponsored books on history, still stubbornly stick to the old rhetoric under that grinding momentum of the official though fading ideology. This opens a new political chapter whereby we see a competition between the official ideology and non-official ideologies unfolding in China.

Ideological Competition, a Case Study from a Translation Perspective

The representation of ideological competition is reflected not only in the wrestling between official ideological considerations at the policy level, but also in non-official ideologies that pose a bottom-up challenge to the dominant official ideology. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the press system was drawn more to market economy than under the Party's control. More and more publishers were attracted to publishing translated Western works in social science and humanities, since these books could both enhance their intellectual reputation and their profit

margin (Gu, 1999). No longer published in the form of “internal reference” or “internal circulation,” translated books were more accessible to the masses at grass roots. Gu (1999) succinctly sums up the dilemma of the party-state on ideological control during the period:

From 1986 onwards, with the deepening of economic reform, most presses were no longer able to ask for subsidies from the state, which meant that they had to assume sole responsibility for their profits or losses. Under the financial pressure, therefore, many presses straightway sold their rights of publishing to various editorial committees run by intellectuals or even private businessmen and basically did not care about the concrete content of their books as long as they were not politically incorrect. (p. 397)

Under this environment a new force of ideology carriers – translated Western works on social/political science – joined, together with others, in the ideological competition China was yet to endure. As part of an emerging civil society, translators are more sensitive towards new ideologies and possible ideological clashes between the old and new, or foreign and domestic. Like all individuals, translators are susceptible to prevalent ideology. Albeit his genuine subscription to the role of mediation and disagreement with any acts or forms of intervention, the translator often finds himself consciously or is found unconsciously leaving behind his ideological footprints across a text-world. More specifically, thanks to his ideological perceptions, the translator is prone to interpret the text on the basis of his own societal, cultural, or political experience in order to believe what he perceives. Translation is in and of itself a representation of social discourse. Just as Fairclough (1989) summarises, “ideology, however, is not inherently commonsensical; certain ideologies acquire that status in the course of ideological struggles, which take the linguistic form of struggles in social institutions between ideologically diverse discourse types” (p.107). To a certain extent, a translation betrays its translator’s ideological tendencies

displayed in negotiating the transfer between a source text and a target text is like crossing a minefield. Given the situation where economic reforms changed the political attitudes of many Chinese individuals, translators have logically become vanguards contributing to the ideological competition.

In writing *Diplomacy*, Kissinger devoted one chapter – The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War – to the Korean War, which was published in 1994 and translated into Chinese in 1998. The publishing house of the book is Hainan Publication House in Hainan Island, one of the few special economic zones established in China in the early 1980s. The interesting thing about the translation is the translators, who are from Taiwan. From a pragmatic perspective, we now understand that linguistic expressions can index and evoke contexts external to the sentence, or types of contexts which may play a role in understanding a shared culture or ideology (Fillmore, 1984, and Setton, 1999). In this sense, a work, particularly a politics-related one by a translator can be described, in no little significant way, as an ideological battlefield where there shall be at least three scenarios. First, s/he entirely complies with the author and surrenders to the author's ideology. Second, s/he disagrees with the author ideologically and shows some inclination to dilute the ideological perspectives of the author. The third scenario is a mix of the first two scenarios, revealing the fact that the translator is torn in between.

Both graduated from the University of Taiwan, one majoring in history and the other in political science, the two translators all have over twenty years of translation experience and published a string of translated books. One of them was the chief editor of the Freedom Times (*ziyou shibao*) at the time when the book (Kissinger 1990) was being translated. There are no reasons to believe that the translators were ignorant of the two different ways expressing Korea between Mainland China and Taiwan, of which the relationship represents another microcosm of the worldwide ideological struggle, as with that between two Koreas. Siding with the West headed by the United States, Taiwan has always referred to Korea as *Hanguo* and North Korea as

North *Han* in direct opposition to the officially designated expression *Chaoxian* in the Mainland.¹² Though diametrically different as Taiwan's dictionaries are from Mainland ones in their respective reference to Korea, there is one shared definition, that is, both sides refer to Korea, once in a geographic sense, as Korean (*Chaoxian*) peninsula.

In the chapter, *The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War* (Kissinger, 1994 and 1998), there are 105 expressions that are related to or correlated with Korea (e.g. Korea, Korean peninsula, North Korea, North Korean Army, South Korea, South Korean Army and the Korean War). In 97 out of the 105 expressions, the translators have used 朝鲜 (Han) rather than *Chaoxian* as base-word. Only in 8 places, shown as follows, Korea/Korean is translated as *Chaoxian*:

1. *Ezhi zhengce de kunjing: Chaoxian* (Choson) *Zhazhen* (Kissinger, 1998)
The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War (Kissinger, 1994)
2. *You Sulian dashi wei chuxi anlihui, xingshi foujuequan, shide Dulumen keyi zuzhi qi kangyu xingdong, yi Lianheguo mingyi chubing, bianchen shi Weierxun zhuyi de "ziyou duikang ducai, shan e shibulianli" de jingshen, rang meijun heli di zai Chaoxian jieru* (Kissinger 1998)
The context provided: By failing to attend the session and to cast the veto, the Soviet Ambassador gave Truman the opportunity to organize resistance as a decision of the world community and justify the American role in Korea in the familiar Wilsonian terms of freedom versus dictatorship, good versus evil. (Kissinger, 1994)
3. *Zai zheyang jingtuiweigu de liannan jumian xia, Chaoxian bando jian bu dao guojia zhanlue liyi, ta de zhuyao mubiao shi zhanshi qinlueze ying shou dao chengfa.* (Kissinger, 1998)
Beset by ambivalence, America perceived no national strategic interest in the **Korean peninsula**; its principal aim was to demonstrate that there was a penalty for aggression. (Kissinger, 1994)

4. *Mao Zedong you liyou renwei, ruguo tab u zai **Chaoxian** zudang Meiguo, ta huoxu jiang zai Zhongguo lingtu shang he Meiguo jiaozhan.* (Kissinger 1998)
Mao had reason to conclude that, if he did not stop America in **Korea**, he might have to fight America on Chinese territory; at a minimum, he was given no reason to think otherwise. (Kissinger, 1994)
5. *Jiuyuefen, meijun Renchuan denglu gaojie, Beihan budui kuitui zhihou, mubiao bian chen "tongyi" **Chaoxian**.* (Kissinger 1998)
After the landing at Inchon in September and the collapse of the North Korean army, the objective changed to "**unification**." (Kissinger, 1994)
6. *Dui zhege yiti zhenzheng de kuangre fenzi shi zai Beijing he Pingrang; **Chaoxian** zhanzhen juedui bu shi Kelimulingong ba meiguo youdao jieru Yazhou zhanzhen, yibian Sulian keyi zai Ouzhou fadong gongshi de yinmou.* (Kissinger, 1998)
The real fanatics on the issue were in Beijing and Pyongyang; the **Korean War** was not a Kremlin plot to draw America into Asia so that it could then attack Europe. (Kissinger, 1994)
7. *"Wo jiu **Chaoxian** chongtu suo zuo de mei yi xiang jueding, dou jinshou yige mubiao: fangzhi baofa di san ci shijie dazhan, yiji ta jiang dui wening shijie dailai de kepa pohuai"* (Kissinger, 1998)
"Every decision I made in connection with the **Korean** conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. (Kissinger, 1994)
8. *Aijixun pinggu meiguo zai **Chaoxian** (Choson) de chengbai, jiu bu zhongshi zhanchang jieguo, er qiangdiao jianli jiti anquan de guannian..."* (Kissinger, 1998)

In measuring America's success in **Korea**, Acheson was less concerned with the outcome on the battlefield than with establishing the concept of collective security: ... (Kissinger, 1994)

The following analysis of the eight examples shows how a non-official ideology contests with the official one at a micro level. Example 1 is the title of the chapter. "The Korean War" is translated as *Chaoxian* War in Chinese instead of the *Han* War, an expression the Taiwanese are accustomed to. The inconsistent use of "The Korean War" shown at the very beginning of the chapter seems to reflect the publisher's political consideration that, since the title is too noticeable and glaring, the Korean War must be translated as "*Chaoxian* War" in Chinese. To the publisher it is as much a gesture of upholding the official ideology as a means of personal protection. To the Taiwan translators their agreement with the publisher appears to be more a commercial compromise than an ideological back off, in that there is no sign that they were arm-twisted into changing *Han* for *Chaoxian* inside and across the chapter.

Example 3 shows that the shared expression of Korean peninsula by both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Likewise, in Examples 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8, *Chaoxian* in Chinese is used contextually to refer to the peninsula, though the word peninsula is not written. It is more in a geographic sense than a political one, just as with the original. However, Example 6 is dubious and baffling, since it is the only time the translators use *Chaoxian* War inside the chapter. The possible explanation is likely to be the fact that the translators may have unconsciously buckled under pressure of the semantic representation of both Beijing, which uses *Chaoxian* instead of *Han* and Pyongyang, which was the capital of Gohchoson and Choson and is the capital of DPRK, or they may have committed a "slip of the pen" in that the words "Beijing and Pyongyang" may be syntactically too close to the expression "the Korean War".

Translation belongs to the domain where languages are in use and meaning potential in action for transfer. Views on translation, particularly translation on Western works on politics are inevitably tied

to the ideological tendency and political consciousness of the translators during the time of translation. In translation, faithfulness is an important element that translators regard as truth in carrying out the language transfer. However, just like “truth” defined by Gee (1999), “faithfulness” is also a matter of taking, negotiating, and contesting perspectives created in and through language in social activities. In this sense, ideology shapes linguistic expression and linguistic expression reflects ideology which, in turn, influences utterers and hearers alike.

This analysis, however superficial, indicates that Marxism is a spent ideology in China, as the society is more oriented towards market economy featured by cost-effectiveness and profit-making, and that, thanks to the attributes of confusion and contradiction, the official ideology no longer dominates as it used to, particularly when civil society has taken shape and new cultural and ideological ideas are allowed to compete even in the form of translation.

Conclusion

The selection of the expressions surrounding Korea has changed according to the ideological variations that have moved from one phase to another in China, highlighting the interrelation and interaction between ideology and linguistic expression. Understanding an expression, just like understanding a sign, is ultimately an act of reference between the expression apprehended and other already known expressions. The so-called understanding is nothing more than an ideology-oriented response to an expression with expressions (Volusinov, 1981). An utterance of an expression does have its ideologically situated meaning potential hidden somewhere. To pull off the meaning potential reveals, in one way or another, the political environment in which competing ideologies will eventually fight out which expression(s) or which ideological nature of meaning of the expression(s) is(are) acceptable, tolerable or forbidden in society. Meaning is after all derived both from what is encoded in words and

grammar and from the inferences drawn in processing these semantic representations in contexts (Setton, 1999). In other words, understanding a linguistic expression or expressions helps us to understand, at least, some dimensions of the political landscape and ideological climate in which expressions at large are shaped and in turn shaping politics and ideology.

Ideology is omnipresent in our society, in which language plays a continuous and comprehensive role of social communication that facilitates the spread of ideologies. Anything ideological possesses meaning that lies beyond what it represents, depicts, or stands for (Volusinov, 1981). Any change of the meaning expressed in language indicates a concomitant change in ideology, and can thus enable us to identify changes, political or economic at a macro level, though not always to the satisfying level as we desire.

Thanks to the rich history, the word Korea has founded quite a few yet active expressions in Chinese, which all have meaning potential to evoke or stir up political sentiments. By analysing the changes of linguistic expressions for Korea in Chinese, we are able to map out the route China has taken in ideology. The fact that the Chinese were confused over how to express themselves means, more often than not, that a prevalent ideology is shifting or being challenged. Confusion results from changes of ideology that not only usher in new linguistic expressions, but also alter meanings potential of old expressions. With a flourishing of cultural pluralism, usually a forerunner of political pluralism, less dominant ideologies do compete with the official ideology in various ways and forms, and the competition can also be traced and identified in and through linguistic expressions. Though it is hard to quantify the degree to which the official ideology has faded in importance, the discussion and analysis help underscore the extent of acceptance or acceptability of a dominant ideology.

Another noticeable phenomenon among the young people in China today is that they tend to use various expressions to refer to the Taiwanese, but “the people from Taiwan *province*,” the expression the old generations used to utter with extreme sensitivity and caution.

Further, the younger generation are inclined to use “the Taiwan government” for the official prescription “Taiwan authorities”. Do they consciously use the expression? Do they know that theirs is at odds with the official one? Have the central government taken any action to stamp it out? If so, how? Does it really indicate that the utterer believes that Taiwan should be independent? Questions can go on. To answer these questions one may resort to the employment of methodologies different to those used in addressing the questions about Korea. One thing shall, however, remain unchanged, that is, linguistic expressions do reflect or refract ideology in a historical and/or cultural context.

Notes

1. According to *Pinyin*, a guide to the writing and pronunciation of modern Mandarin Chinese in Romanization, Korea should be written as *Chaoxian* rather than Choson. However, Choson is also used as it is used in Korea for the purpose of understanding the history of the word from the perspective of Korean history.
2. In the post-Deng period President Jiang Zemin and the leadership of the third generation developed Deng’s Theory by proposing and implementing the Three Representations as an ideological guideline, which was eventually enshrined in the Party’s constitution by the leadership of the fourth generation. The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China adopted the amendment of the party constitution on November 14, 2002, announcing that the CPC represents (1) development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, (2) orientation of China’s advanced culture and (3) fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.
3. According to *Pinyin*, *Kaoli* should be written as *Gaoli*. However, *Kaoli*, which comes from an old way of Chinese Romanization, is used in the paper to show the linguistic association with the passing on of the word Korea to the West.
4. As *Kaoli* derives from Koryo and Choson from Gohchoson, Han Nation is the variation of Samhan and Taehan Empire.
5. *Kaoli* (Koryo) was however proposed by North Korea in 1980 as the name for a unified Korea. The full name, as suggested by North Korea, should be

the Confederated States of Koryo provided that two Koreas ceased to use their own names (Hu Chun Hui, 2000).

6. After the fall of Shang Dynasty (1700B.C. – 1100B.C.), Kija, a high-ranking official became a political refugee and fled with his 5,000 men to Pyongyang, where he established the first kingdom of Korea called Kija Choson (Jizi Chaoxian). Later, taken over by Weiman from Yan State, a northern state of China, Kija Choson became known as Weiman Choson.
7. This is, of course, controversial to some contemporary Korean historians. Sin Ch'aeho, for instance, was one of the prominent Korean historians who, as early as the turn of the 20th century, challenged inherited conceptions of nation and identity of Korea and the limits of Korean territoriality. He was the first historian in the modern history of Korea to call for a Korean Manchuria. He tried to reverse conventional depiction of Kija's role over the region as the king and concluded that Kija was given only an enfeoffment of a tiny territory by the Puyo court. The King of Puyo was ruler, Kija only his vassal (Schmid, 1997). Controversy aside, Gohchoson, the earliest kingdom of Korea, is in actuality called both Kija Choson and Weiman Choson throughout Korean history (Hu Chun Hui, 2000).
8. In the Anti-Japanese War many Korean soldiers joined the Chinese Communist Party to resist the Japanese aggression in the North Manchuria and Korea. And the Korean War further "sealed their friendship in blood." Except for a short period between 1966 and 1969, China always maintained its "lips-and-teeth relationship" with North Korea, marked by their mutual support in ideology and domestic politics (Jia Hao and Zhuang Qubing, 1992).
9. The Four Cardinal Principles are 1) Keep to the Socialist Road, 2) Uphold the Dictatorship of the Proletarian, 3) Uphold the Leadership of the Communist Party and 4) Uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
10. Little wonder that studies of China's foreign policy and foreign trade during the period provided little information on the burgeoning economic contacts between China and South Korea during that period.
11. There are three entries concerning the ROK in the dictionary: the ROK-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, Treaty of Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, and Mutual Defence Treaty between the Republic of

Korea and the United States of America. For details see *Dictionary for Current International Affairs*.

12. In contradistinction to the definitions of Korea by Mainland China's dictionaries, dictionaries published in Taiwan have just a different base-word for Korea. Instead of referring South Korea as South Chaoxian (South Choson), Taiwan's dictionaries use North *Han* for North Korea. According to San Min's English-Chinese Dictionary, Korea is firstly an ancient country in the Korean peninsula; secondly, it refers to the Republic of Korea; and thirdly, it refers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In this entry, obviously the sequence accounts for the importance of the definition. According to *Dr Eye*, one of Taiwan-made translation software, Korea simply means *Han Nation* and Han national(s).

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The Chengyu, in Chinese 成語, are four character expressions that express a particular meaning, taken from the stories of classical China. There are lots of Chengyu in the Chinese language and they get used quite a bit. When a foreigner manages to master the Chengyu 成語 along with idiomatic expressions 成語 both in written and spoken language, it means they have reached a very high level in the Chinese language. In the course of my studies I 成語ve run into several of these expressions and wanted to draw up those I have encountered most frequently. So below you will find a list of 148 Chengyu and idioms. In 108BCE Northern Korea was integrated into Han as Chaoxian and divided into four provinces together with parts of Manchuria. There are stone sculptures of Han style in Korea and extensive colonies of Han Chinese were founded that retained Chinese culture up until the 4th century before being gradually assimilated into the Korean population. Population grew substantially. The Chinese at Lolang (now called Pyongyang) numbered as many as 300,000 and the area was under Chinese control until 313CE.