



**IS THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION OVER?
An Empirical Assessment**

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Introduction

Since the Portuguese military overthrew the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship in April of 1974, the number of democracies in the world has multiplied dramatically. Before the start of this global trend toward democracy, there were roughly 40 countries in the world that could be rated as more or less democratic. The number increased moderately through the late 1970s and early 1980s as a number of states experienced transitions from authoritarian (predominantly military) to democratic rule. But then, in the mid-1980s, the pace of global democratic expansion accelerated markedly, to the point where as of 1996 there were somewhere between 76 and 117 democracies, depending on how one counts. *How* one counts is crucial, however, to the task of this essay: thinking about *whether* democracy will continue to expand in the world, or even hold steady at its current level. In fact, it raises the most fundamental philosophical and political questions of what we mean by democracy.

In a seminal formulation, Samuel Huntington has dubbed this post-1974 period the ‘third wave’ of global democratic expansion and has shown the central importance to it of regional and international demonstration effects.¹ The democratizing trend began in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, spread to the military regimes of South America in the late 1970s and early 1980s, reached East, Southeast, and South Asia by the mid- to late 1980s, then at the end of the 1980s saw a surge of transitions from Communist authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and a trend toward democracy in Central America as well. Finally, the democratic trend spread to Africa in 1990, beginning in February of that year with the sovereign National Conference in Benin and the release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning of the ANC in South Africa. By the beginning of 1996 there were between 9 and 18 democracies on the continent—again, depending on how one counts.

Huntington defines a ‘wave of democratization’ simply as “a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period” (Huntington 1991, 15). He identifies two previous waves of democratization (a long slow wave from 1828 to 1926 and a second post-WWII wave, from 1943–1964). Significantly, each of the first two waves ended with what he calls a “reverse wave” of democratic breakdowns (1922–42, 1961–75). In each of these two previous reverse waves, some but not all of the newly established (or re-established) democracies broke down. Overall, in each reverse wave, the number of democracies

¹ See Huntington (1991). Treating earlier historical developments somewhat differently, Philippe C. Schmitter labels this period the ‘fourth wave’ of global democratization, but this does not alter the trends and issues analyzed here. See Schmitter (1993, 1–34).

in the world decreased significantly but left more democracies in place than had existed prior to the start of the previous democratic wave.

Reverse waves are obviously traumatic times for political freedom and human rights in the world. They may also be especially dangerous times for world peace. The first reverse wave gave rise to the expansionist fascist regimes that brought on the Second World War. The second reverse wave occurred during the peak of the Cold War and witnessed a number of regional conflicts and civil wars in which (in contrast to the current period) some established democracies fought directly or through surrogates and vigorously backed certain anticommunist authoritarian regimes. Although regimes in transition may be prone to international conflict and democratic regimes have a long history of war and conquest against nondemocracies, no two countries with established liberal democracies—as I will define the term here—have ever gone to war against one another.² In fact, as Bruce Russett has shown, democracies “rarely fight each other even at low levels of lethal violence,” and they are much less likely to let their disputes with one another escalate.³ This, he argues persuasively, is not only because of the institutional restraints on democracies’ decisions to go to war but even more so because of democratic normative restraints on the use of force to resolve disputes. His data show that the longer democracies endure (and, presumably, consolidate these norms), the less likely is any kind of violent conflict between them. As UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has observed, “a culture of democracy is fundamentally a culture of peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1996, 9). More generally, the relative openness of democracies to the free flow of information, and their valuing of law and constitutionalism, logically make them much more likely than authoritarian regimes to honor their obligations under international laws and treaties. The secretiveness, repression, and dubious legitimacy of authoritarian regimes make them “more likely to incite hostilities against other States in order to

² There is a vast literature assessing the thesis of the ‘democratic peace.’ For a particularly important, influential (and succinct) theoretical and empirical investigation, see Russett (1993). A seminal earlier treatment, building on Immanuel Kant’s thesis of republics as the basis of perpetual peace, is Doyle (1983). For a more wide-ranging analysis, which exhaustively reviews the existing literature and departs from much of it in suggesting that democracies are intrinsically less inclined toward aggressive violence, see the many works by Rummel (1976, 1981, and forthcoming). For his most recent evidence showing that democracies are generally ‘less warlike’ (and totalitarian regimes the most so), as indicated by their mean battle dead in war, see Rummel (1995). Evidence that transitional regimes (moving from autocracy or a mixed regime toward democracy) are more inclined toward interstate war than stable democracies or autocracies is presented in Mansfield and Snyder (1995a and 1995b). They place heavy emphasis on the ‘mass nationalist sentiment’ that is often unleashed or stimulated and exploited by ruling elites in the shift to electoral politics with universal suffrage. Nevertheless, they conclude that “the cure is probably more democracy, not less,” and that in critical cases where transitions toward democracy brought war, “the arrival of full democracy has produced more pacific policies” (1995a, 95).

³ See Russett (1993, 119. The statistical evidence is summarized in Table 1.2, page 21, and Table 4.1, page 79).

justify their suppression of internal dissent or forge a basis for national unity” (Boutros-Ghali 1996, 10).

The norms that restrain institutionalized democracies from war with one another also appear to foster peaceful conflict resolution within their societies. Although the *process* of democratization may stimulate ethnic conflict and induce weak states to meet communal rebellion with repression rather than accommodation, “[t]he resolution of ethnopolitical conflicts in institutionalized democracies depends most fundamentally on the implementation of universalistic norms of equal rights and opportunities for all citizens...and pluralistic accommodation of [group] desires for separate collective status” (Gurr 1993, 137). In democracies, particularly ones with well-institutionalized representative processes, minority groups have the political scope to mobilize and win response within the democratic process, and they lose support when they turn to violence and terrorism. The policies and institutions that settle ethnopolitical conflicts and manage diversity peacefully include full political and civil rights for ethnic minorities, programs designed to alleviate their poverty, protection for them to use their languages and cultures, regional autonomy with meaningful devolution of power, and mechanisms or incentives for sharing power, constructing multiethnic coalitions, encouraging crosscutting and nonethnic alignments or allowing broad access to power at the center.⁴ Putting these reforms in place and making them work involve processes of bargaining, accommodation, consensus-building, and political learning that are not unknown in authoritarian regimes but are much more likely in democracies.⁵ And strategies for moderating conflict through creative design of electoral institutions intrinsically require meaningful, competitive elections.

Beyond the specific dynamics of violence among states and among or against ethnic groups within states lies a more powerful and stunning generalization: “Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely” (Rummel 1994, 1). As Rudolph Rummel has shown in his exhaustive study of deaths from war, genocide, mass murder, and domestic violence in this, history’s most murderous century, every instance of mass murder by a state against its own people has happened under authoritarian rule, and the more absolutist the regime the greater the tendency toward democide (genocide and mass murder of innocent civilians).⁶ Thus, Rummel concludes, “The way to virtually eliminate genocide and mass murder appears to be through restricting and checking power. This means to *foster democratic freedom*” (Rummel 1994, 8).

⁴ See Gurr (1993, 290–313); Horowitz (1985, 583–680, 1990a and 1990b, and 1991, 124–26); and Lijphart (1977 and 1990).

⁵ See Diamond and Plattner (1994, xxiii–ix). See also the country and regional case studies in this volume.

⁶ For a summary of the evidence and conclusions, see Rummel (1994). The full presentation (and review of the literature) appears in Rummel (forthcoming).

Beyond the concerns for domestic and international peace, and the valuing of political choice, freedom, and accountability in themselves, there are other reasons as well to welcome the expansion of democracy in the world and to fear its possible recession. With their protection for individual and group rights to protest and organize, their freer flows of information, their greater scope for policy deliberation, debate, and change, their greater respect for law (including international conventions), and their mechanisms to hold rulers accountable to the ruled, democracies do a much better job of protecting the environment (R. Payne 1995, 41–55). And—contrary to the myth that rests on the India-China comparison—they are also more effective at reducing population growth. Even when controlling for the level of economic development, populations grow much more rapidly under authoritarian rule (Przeworski and Limongi forthcoming). While the relationship between democracy and economic growth remains at issue both empirically and theoretically, a growing body of evidence suggests that, at a minimum, authoritarian regimes in general do not grow faster in per capita income than democracies (Przeworski and Limongi forthcoming and 1993, 51–69).⁷ Indeed, statistical analyses suggest that the supposed ‘cruel choice’ between democracy and development is a false one, that “democracy need not generate slower growth” (Przeworski and Limongi forthcoming, 1994 conference draft, 13), and that in the poorest countries, the level of democracy (as measured by the annual Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties, which are discussed more extensively below) is positively and significantly correlated with improvements not only in per capita income but in infant survival rates and life expectancy as well.⁸ Thus, while democracy may generate fewer ‘economic miracles’ of rapid development, it also seems better suited to avoiding and correcting disasters, as Przeworski and Limongi observe, and to achieving steady progress in human well-being. Finally, while the empirical relationship between democracy and inequality is also in dispute, democracies appear in the long run to respond better to the needs of the poor and the marginalized, precisely because they enable such groups to organize and mobilize within the political process.

⁷ This does not mean that there is no relationship at all between regimes and growth performance. As Przeworski and Limongi speculate in their forthcoming essay, it may well be the case that “democracies are more likely to generate both miracles and disasters than dictatorships” (1994 conference draft, 4). In this regard, they warn, social scientists should be careful about equating growth with human welfare. People may value an ensured minimum of steady growth over a high average with wide variation. As they also note, this perspective is consistent with the evidence from the work of Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen that democracies do not experience famines, because their openness permits them “to abort or correct projects that impose excessive intertemporal costs” (5).

⁸ Dasgupta’s analysis (1993, 116–21) is based on rank-order correlations of changes in development levels (1970–80) with the average ratings for political rights and civil liberties (1973–79) in 51 of the world’s poorest countries. While he takes pains to emphasize that correlation does not demonstrate causation, the evidence is certainly consistent with the argument that democracy does not diminish overall human welfare and may well improve it.

The above positive benefits of democracy derive, as Russett notes with respect to interstate peace, from both the norms and the political institutions that characterize democracies. But which democracies? Is it enough, for peace and development and just treatment of minorities, that governments come to power through free, fair, and competitive elections? To what extent must there be present the corollary features of democracy implicit in these theories—a rule of law, free flow of information, freedom for individuals and groups to organize and express themselves, and a distribution of power among branches of government that produces ‘horizontal’ accountability of rulers to one another? Clearly, there are powerful normative reasons to consider the substantive questions that occupy this essay: whether the third wave—and the democracies it has produced—can be sustained; whether we will soon see instead a third reverse wave of democratic recessions and breakdowns; and what factors will determine which of these scenarios unfolds. But before we can venture an answer to these questions we must ponder a prior, conceptual one: what exactly do we mean by democracy? Which ‘democracies’ are we talking about?

Conceptualizing Democracy

Much of the contemporary confusion and debate about the number of democracies in the world, the classification of specific regimes, the conditions for making and consolidating democracy, and the consequences of democratic regimes for peace and development stems from a lack of consensus about just what we mean by ‘democracy.’ So serious is the conceptual confusion in the literature that David Collier and Steven Levitsky have identified more than 550 ‘subtypes’ of democracy in their review of some 150 (mostly recent) studies (Collier and Levitsky 1996). Some of these nominal subtypes merely identify specific institutional features or types of full democracy, but many denote ‘diminished’ forms of democracy.

The ‘diminished subtypes’ of democracy vary greatly in terminology and conceptual emphasis. Some, such as ‘bourgeois’ or ‘capitalist’ democracy, identify the dominance of socioeconomic elites or extreme social inequality as the key barrier to full democracy. However, the incorporation of social and economic desiderata into the definition of democracy—an approach so fashionable in the 1960s and 1970s—has waned considerably in the past two decades. By and large, most scholarly and policy uses of the term ‘democracy’ today appropriately have in mind a purely political conception of the term, and this intellectual shift back to an earlier convention has greatly facilitated progress in studying the dynamics of democracy, including the relationship between political democracy and various social and economic conditions.⁹

⁹ It may well be the case, as some scholars find, that severe, persistent socioeconomic inequality is a major threat to the persistence of political democracy. But to establish this, we must

Where conceptions of democracy diverge fundamentally (but not always very explicitly) today is on the range and extent of political properties encompassed by democracy. Minimalist definitions descend from Joseph Schumpeter, who defined democracy as a system “for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1947, 269).¹⁰ Huntington, among others, explicitly embraces Schumpeter’s emphasis on competitive elections for effective power as the essence of democracy.¹¹ Over time, however, Schumpeter’s appealingly concise expression has required periodic elaboration (or what Collier and Levitsky call ‘precising’) to avoid inclusion of cases that do not fit the implicit meaning.

The seminal elaboration has been Robert Dahl’s conception of ‘polyarchy,’ which overtly has two dimensions: opposition (or organized contestation through regular, free, and fair elections) and participation (the right of virtually all adults to vote and to contest for office). Yet Dahl’s conception has embedded in the above two dimensions a third, upon which the meaningfulness of the first two depend: civil liberty. Democracy (or Dahl’s imperfect ‘polyarchy’) requires not only freedom to vote and contest for office but freedom to speak and publish dissenting views, freedom to form and join organizations, and alternative sources of information; in other words, not just the political pluralism of multiple parties and candidates but a broader societal pluralism that makes political opposition and participation truly meaningful.¹² Both Dahl’s own early effort and a later, more comprehensive and methodologically sophisticated venture of two of his students to measure polyarchy empirically take seriously the nonelectoral dimensions. In fact, in the scale of polyarchy developed by Coppedge and Reinecke, free and fair elections are

first have a measure of democracy that is limited to features of the political system. For an effort that exhibits this approach (and finding), see Arat (1991). For a critique of the incorporation of socioeconomic criteria, see Karl (1990, 2).

¹⁰ For a useful explication of Schumpeter’s thinking about democracy in this classic work, see Held (1987). For Schumpeter, Held explains, “the democratic citizen’s lot was, quite straightforwardly, the right periodically to choose and authorize governments to act on their behalf” (1987, 165). Schumpeter was clearly uneasy with direct political action by citizens, warning that “the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede” (1947, 283). Thus, his “case for democracy can support, at best, only minimum political involvement: that involvement which could be considered sufficient to legitimate the right of competing elites to rule” (1987, 168). This is, indeed, as spare a notion of democracy as one could posit without draining the term of meaning.

¹¹ Huntington (1991, 5–13, especially 6, and 1989, 15). For similar conceptions of democracy as based on competitive elections, see, for example, Lipset (1981, 27, and 1994, 1); Linz (1978, 5–6); Pennock (1979, 7–15); Powell (1982, 3); Vanhanen (1990, 17–18); Di Palma (1991, 16); and Przeworski (1991, 10–11).

¹² Dahl (1971, 2–3) uses the term ‘polyarchy’ in order to distinguish these systems from a more ideal form of democracy, “one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens” (2). For a perspective that rejects ‘whole-system’ logic altogether and emphasizes both the democratic shortcomings of the established, industrialized constitutional polities and the democratic fragments in many autocratic polities, see Sklar (1996).

only one of four components (the others being freedom of expression, freedom of organization, and alternative sources of information).¹³

Minimalist conceptions of democracy, particularly more recent ones, usually acknowledge the need for minimum levels of freedom (of speech, press, organization, and assembly) in order for competition and participation to be meaningful. But typically they do not devote much attention to them, nor do they attempt to incorporate them into actual measures of democracy. Thus (consistent with most other efforts to classify or measure regimes), one of the most recent and important quantitative analyses, by Adam Przeworski and his colleagues, defines democracy simply as “a regime in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (with the provisos that real contestation requires an opposition with some nontrivial chance of winning office and that the chief executive office and legislative seats are filled by contested elections).¹⁴ Such Schumpeterian conceptions—particularly common among

¹³ See Dahl (1971, Appendix A, 231–45) and Coppedge and Reinecke (1991, 47–68).

¹⁴ Przeworski et al. (1996, 50–51). Their methodology is more comprehensively explained in Alvarez et al. (1994). Many other approaches to conceiving and measuring democracy in quantitative, crossnational analyses have also tended to rely on indicators of competition and participation (whether dichotomous, categorical, or continuous), but some of these were gravely flawed by their incorporation of substantively inappropriate indicators, such as voter turnout or political stability. On this and other conceptual and methodological problems, see Bollen (1991, 3–20). In the quest for a ‘hard,’ objective, and richly quantitative indicator, Vanhanen repeats this same mistake, using voter turnout rates in elections and the share of the total vote won by all other parties but the largest one as two (equally weighted) indicators of democracy (1990, 15–23). In addition to the conceptual problem of equating democratization with voter turnout, this approach also advantages fragmented, multiparty systems in which the largest party gets a relatively small share of the vote. It thus produces numerous empirical anomalies; for example, the democratization indices of Italy and Israel are about twice that of the United States; so was Papua New Guinea’s in 1988; and Singapore in 1988 ranked higher than the United States, India, or Venezuela.

As an alternative approach that explicitly includes the behavioral, noninstitutional dimensions of democracy, the combined Freedom House scales of political rights and civil liberties, described below, are increasingly being used in quantitative analysis. For examples, see Rowen (1995, 52–64), and Bhalla (forthcoming). Moreover, several efforts have been made to construct scales of democracy that measure all three dimensions: electoral competition, participation (universal suffrage), and essential civil liberties. See in particular, Coppedge and Reinecke (1991) and Hadenius (1992 and forthcoming). The problem with these complex indices is that, in their faithfulness to the more liberal conception of democracy, they generate demands for data on multiple indicators that require subjective judgments and thus are very difficult and costly to gather and code (especially retrospectively) for every year over a long time period (which, Vanhanen concedes, is why he did not employ one). Thus, they tend to be produced for one or two time points. A significant departure in this regard is the Political Regimes Database, which is coding political regime type and subtype for 117 countries from 1946 to 1988, using numerous specific indicators of civil liberties and political repression. See Gasiorowski (1991, 105–21).

While the Freedom House data are available annually, they go back in time only to 1972 and the criteria for scoring have become stricter (particularly in the 1990s), creating problems for interpreting changes in scores over time. The appeal of a simple dichotomous measure, such as that used by Przeworski and his colleagues, is precisely the relative simplification of data collection and regime classification and the ability to conduct a straightforward ‘event history’ analysis that analyzes changes to and away from democratic regime forms or, put differently, ‘hazard rates’ of democratic life expectancy. Certainly, there is value in multiple methodological approaches; our knowledge of the determinants of democracy is likely to become more reliable and robust to the

Western policymakers tracking and celebrating the expansion of democracy—risk committing what Terry Karl has called the “fallacy of electoralism”—of privileging electoral over other dimensions of democracy and ignoring the degree to which multiparty elections, even if competitive and uncertain in their outcome, may exclude significant sections of the population from the effective capacity to contest for power or advance and defend their interests, and/or may leave significant arenas of decision-making power beyond the reach or control of elected officials (Karl 1986, 9–36, 1990, 14–15, and 1995, 72–86). As Philippe Schmitter and Karl emphasize: “However central to democracy, elections occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between the highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties, which can, especially in the early stages of a democratic transition, proliferate in a bewildering variety” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 78).

As Collier and Levitsky note, minimalist, procedural definitions of democracy have expanded in recent years to rule out the latter element of ambiguity or misclassification; many are now more precise in excluding from classification as democracies regimes that suffer substantial ‘reserved domains’ of military (or bureaucratic or oligarchical) power that are not accountable to elected officials.¹⁵ On such grounds, Guatemala in particular has often been dismissed as a ‘pseudo-’ or ‘quasi’ democracy. But still such formulations can fail to give due weight to levels of political repression and marginalization that may exclude significant segments of the population—typically the poor or ethnic and regional minorities—from exercising their democratic

extent that different indicators and methodologies point to similar findings. Encouragingly, the Freedom House ratings and other measures of democracy appear generally highly correlated with one another. (See Inkeles 1991, 4; and Jagers and Gurr 1995, Table III, 475). Also, Hadenius finds that his measures of electoral competition and participation are generally highly correlated with political freedoms.) In fact, Przeworski et al. report that the Freedom House combined ratings for 1972 to 1990 predict 93% of their regime classifications during this period (1996, 52).

Still, both a methodological and a political concern remain. As the evidence below indicates, there appears to be a recent growing divergence since 1990 between the formal properties and the liberal substance of democracy. Thus the substantive validity of measures that focus mainly on formal competition may be particularly suspect after 1990 (which, interestingly, is the current endpoint of the Przeworski et al. data set). Moreover, it is likely (particularly when a dichotomous indicator of democracy is in question) that the divergence from other (more continuous and civil-liberties-based) scales is clustered precisely among ‘marginal’ regimes that have real electoral competition but weak protection for individual and group rights. So long as the intercorrelations among different democracy scales remain high, this problem (in and of itself) will probably not be large enough to call into question the validity of these studies’ findings concerning the causes and consequences of democracy (especially when different democracy measures yield similar findings). But the problem does raise a serious political concern, which I address below: the danger of neglecting the ‘freedom’ dimension in shaping international policies and thus legitimating if not encouraging the ‘hollowing out’ of democracy.

¹⁵ A seminal discussion of reserved domains appears in Valenzuela (1992, 64–66). See also Huntington (1991, 10); Schmitter and Karl (1991, 81); O’Donnell (1996b, 34–51); and Linz and Stepan (1996, ch. 1), where they insist that a democratic transition is completed only when the freely elected government “*de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*” (quoted from the manuscript version).

rights of opposition and participation. One of the most rigorously constructed and widely used measures of democracy in cross-national, quantitative research (that used in the Polity datasets of Ted R. Gurr and his colleagues) acknowledges civil liberties as a major conceptual component of democracy but, because of the paucity of data (especially going back in time), does not incorporate them explicitly into the empirical scale of democracy.¹⁶

Freedom represents a continuum of variation; whereas competitive elections tend to be more clearly present or not, individual and group rights of expression, organization, and assembly may vary to many degrees across countries that all have regular, genuinely competitive, multiparty elections in which votes are (more or less) honestly counted and the winning candidates exercise (most of the) effective power in the country. For example, how large and overtly repressed or marginalized must a minority be for the political system to be disqualified as a polyarchy, or in my terms, a *liberal* democracy?¹⁷ Is Turkey disqualified because of the indiscriminate violence it has

¹⁶ On the new Polity III dataset, see Jagers and Gurr (1995, 469–82). On the earlier Polity II data (from which about half of the annual country scores for 1946–86 have been corrected, mostly slightly, and all updated to 1994, in Polity III), see Gurr, Jagers, and Moore (1991, 69–104). Although it does not measure civil liberties, the democracy measure of the polity datasets does not stop at measuring the openness and competitiveness of elections (including specifically executive recruitment). Significantly, it also measures (with increased sensitivity in Polity III) institutional constraints on the exercise of executive power (which captures to a considerable degree the existence of ‘horizontal accountability’). This is a significant step beyond measures that focus exclusively on competitive elections. Jagers and Gurr argue in their 1995 article that even though they do not measure civil liberties and the rule of law directly, their measures of formal institutional structure more or less capture this behavioral dimension, and that their scale therefore correlates highly (in the years and countries for which it overlaps) with others that do measure civil liberties directly (with subjective scorings). Empirically, this claim is substantially true, although, as one would expect, their democracy measure correlates slightly more highly with Freedom House’s political rights scale (.92) than with its civil liberties scale (.87). By contrast, the Coppedge and Reinecke polyarchy scale correlates .93 with *both* Freedom House scales, and these two scales together constitute the best indicator of what I term below ‘liberal democracy.’ Whenever alternative scales rest on subjective scoring, correlations above .80 or so must be regarded as impressive evidence of the empirical validity of the measures. Still, to repeat our point in the note above, in the variation that remains (and the different strategies for aggregating regimes with diverse scores into a few types) may cluster critical cases of divergent coding that bear important theoretical and policy implications. For example, Jagers and Gurr decompose regimes in 1994 into ‘coherent’ and ‘incoherent’ democracies and autocracies. “Incoherent democracies denote those political systems with primarily democratic elements that also place substantial limits on participation, competition, and/or civil liberties” (1995, 478). Their 19 incoherent democracies in 1994 include a few regimes (such as Senegal, Cambodia, and Belarus) where the level of ruling-party dominance and intolerance is such that even the minimal Schumpeterian criteria for electoral democracy are lacking. More significantly for the purposes of this discussion, their list of ‘incoherent democracies’ excludes (and counts as ‘coherent democracies’) some civilian, electoral regimes that suffer very substantial abridgments of human rights and the rule of law, such as India, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine. (For their list, see 481, note 16. In a private communication based on my inquiry, Gurr has indicated that Sri Lanka and probably Pakistan should have been included in their list of incoherent democracies for the early 1990s. For evidence of these abridgments, see the relevant country reports in the annual volumes of Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, cited below.)

¹⁷ I use the term ‘liberal,’ of course, to refer not to an economic regime with a limited state and an open economy but to a form of political democracy in which individual and group liberties are particularly strong and well protected. There is obviously some affinity between economic and

used to suppress a ruthless Kurdish insurgency and its historical constraints (recently relaxed) on the peaceful expression of Kurdish political and cultural identity? Is India disqualified because of alarming human rights violations by its security forces in secessionist Kashmir; or Sri Lanka because of the brutal excesses by both sides in the secessionist war of Tamil guerrillas; or Russia because of its savage war against Chechen secessionists; or Colombia because of its internal war against drug-traffickers and left-wing guerrillas and its exceptionally high levels of political assassination and other human rights abuses? Do all these polities not have a right to defend themselves against violent insurgency and secessionist terror? Or does democracy fall short—despite highly competitive elections in each of these five countries, which have witnessed some degree of party alternation in each case in recent years—because of high levels of political violence, lawlessness, and corruption, by both state and nonstate actors?¹⁸ As I indicate below, the problem is not limited to these countries but increasingly characterizes a distinctive and growing group of countries that are commonly considered ‘democracies’ today.

By a minimalist definition, all five of the above countries qualify as democracies. But by a stricter conception of ‘liberal democracy,’ all fall short. All suffer sufficiently serious abridgments of political rights and civil liberties that they fail to qualify as ‘free’ in the annual ratings by Freedom House. Moreover, this gap between minimal, formal, or what I will henceforth term ‘electoral’ democracy and liberal democracy has serious consequences for theory, policy, and comparative analysis. These consequences derive not only from the question raised of the relationship between ‘democracy’ and human rights but also, as I will also show, from the dramatic growth in the gap between electoral and liberal democracy—one of the third wave’s most significant and little-noticed features.

The formal conception—*electoral democracy*—defines democracy as a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections. As we have seen, this conception remains highly salient for

political liberty in these senses, but there are tensions and complexities as well that are far beyond the scope of this discussion. The term ‘liberal’ should also be construed here very broadly, even in the political sense. It requires sufficient civil liberties and pluralism to allow for free and meaningful competition of interests and a rule of law between elections as well as in them. But this still leaves very substantial scope for variation in the balance a society places on individual rights vs. responsibilities, or to put it another way, on the emphasis on the individual vs. the community. Requiring by definition that the individual be free to organize and speak, and protected from arbitrary arrest and torture, does not mean that a society must embrace a *libertarian* (as opposed to communitarian) notion of the proper political and social order. In this sense, I believe the thesis that ‘liberal democracy’ is inappropriate for and unworkable in Confucian and other East Asian societies is wrong theoretically, and it is certainly being proven wrong empirically in South Korea and Taiwan. See my paper “Some Democratic Lessons in The ‘Asian Values Debate,” (1996a).

¹⁸ See the relevant country reports in Human Rights Watch (1995) and its reports of preceding years; Human Rights Watch Arms Project (1995); Freedom House (1995), and the forthcoming and preceding annual Freedom House reports.

both scholarship and policy, but it has been amplified or 'precised' to various degrees by different scholars and theorists. This exercise has been constructive, but unfortunately it has left behind a plethora of what Collier and Levitsky term 'expanded procedural' conceptions, which do not clearly relate to one another and occupy various intermediate locations in the continuum between electoral and liberal democracy.¹⁹

How does *liberal* democracy extend beyond these formal and intermediate conceptions? In addition to regular, free, and fair electoral competition and universal suffrage, it requires the absence of 'reserved domains' of power for the military or other social and political forces that are not accountable to the electorate, directly or indirectly. Second, in addition to the 'vertical' accountability of rulers to the ruled (which is secured most reliably through regular, free and fair, competitive elections), it requires 'horizontal' accountability of office-holders to one another; this constrains executive power and so helps protect constitutionalism, the rule of the law, and the deliberative process.²⁰ Third, it encompasses extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and group freedoms, so that contending interests and values may be expressed and compete through various ongoing processes of articulation and representation, beyond periodic elections.²¹ Specifically, liberal democracy has the following components:

¹⁹ Among the expanded procedural definitions that appear to bear a strong affinity to the conception of liberal democracy articulated here, but which are somewhat cryptic or ambiguous about the weight given to civil liberties, are Karl (1990, 2) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992, 43–44 and 46).

²⁰ Obviously, the independent power of the legislature to 'check and balance' executive power will differ markedly between presidential and parliamentary regimes. However, even in parliamentary regimes democratic vigor requires striking a balance between disciplined parliamentary support for the governing party and independent capacity to scrutinize and question the actions of cabinet ministers and executive agencies. For the political quality of democracy, the most important additional mechanism of horizontal accountability is an autonomous judiciary, but crucial as well are institutionalized means (often in a separate, autonomous agency) to monitor, investigate, and punish government corruption at all levels. On the concept of 'lateral' or 'horizontal' accountability and its importance, see Sklar (1987, 686–714, and 1996, 26–27); and O'Donnell (1994, 60–62). Sklar terms the lateral form 'constitutional democracy' and emphasizes its mutually reinforcing relationship to vertical accountability.

²¹ This emphasis on the nonelectoral dimensions of democracy in the continuing play of interests in politics figures especially prominently in the work of Schmitter and Karl (1991). They list pluralism as a dimension on which regimes may simply be "*differently* democratic," in that democratic corporatist arrangements may grant certain peak associations monopoly rights of representation, with obligatory membership within the interest sector and close linkages to the state. However, such corporatist arrangements are typically found within the limited functional arenas of capital and labor, and where they exist in democracies they are supplemented by a pluralistic array of other organizations for representing other interests. Were all of associational and expressive life organized in this vertical, monopolistic way, I believe it might raise serious questions about the degree of democracy. In any case, fully corporatist regimes of interest representation are fading rather than flourishing in established democracies, and to the extent that new democracies adopt them, they tend to manifest more limited features of 'policy concertation.' On the distinction and trends as they relate to postcommunist Eastern Europe, see

- Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies, in fact as well as in constitutional theory, with elected officials (and not democratically unaccountable actors or foreign powers); in particular, the military is subordinate to the authority of elected civilian officials.
- Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in fact, by the autonomous power of other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability).
- Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and the presumption of party alternation in government over time, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections (even if electoral thresholds and other rules exclude smaller parties from winning representation in parliament).
- Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups (as well as traditionally disadvantaged or disempowered majorities) are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their interests in the political process nor from using their language and culture.
- Beyond parties and intermittent elections, citizens have multiple ongoing channels and means for the expression and representation of their interests and values, including a diverse array of autonomous associations, movements, and groupings that they have the freedom to form and join.²²
- In addition to associational freedom and pluralism, there exist alternative sources of information (including independent media) to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access.
- Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition.
- Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though they are invariably unequal in their political resources), and the above individual and group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, nondiscriminatory judiciary whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centers of power.
- The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, or undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but by organized antistate forces as well.²³

Terra (1996). On the greatly limited character of neocorporatist forms of interest representation in the new democracies of Southern Europe, see Schmitter (1995, 284–314).

²² This is a particular emphasis of Schmitter and Karl (1991, 78–80), but it has long figured prominently in the work and thought of democratic pluralists such as Robert A. Dahl (1971 and, for example, 1961 and 1982).

²³ I suspect there would be very substantial overlap between the list of regimes identified by these criteria and those regimes indicated by the two simpler and less formal standards proposed by Laurence Whitehead: “How does a purportedly democratic regime treat those held in its prisons? Would we describe the regime as sufficiently democratic to qualify as a leading western democracy?” A key point of my long conceptual discussion here is precisely Whitehead’s: “It would be a grave disservice to the cause of democratic consolidation to misapply the term to regimes that fall short of a well-anchored standard” (Whitehead 1989, 77).

These elements of liberal democracy comprise most of the criteria by which Freedom House annually rates political rights (of contestation, opposition, and participation) and civil liberties in every country of the world. Political rights and civil liberties are each measured on a seven-point scale, with a rating of 1 indicating the most free and 7 the least free. Combining the two scales (as a number of recent quantitative analyses of the determinants of democracy have done) produces a total score ranging from 2 to 14, or an average score from 1 to 7. Countries averaging 2.5 or lower are considered 'free' by Freedom House; those scoring 3 to 5.5 are 'partly free'; and those at the lower end of 5.5 (as measured by a more discriminating raw-point score) down to 7 are 'not free.'²⁴

The 'free' rating in the Freedom House survey is the best, most sensitive and objective empirical indicator available of "liberal democracy." Of course, with any multipoint scale there is inevitably some arbitrariness in where one draws the line to establish the threshold for a concept. However, there are real differences even between the 2.5 and 3.0 average rating, which is the cutting point of the threshold. In the 1995–96 Freedom House survey, all nine countries with the lowest "free" score of 2.5 rate a 2 on political rights and a 3 on civil liberties. The difference between a 2 and a 3 on political rights is very real, typically indicating significantly more military influence in politics, electoral and political violence, and/or electoral irregularities and thus political contestation that is appreciably less, free, fair, inclusive, and meaningful. This is the case, for example, in El Salvador and Honduras (both rated 3 on political rights and 3 on civil liberties) and also in Venezuela, where military autonomy and impunity and political intimidation have eroded the quality of democracy in recent years.²⁵ The difference between 2 and 3 on civil liberties is also significant, as the lower-rated countries have at least one area—such as freedom of speech or the press, personal security from terror and arbitrary arrest, and associational freedom and autonomy—where liberty is significantly constrained. Still, political rights are strong enough to render the system generally 'free' (if just barely). When a country (most notably Brazil) with a 2 on political rights scores a 4 on civil liberties, however, human rights violations are so serious and widespread, the military and police are so immune to accountability for them, the judicial system is so ineffectual and corrupt, and/or the poor and landless are so systematically victimized by wealthy

²⁴ For a full explanation of the survey methodology, see Freedom House (1995, 672–77, or 1996, 7–11). Raw point scores for the two scales are constructed by assigning 0 to 4 points to each country on each of thirteen checklist items for civil liberties and each of eight check list items for political rights. The 1994 political rights scores included a ninth checklist item—decentralization of political power—that was appropriately dropped from the most recent survey, since it is better viewed as a measure of differences in the type rather than degree of liberal democracy. This is reflective of subtle (and in some years) significant changes in survey methodology that have occurred from time to time and that do, admittedly, complicate interpretation of changes in country scores over time (especially going back more than five or six years).

²⁵ See, for example, the country reports on these three countries in Freedom House (1995, 231–34, 286–89, and 599–602).

elites that the political system cannot be considered liberal and free, even though it is democratic in the strictly political arena of elections and party politics.²⁶

It is precisely in the categorization of specific countries at specific times that the differences among conceptual approaches becomes most apparent. But as I have noted above, conceptual approaches are no longer easily dichotomized into 'electoral' and 'liberal' approaches. There is a class of conceptions of democracy that fall somewhere in between, explicitly incorporating basic civil freedoms of expression and association and trying to take serious empirical account of them, yet still allowing for sharp constrictions of citizenship rights and a porous, insecure rule of law. The crucial distinction turns on whether political and civil freedoms are seen as relevant mainly to the extent that they ensure meaningful *electoral* competition and participation or are instead viewed as necessary to ensure a wider range of democratic functions.

A particularly clear example of the midrange conception may be found in Juan Linz's definition of democracies as "political systems that allow the free formulation of political preferences through the use of basic freedoms of association, information and communication for the purpose of a free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals, by nonviolent means, the claim to rule without excluding any office of national decision-making from that competition" (Linz 1996, 186; see also 183). Here, a Schumpeterian conception of democracy as political competition among alternative leaders has been expanded to rule out reserved domains of power and to require that electoral competition be underpinned by basic political freedoms. But this leaves open the extent to which civil liberties will otherwise be protected. Thus, the scope of human rights or civil rights in democracies might vary considerably depending on the wishes of the majority, as long as basic freedoms to contest politically remain unquestioned and the rights guaranteed in the constitution are not restricted (Linz 1996, 187). Although this conception encompasses the right to advocate alternatives, it could allow a democracy, by a constitutional process, to constrain civil liberties and minority rights more severely than would be consistent with the principle of *liberal* democracy. As Linz makes clear, democracies are the form of government least likely to violate human rights but may do so when under stress or confronted with terrorist or antisystem challenges. Yet, when democratic states turn to extensive human rights violations in order to defend themselves, they lose their liberal character (as has happened in Turkey and Sri Lanka). This is why violent antidemocratic or secessionist movements are a

²⁶ See Freedom House (1995, 152–55). Similar problems of human rights violations (by insurgents as well as the state), judicial weakness and corruption, and oligarchical violence against the powerless give the Philippines the same 2 and 4 rating in 1996.

particular problem for liberal democracy and why liberal democracies need to act early and creatively to meet potential challenges if they are to preserve their liberal character.²⁷

The mid-range conception is also articulated by Guillermo O'Donnell in his latest theoretical reflection on democracy (O'Donnell 1996b, 34–51). O'Donnell carefully rules out the fallacy of electoralism and the inclusion of 'reserved domains' by adopting Dahl's concept of polyarchy, with its requirement of basic civil freedoms, and then adding on further procedural requirements such that elected officials have meaningful power. On the basis of these criteria, he thus properly excludes from his list of polyarchies in Latin America a number of quasi democracies, such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay (and probably Peru, El Salvador, and Honduras). This brings his classification close to my own listing of 'liberal democracies' in Latin America (below). However, the 'cutting point' in his articulation of 'polyarchy' is focused on the institutionalization of elections, rather than the rule of law more broadly. Indeed, the central point of his essay is to argue that many of the democracies of the third wave are polyarchies, and apparently *enduring* polyarchies, even though clientelism and particularism abound, undermining horizontal accountability and adherence to formal rules. Thus, by his definition, "all the Latin American cases I have labeled polyarchies are such because of a simple but crucial fact: elections are institutionalized" (ibid., 36).²⁸ The institutionalization of elections requires surrounding conditions of freedom, but the cutting point appears to be their relevance for ensuring democratic *electoral* competition. Thus, he concedes:

²⁷ Thus Linz concludes that "[d]emocracies can fail in relation to human rights more by inaction than by action" in neglecting acute social and economic problems and the violations of public order by antisystem groups (1996, 191).

²⁸ As O'Donnell concedes, "the definition of polyarchy is silent about important but elusive themes" such as the degree of government accountability to citizens between elections and "the degree to which the rule of law extends over the country's geographic and social terrain." While O'Donnell is sympathetic to the conception articulated here of 'liberal democracy' and sees a strong affinity with the way he has defined 'polyarchy,' differences do derive from where one draws the 'cutting point' on the continuum of civil and political freedom. Like many substantial conceptual approaches, O'Donnell's cutting point is the combination of "inclusive, fair, and competitive elections" and "basic accompanying freedoms," which can be read (although O'Donnell may not mean it to be read so restrictively) as freedoms to facilitate "inclusive, fair, and competitive elections" (1996b, 36).

Until recently, the definition I have used with my colleagues Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset was largely identical to O'Donnell's in this respect. In our twenty-six country study (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988 and 1989) we defined democracy essentially in Dahl's terms of competition, participation, and freedom, with the third dimension requiring "civil and political liberties...sufficient to ensure the integrity of competition and participation" (see the preface to any of the regional volumes, xvi). This can be read in more or less precisely the same terms as O'Donnell's definition: freedom sufficient to make *electoral* competition and participation meaningful, free, and fair. In our most recent conceptual treatment, we have tried to correct for this problem by specifying conditions closer to the conception of liberal democracy articulated here, namely: "A level of civil and political liberties...secured through political equality under a rule of law, sufficient to ensure that citizens (acting individually and through various associations) can develop and advocate their views and interests and contest policies and offices vigorously and autonomously" (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995, 7).

In many of the new polyarchies, individuals are citizens only in relation to the one institution that functions in a manner close to what its formal rules prescribe—elections. As for full citizenship, only the members of a privileged minority enjoy it... Informally institutionalized polyarchies are democratic in the sense just defined... But their liberal and republican components are extremely weak (ibid., 13).²⁹

The question of how extensive liberty must be before a political system can be termed a 'liberal democracy' is a deeply normative and philosophical one. I wish here to remain faithful to the conception of democracy as a political process and thus to agree with O'Donnell that the right of battered women to sue their husbands, however normatively important, is not a liberty that is strictly required for polyarchy or even for a (minimal level) of the higher threshold I establish and term here 'liberal democracy.' The subtle but crucial difference is the extent to which we define the political process as centering around elections or encompassing a much broader and more continuous play of interest articulation, representation, and contestation. If we view the latter as an *essential* component of democracy, perhaps no less important than elections, then there must be adequate political and civil freedoms surrounding that broader process as well and, to use O'Donnell's language, individuals must be able to exercise their rights of citizenship not only in elections but in obtaining the "fair access to public agencies and courts" that is often denied in his informally institutionalized polyarchies. From this perspective the right of battered women to sue their husbands is not a requirement for liberal democracy—because democracy as defined here is about the structure of power in the political system, not in the home or the workplace—but the right of women, including poor women, to organize and lobby freely within the political process to establish such a right to sue (and to bring legal action before the constitutional court to determine if such a right is not already constitutionally guaranteed) is a requirement for liberal democracy.³⁰ It is also a requirement for Dahl's (somewhat less expansive) concept of polyarchy, which requires freedom of association and of interest articulation by associational groups.

An appreciation of the dynamics of regime change and the evolution of democracy must allow for a third class of regimes that are less than even minimally democratic but distinct from more purely authoritarian regimes. This requires a second 'cutting point' between electoral democracies, which allow for free and fair elections between multiple political parties, and other electoral regimes that have multiple parties and many of the other constitutional features of

²⁹ For a similar, mid-range conception of democracy that also builds on Dahl's polyarchy, see Hartlyn and Valenzuela (1994, 100–101). Their conception also emphasizes the procedures of contestation and participation, with adequate protection for freedoms of expression and association, but adds a third dimension, 'constitutionalism,' which, in limiting the hegemony of electoral majorities and the powers of governmental authorities, overlaps with the 'executive constraints' element of the Jagers and Gurr democracy scale.

³⁰ Where socially marginalized, abused, and exploited groups are given full rights of political citizenship, I believe improvements in social justice will generally follow.

electoral democracy but that lack at least one basic requirement: a sufficiently fair arena of contestation so that the ruling party may be turned out of power. Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and I have termed these regimes ‘pseudodemocracies,’ “because the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often in part to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination” (1995, 8).³¹

As I use the term here, there is wide variation among pseudodemocracies. They include what Linz, Lipset, and I termed ‘semidemocracies,’ which more nearly approach electoral democracies in their pluralism and competitiveness, as well as what Giovanni Sartori has termed ‘hegemonic party systems,’ in which a relatively institutionalized ruling party makes extensive use of coercion, patronage, media control, and other features to deny formally legal opposition parties a fair and authentic chance to compete for power (Sartori 1976). Another characteristic feature of such hegemonic party systems is that the ruling party regularly wins massively and controls the overwhelming bulk of legislative seats and most governments at the regional and local levels. Mexico (until 1988), Senegal, and Singapore are classic examples of such a system. Here pseudodemocracy extends beyond such class hegemonic party regimes to encompass as well multiparty electoral systems in which the undemocratic dominance of the ruling party may be weak and contested (as in Kenya), or in the process of decomposing into a more competitive system (as in Mexico), or highly personalistic and poorly institutionalized (as in Ghana and Kazakhstan).

What distinguishes pseudodemocracies from other nondemocracies is that they tolerate the existence of genuine (not merely artificial, state-controlled) opposition parties. Typically, this also is accompanied by more space for organizational pluralism and dissident activity in civil society than is tolerated in the most repressive authoritarian regimes. Invariably, pseudodemocracies fall well below the standard of liberal democracy, but they vary significantly in their repressiveness and in their proximity to the threshold of electoral democracy (which Mexico could well cross in its next presidential election, in the year 2000). Thus, as the Appendix shows, they tend to have somewhat higher levels of freedom than other ‘authoritarian’ regimes.³²

³¹ See also Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988 and 1989, xviii of the preface to each volume). Burton, Gunther, and Higley (1992, 6–7) also identify a class of electoral pseudodemocracies, but their usage differs from mine in including statutory one-party states.

³² If we take seriously Collier and Levitsky’s (1996) appeal to work to clear away the mounting conceptual clutter in comparative democratic studies, it is useful for any effort at a typology of regimes to orient itself to other concepts, particularly ‘diminished subtypes’ of democracy. Those subtypes that are missing the attribute of free elections or relatively fair multiparty contestation clearly fall into my category of ‘pseudodemocracies.’ Those that have real and fair multiparty competition but with limited suffrage are not neatly placed in this framework and would seem to constitute a separate type of ‘exclusionary,’ ‘oligarchic,’ or ‘limited suffrage’ democracy. While this is a distinct regime type, it is not relevant to an analysis of regime variation in the third wave, because almost invariably, electoral regimes since the mid-1970s have been based on universal suffrage. Those regimes that are diminished by the absence of adequate civil liberties or civilian control of the military may nevertheless be electoral democracies; this is the case with what Terry Karl refers to as the ‘hybrid’ regimes of Central America (1995, 80–81). See in particular Collier

The distinction between these two types of nondemocratic regimes is also important theoretically. If we view democracy in *developmental* terms, as emerging in fragments or parts by no fixed sequence or timetable, then the presence of legal opposition parties that may compete for power and win some seats in parliament and of the greater space for civil society that tends to prevail in such systems constitute important foundations for future democratic development.³³ In Mexico, Jordan, Morocco, and a number of states in sub-Saharan Africa where former one-party dictators engineered their re-election under pseudodemocratic conditions, these democratic fragments are pressing out the boundaries of what is politically possible and may eventually generate breakthroughs to electoral democracy. In a similar vein (in an earlier era), elite-dominated, restricted democracies in Chile, Venezuela, and Costa Rica gradually became more democratic as civil society organizations and capable, middle-class parties forged effective linkages with one another (Karl 1995, 82–83).

This framework leaves, then, a fourth, residual category, which I term simply ‘authoritarian regimes.’ Such regimes vary in their levels of freedom (see again the Appendix) and may even hold fairly somewhat competitive elections, as in Uganda (and previously several other one-party African regimes). They may have some modest civil society and judicial autonomy. Or they may be extremely closed and repressive, even totalitarian. But all of them lack a crucial building block of democracy: formally legal and independent opposition parties. Significantly, all of the most repressive regimes in the world, as measured by Freedom House, fall in this category.

It should be emphasized that this four-fold typology is a system for classifying national political regimes, but political reality on the ground does not admit so neatly of such classifications. The level of democracy may vary significantly across sectors and institutional arenas (as would be expected if democracy emerges ‘in parts’). It may also vary considerably across territory within the national state. Thus, some states in India manifest not only generally better, more efficient and accountable governance but also better protection for civil liberties and lower levels of electoral and political violence than other states. The states of Karnataka, Kerala, Gujarat, and West Bengal

and Levitsky’s figure 4, which classifies different categories of diminished subtypes. Careful attention should be paid to empirical application of concepts, however. For example, Donald Emmerson’s category of “illiberal democracy” would seem to be coincident with ‘electoral democracy’ in my framework, and indeed it could be said that a principal reason why these regimes are merely ‘electoral’ democracies is because they are illiberal. However, as he applies the concept to Southeast Asia, and especially to the two regimes he classifies as ‘one-party democracies,’ Singapore and Malaysia, the convergence with my own framework breaks down. Civil and political freedoms are so constrained in these two countries that the minimum criterion of electoral democracy—a sufficiently level electoral playing field to give opposition parties a chance at victory—is not met. See Emmerson (1995, 223–48).

³³ Both the term ‘developmental’ and my emphasis on the continuous and open-ended nature of change in the character, degree, and depth of democratic institutions owe heavily to the work of Richard L. Sklar (1987, 686–714, and 1996). Readers will nevertheless note important differences in our perspectives.

might thus properly be considered more *liberally* democratic than the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar, for example.³⁴ The treatment of African-Americans in the southern states prior to 1965 is another case in point. Particularly with respect to large countries, it may be necessary to disaggregate to form a more sensitive picture of the quality and extent of democracy. Unfortunately, this is a task we can only acknowledge and hint at from time to time in this work.

Democracy in 'Developmental' Perspective

As the above discussion makes clear, even 'liberal' democracies fall short of democratic ideals. At the less liberal end of the group, they may still have some serious flaws in their guarantees of personal and associational freedom. And certainly any casual acquaintance with the news from Italy, Japan, Belgium, France, the United States, and most other industrialized democracies will underscore that even long-established and well-institutionalized democracies with the most liberal average freedom scores of 1 or 1.5 are afflicted with serious problems of corruption, favoritism, and unequal access to political power, not to mention voter apathy, cynicism, and disengagement.

There is not now and has never been in the modern world of nation-states a perfect democracy—where all citizens have roughly equal political resources and government is completely or almost completely responsive to all citizens. This is why Dahl used the term 'polyarchy' to characterize the more limited form of democracy that is realistically possible (to date) in the modern state (Dahl 1971, 2). An important intellectual trend of democracy's third wave has been the increased 'valorization' of (even limited) political democracy as an end in itself and the growing tendency of scholars and intellectuals (even many of those who had once been on the Marxist and rejectionist left) to agree on the need for realism in what can be expected of democracy. Certainly, democracy does not produce all good things. As Juan Linz observed two decades ago, "political democracy does not necessarily assure even a reasonable approximation of what we would call a democratic *society*, a society with considerable equality of opportunity in all spheres" (Linz 1978, 97; emphasis is mine). As Schmitter and Karl have argued, democracies are not necessarily more economically or administratively efficient, or more orderly and governable, than autocratic regimes (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 85–87). But in allowing for civil and political freedom and for the real possibility of selecting alternative governments and policies, and especially in the scope they provide for disadvantaged and disempowered groups to organize and mobilize politically, liberal democracies in particular provide over the long run better prospects for reducing social injustices and correcting mistaken policies and corrupt practices.

³⁴ I am grateful to Sunita Parikh for emphasizing this point to me.

It is important, then, not to take the existence of democracy—even liberal democracy—as cause for apathy or collective self-congratulation. Democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon. Even where it exists, where a country is above the threshold of formal (or even liberal) democracy, democratic institutions can be improved and deepened and may need to be consolidated (see below); political competition can be made fairer and more open; participation can become more inclusive and vigorous; citizens' knowledge, resources, and competence can grow; elected (and appointed) officials can be made more responsive and accountable; civil liberties can be better protected and the rule of law become more efficient and secure.³⁵ Viewed in this way, continued democratic development is a challenge for all countries, including the United States, and all democracies, new and established, could become more democratic than they now are. Obviously, the improvement and invigoration of democracy will not solve all social and economic problems societies face. But in widening the scope of public deliberation, empowering traditionally marginalized and alienated groups, and generally increasing citizen competence and government responsiveness, reforms that deepen and extend democracy may also increase the sophistication of mass publics and the legitimacy—and hence governing capacity—of elected officials.³⁶ Beyond this, increasing citizen competence and participation in the political process will have spillover effects into other arenas of social life (and vice versa). The general increase in civic engagement—of direct, active participation in all sorts of voluntary associations and community networks—in turn generates norms of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation that further reduce cynicism, encourage participation, and facilitate economic development, democratic stability, and the resolution of social problems. Increasingly, social scientists are emphasizing that such 'social capital' is a critical resource for dealing with the seemingly intractable problems of poverty, alienation, and crime in the United States and other industrialized democracies. In the absence of such social capital, "mutual distrust and defection,

³⁵ On the problem of civic competence and the challenges to improving it in contemporary, large-scale, complex, media-intensive, and information-saturated societies, see Dahl (1992, 45–59).

³⁶ In their comparative study of the restructuring of property relations in postsocialist Eastern Europe, Bruszt and Stark (forthcoming) argue that policy coherence, effectiveness, and sustainability are fostered where executives are constrained and reform policies are negotiated between governments and 'deliberative associations.' As evidence they cite in particular the different trajectories of economic reform and performance in the (more deliberative and successful) Czech Republic and (more delegative and economically unstable) Hungary. This finding is particularly significant given the conventional view in the literature (and especially in international policy circles) that if painful economic restructuring is to be achieved under democracy, power must be 'delegated' to technocratic elites in the executive branch who are then 'insulated' from popular pressures and horizontal accountability. By contrast, Stark and Bruszt argue that the 'extended accountability' emanating from broad consultation and deliberation generates a societal consensus that contributes not only to democracy but to policy effectiveness. The notion of 'extended accountability' was articulated by Stark in his presentation to the Stanford Seminar on Democratization, 15 February 1996. This view has an important kinship with Guillermo O'Donnell's analysis of the problems of 'delegative democracy' (1994).

vertical dependence and exploitation, isolation and disorder, criminality and backwardness [reinforce] one another in...interminable vicious circles" (Putnam 1993, 181, and 1995, 65–78).³⁷

Viewed from a developmental perspective, the fate of democracy is open-ended. Democracy generally emerges in different 'parts' or stages through many different paths and degrees in different countries, and electoral democracy is only one element of full political democracy.³⁸ Moreover, democratic development may move both ways. Just as electoral democracies can become more democratic—more liberal, more constitutional, more competitive, more accountable, more inclusive, and more vigorously participatory—so they can also become more illiberal, abusive, corrupt, exclusive, narrow, unresponsive, and unaccountable—i.e., less democratic. And liberal democracies, too, may either improve or decline over time in their levels of political accountability, accessibility, competitiveness, and responsiveness. There is no guarantee that democratic development will be only in one direction and much to suggest that all political systems (including democracies, liberal or otherwise) tend to become rigid, corrupt, and unresponsive over time in the absence of periodic reform and renewal.³⁹ Indeed, democracy may not only become diminished in its political quality over time, it may even effectively *disappear*, not merely through the breakdown or overthrow of formal democratic institutions (e.g., by military or executive coup) but through more insidious processes of decay. This is a phenomenon—what may be termed the progressive 'hollowing out' of formal democracy—that is often neglected in contemporary discussions and is central to understanding the trajectory of democratic change in the world over the last few years, as the following review of empirical trends will show.

³⁷ On the reciprocity between a vigorous civil society and an effective democratic state, see also Diamond (1994, 4–17).

³⁸ See Sklar (1987). Although Sklar's approach is very different from that of the 'transitions' school, as exemplified (with important variations) by the work of such people as Linz, O'Donnell, Schmitter, Karl, and Huntington, even this school acknowledges that 'democratization' of authoritarian regimes is typically preceded by 'liberalization,' in which (to use Sklar's language) important parts or 'fragments' of democracy may emerge, and press forward for further democratization. Sklar's view is quite distinctive, however, in viewing democratic development as a continuous process rather than the crossing of a threshold of regime type. See also Sklar (1996).

³⁹ Such a developmental perspective may help to inoculate democratic theory against the tendency toward teleological thinking that Guillermo O'Donnell (1996a) discerns in the literature on democratic consolidation: that is, the underlying assumption that there is a particular natural path and end state of democratic development. This inoculation is important not only because, as O'Donnell notes, the new democracies of the East and South may look very different than those of Europe and North America (even when they become institutionalized), but even more, I would argue, because there is no endpoint of democratic development. Thus, as I will indicate below, while I differ from O'Donnell in believing that the concept of democratic 'consolidation' is meaningful and useful, it is only so in denoting a threshold of political legitimacy and stability that is not irreversible. Moreover, even when it remains thoroughly consolidated, democracy can always become stronger or weaker, fuller or thinner. When it stagnates, and its citizens become politically apathetic and detached, it is likely to deteriorate. The price of liberty is indeed eternal vigilance.

Empirical Trends in Democracy since the Start of the Third Wave

By any conception, democracy has expanded dramatically since the third wave began with the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in April 1974. If we take a minimalist or formal conception of democracy (in which governmental offices are filled through competitive, multiparty elections that place incumbents at real risk of defeat), both the number of democracies in the world and the proportion of the world's regimes that are democratic have increased dramatically since the third wave began. In 1974 there were only 39 democracies total in the world, and only 28 with populations over one million (or so close to one million that they would exceed that mark by 1995).⁴⁰ Only about 23 percent of the countries over one million population and about 27 percent of all the world's countries were formally democratic. The difference between these proportions points to an interesting relationship between size and democracy that has held continuously throughout the third wave: very small countries (with populations of less than one million) are significantly more likely to be democratic (and free). This striking relationship is explored in greater depth below.

By the beginning of 1996 the number of democracies in the world had increased to 117, and even though the number of independent states has steadily grown throughout the third wave (by more than a third), the proportion of countries that are formally democratic has more than doubled, to over 60 percent. More striking still is how much of this growth (both proportionally and in sheer number of democracies) has occurred in the 1990s, with the collapse of Soviet and East

⁴⁰ Huntington counts 30 democracies in 1973 with populations over one million but does not list the countries he classifies. Presumably he does not count as democracies the Chilean and Uruguayan regimes that broke down in 1973, so the discrepancy could be due to his classification of some ambiguous regimes (notably Malaysia) as democratic at the time. In classifying ambiguous regimes in 1974, I follow Przeworski's principle that "[d]emocracy is a system in which parties lose elections" (1991, 10). In ambiguous cases, I have classified civilian, multiparty, electoral regimes as democratic only if the ruling party lost power in an election at some point or clearly allowed itself to be at risk of electoral defeat. Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia (after 1969), and Senegal all failed this rule in 1974. For the 1990s I simply accept Freedom House's classification of regimes as formally democratic or not, but it also appears to follow this principle. In 1995 it classifies as nondemocracies a number of civilian, multiparty, electoral regimes; in addition to the above four (still), Ghana, Gabon, Cameroon, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Despite the presence of multiparty electoral competition, these countries are nondemocracies (even in the minimalist sense) because the ruling party in each case is so dominant (or in Giovanni Sartori's classic framework, "hegemonic") that it does not allow the opposition any kind of fair chance to defeat it electorally (or challenge it in between elections). This failure to qualify as formally democratic does not derive merely from the low civil liberties or average freedom scores of these countries; a number of the formal democracies in 1995 (such as Turkey, Moldova, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and such longtime democracies as India, Sri Lanka, and Colombia) had average freedom scores in 1995 of 4 to 5, no better than a number of the electoral nondemocracies above. The key distinction in these ratings of formal democracy is, then, as Przeworski and his colleagues frame it: "an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections" (1996, 50). For a full listing of regimes, see the Appendix.

European communism and the diffusion of the third wave to sub-Saharan Africa. As Table 1 shows, the number and percentage of democracies in the world has increased *every year* since 1990. This can only be described as a democratic breakthrough without precedent in world history. As recently as 1990, when he was writing *The Third Wave*, Huntington found only 45 percent of the world's states (with populations over one million) to be democratic, a proportion virtually identical to that in 1922 at the peak of the first wave (Huntington 1991, 25–26). Even if we similarly restrict our view to countries with populations over one million, the proportion of democracies in the world now stands at 57 percent.

TABLE 1

Change in the Number of Formal Democracies, 1974, 1990–1995

Year	Number of Democracies	Number of Countries	Democracies as a % of all Countries
1974	39	142	27.5%
1990	76	165	46.1%
1991	91	183	49.7%
1992	99	186	53.2%
1993	108	190	56.8%
1994	114	191	59.7%
1995	117	191	61.3%

Source: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*, 1990–91, 1991–92, 1992–93, 1993–94, 1994–95 (New York: Freedom House, 1991 and years following). All figures are for the end of the calendar year, except for 1974, which offers my estimate of the number of democracies in the world in April 1974, at the inception of the third wave.

What has been the trend with respect to *liberal* democracy? As one would expect, both the number of countries and the proportion of countries in the world rated “free” by Freedom House have also significantly increased, but not quite as dramatically. From the beginning of the Freedom House survey in 1972 until 1980 the number of free states increased by only ten (and the proportion of free states in the world rose only slightly, from 29 percent in 1972 to 32 percent in 1980). Moreover, change was not only in one direction. During the first six years of the third wave (to 1980) five states suffered breakdowns or erosions of democracy that cost them their free status by the end of the decade. In fact, although the overall trend of regime change during the third wave has been toward significantly more democracy and freedom in the world, fully 22 countries suffered democratic breakdowns or recessions from the ‘free’ status between 1974 and 1991 and, as I will shortly indicate, further deterioration has occurred since then (Diamond 1993, 41, Table 3.2).

In the latter half of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s freedom took its biggest jump during the third wave. As we see in Table 2, between 1985 and 1991 (a crucial time point, since it encompasses the demise of both East European and Soviet communism) the number of free states jumped from 56 to 76 and the proportion of free states in the world increased from a third to over 40 percent. Moreover, the proportion of blatantly authoritarian 'not free' states declined to a historic low of 23 percent in 1991 and fell further to barely over 20 percent in 1992. By contrast, in 1972 almost half the independent states in the world were rated 'not free.'

TABLE 2

Freedom Status of Independent States, 1972–1995

Rating	1972	1980	1985	1991	1995
Free	42 (29.0%)	52 (31.9%)	56 (33.5%)	76 (41.5%)	76 (39.7%)
Partly Free	6 (24.8%)	52 (31.9%)	56 (33.5%)	65 (35.5%)	62 (32.5%)
Not Free	67 (46.2%)	59 (36.2%)	55 (32.9%)	42 (22.9%)	53 (27.7%)
Total	145 (100%)	163 (100%)	167 (100%)	183 (100%)	191 (100%)

TABLE 3

Freedom Status of Independent States, 1991–1995

Rating	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Free	76 (41.5%)	75 (40.3%)	72 (37.9%)	76 (39.7%)	76 (39.7%)
Partly Free	65 (35.5%)	73 (39.2%)	63 (33.2%)	61 (31.9%)	62 (32.5%)
Not Free	42 (22.9%)	38 (20.4%)	55 (28.9%)	54 (28.3%)	53 (27.7%)
Total	183 (100%)	186 (100%)	190 (100%)	191 (100%)	191 (100%)

Rating refers to the status of the country at the end of the calendar year.

These summary ratings are derived from the Freedom House scales of political rights and civil liberties. Each scale ranges from 1, most free, to 7, least free. States are considered 'free' if their average score on the two scales is 2.5 or lower; 'partly free' if their average score is 3 to 5.5; and 'not free' if their average score is 5.5 to 7. The two scales are derived from more discriminating raw point scores, ranging from 0 to 36 for political rights and 0 to 52 for civil liberties, which are used to separate into 'partly free' and 'not free' countries that average 5.5 on the two scales. For the methodology of the Freedom House annual survey, see Freedom House (1995).

As we see in Table 3, the 1991–92 period appears to have been the highwater mark for freedom in the world. Since 1991 the proportion of free states has declined slightly, and since 1992 the proportion of ‘not free’ states has jumped sharply. Despite the steady growth in the number of formal electoral democracies in the world, the number of free states has stagnated in the first half of this decade. More generally, gains in freedom have been offset by losses. During 1993, 43 countries registered a decline in their freedom score, 18 a gain. In 1994 eight countries improved their freedom category (e.g., from partly free to free) and four declined in category, but overall freedom scores increased in 22 countries while declining in 23 (Freedom House 1995, 5–7). During 1995 the trend was slightly more positive, with four positive changes in categories and three negative and a total of 29 increases in freedom scores and 11 declines. Yet the number of free states did not change at all.

Juxtaposing the two divergent trends of the 1990s—continued growth in electoral democracy but stagnation in liberal democracy—demonstrates the increasing shallowness of democratization in the late period of the third wave. During the first six years of this decade the gap between formal and liberal democracy in the world has steadily grown. As a proportion of all the world’s democracies, free states have declined from 85 percent in 1990 to 65 percent today (Table 4). During this period, the quality of democracy (as measured by the levels of political rights and civil liberties) has eroded in a number of the most important and influential new democracies of the third wave—Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and Pakistan—while an expected transition to democracy in Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria, imploded. At the same time, political freedom has deteriorated in several of the longest surviving democracies in the developing world, including India, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Venezuela.

As Huntington has argued in the *The Third Wave*, the demonstration effects that are so important in the wavelike diffusion or recession of democracy emanate disproportionately from the more powerful countries within a region and internationally. Table 5 shows the trends in average freedom scores for the past decade (from 1986 to 1995) for twelve countries that are electoral democracies today and that could be considered the most powerful countries (in population and gross national product) within their regions.⁴¹ The overall picture conveys the mixed and

⁴¹ Table 5 also includes Nigeria as a kind of parenthetical reference, because it appeared for so much of this period to be moving toward democracy and had constructed most of the architecture of electoral democracy until 1993, when the military annulled the results of a free and fair presidential election and then ultimately scrapped the whole emergent electoral system in a November coup. The drastic reduction of freedom in Nigeria since the June 1993 election annulment underscores my point about the significant recessionary trends of freedom in the world in recent years. And the demonstration effects of military rule in Nigeria should not be dismissed. They may well have contributed to the military overthrows of electoral democracy in Gambia in 1995 (where Nigeria had military advisors stationed) and in Niger (Nigeria’s principal northern neighbor) in January 1996. The poignancy and needlessness of Nigeria’s political

TABLE 4

Formal and Liberal Democracy, 1990–1995

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Number of Formal Democracies	76 (46.1%)	91 (49.7%)	99 (53.2%)	108 (56.8%)	114 (59.7%)	117 (61.3%)
Free States (Liberal Democracies)	65 (39.3%)	76 (41.5%)	75 (40.3%)	72 (37.9%)	76 (39.7%)	76 (39.7%)
Free States as % of Formal Democracies	85.5%	83.5%	75.8%	66.6%	66.6%	65.0%
Total Countries	165	183	186	190	191	191

contradictory nature of global democratic trends in recent years. In two of these twelve countries, South Korea and Poland, freedom scores have been continuously good ('free') since their transitions to democracy and have even improved recently. (The trend is also positive in South Africa, but its democratic transition is too recent to draw many inferences yet.) In each of the six countries that have been electoral democracies for all or most of the decade covered in the table, freedom levels have eroded. Most strikingly, India has gone from a long-time status of free to partly free.⁴² Pakistan has declined, since its democratic transition in 1988, from nearly free to the same middling freedom score (4) as India. Brazil and the Philippines have experienced deterioration in civil liberties that has put them just below the free category, although both have

tragedy emerges in particularly sharp relief when its trend in freedom scores is compared with South Africa's. From the late 1980s both of these countries began to experience a controlled political decompression, and their freedom scores improved step-wise in remarkably parallel fashion—until 1993 when the Nigerian military aborted democracy while the South African regime was preparing to inaugurate it.

⁴² It must be conceded that Freedom House has become more sensitive in its scoring in recent years, and in the 1990s its ratings appear to reflect a greater tendency to downgrade freedom scores in electoral democracies for problems of human rights abuses, electoral violence, military influence, and generally poor and corrupt functioning of democratic institutions. The freedom score for India (4), which is no better than for nondemocratic Mexico, Jordan, and Ghana in 1995, strikes many observers (including myself) as particularly questionable and perhaps harsh in its underappreciation of the extent of electoral competitiveness and the vibrancy of Indian civil society. Nevertheless, I believe the overall implication of these scores—that levels of civil and political freedom have diminished since the mid-1980s in many prominent electoral democracies—is valid and supported by other evidence and analysis (including the rising incidence of religious and secessionist violence and repressive state responses).

TABLE 5

Average Freedom Scores, 1986-1995

12 Influential Electoral Democracies

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
India	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	4.0	4.0
Pakistan	4.5	4.5	3.0•	3.0	4.0	4.5	4.5–	4.0	4.0	4.0–
Brazil	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.5	2.5–	2.5	3.5	3.0	3.0
Argentina	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.5–	2.5	2.5–
Turkey	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	5.0
Philippines	3.0•	2.0	2.5	2.5–	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.0
South Korea	4.5	4.0	2.5•	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0
Thailand	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.5+	2.5	5.0	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.5
Russia*	7.0	6.5	5.5	5.5+	4.5	3.0•	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Ukraine*	7.0	6.5	5.5	5.5+	4.5	3.0•	3.0	4.0	3.5	3.5
Poland	5.5	5.0	5.0	3.5	2.0•	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.5
South Africa	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5+	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	2.5•	1.5

Failed Transition

Nigeria	6.0	5.5	5.0	5.5	5.0	4.5	4.5	6.0	6.5	7.0
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• Indicates year of transition to electoral democracy.

* Scores are for USSR until 1991.

+ Denotes an upward trend in the level of freedom, but without a change in score.

– Denotes a downward trend in the level of freedom, but without a change in score.

improved their overall freedom scores in the last year or two. Argentina remains free (with significant progress on economic reform), but its freedom scores have been edging steadily downward since 1990, which is about the time that a president with less apparent commitment to democratic procedures, Carlos Menem, succeeded Raul Alfonsín. Thailand has oscillated quite a bit due to military intervention, overt and more subtle, but even with the restoration of electoral democracy after the 1991 coup, it has not returned to the relatively 'free' conditions of the preceding years. Turkey's deterioration has been most striking of all, declining sharply since 1993 from the nearly free average score (3) it held for six years, reflecting growing military influence and what have been described as 'widespread' and 'appalling' human rights abuses.⁴³ Finally, in the

⁴³ See Freedom House (1995, 567); Human Rights Watch (1993, 243). See also the United States Department of State (1994), which frankly notes the persistence of torture and excessive use of force, despite the close security and economic ties between the United States and Turkey. Human Rights Watch (1995) indicates some improvement in Turkey's human rights situation in 1995, including the amendment of a repressive law, the release of scores of political prisoners, and some reduction in killings by 'death squads,' due largely to international and especially European pressure. However, there persisted a pattern of abuse much more characteristic of authoritarian regimes than of even minimal electoral democracies. "Free expression was still punished with arrests and imprisonment, torture was still employed as a routine instrument of police investigation, an abusive counterinsurgency campaign continued to empty Kurdish

more recent (and unstable) electoral democracies of Russia and Ukraine, freedom scores have declined slightly since the transition, but with the rising political strength of Communists and hardline nationalists in Russia, freedom, and even electoral democracy, would appear to be seriously endangered now.

This disturbing undertow in the third wave has been particularly significant (if not more widely acknowledged) within Latin America. Of the 22 countries below the Rio Grande with populations over one million, 10 have experienced a significant decline in their level of freedom since 1987, 6 have improved. While 5 countries made transitions to formal democracy (Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti, Panama, and Paraguay), only Chile became a free state, and 6 countries fell out of the 'free' status because of substantive deterioration in democratic conditions. Even in some free states (such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Jamaica) Freedom House has observed a downward trend in freedom in recent years. Although it is commonly assumed that Latin America today is overwhelmingly democratic, only 8 of the 22 principal countries in the region were rated as free at the end of 1995, compared with 13 in 1987 (see Table 6).⁴⁴ While harsh and blatant authoritarian rule has receded in the hemisphere, so has liberal democracy, as the region has experienced a 'convergence' toward "more mixed kinds of semidemocratic regimes" (Jonathan Hartlyn forthcoming, page 14 of November 1995 draft manuscript).

Some consider it remarkable that Latin American democracies have survived at all under the enormous stresses they have experienced over the past decade—dramatic economic downturns and increases in poverty (only recently being reversed in some countries), the mushrooming drug trade and the violence and corruption that flourish in its wake. Since the redemocratization of Latin America began in the early 1980s, the response to severe adversity and political crisis—including scandals that have forced presidential resignations in several countries—has primarily been adherence to constitutional process and electoral alternation in office (although the military did nearly overthrow democracy in Venezuela in 1992 and has rattled its sabers loudly elsewhere). In the practice of 'voting the bums out' rather than mobilizing against democracy itself, Latin American publics have given many observers cause to discern a normalization and maturation of democratic politics unlike in previous eras. (See, in particular,

villages, and there were continued reports of disappearances" (1995, 239). Both the radical separatist Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, and Turkey's state security forces have been responsible for extensive violence against innocent civilians in violation of international law. Human Rights Watch estimates that the civil war in Southeastern Turkey has claimed "over 19,000 deaths, including some 2,000 death-squad killings of suspected PKK sympathizers, two million displaced, and more than 2,200 villages destroyed, most of which were burned down by Turkish security forces" (Human Rights Watch Arms Project 1995, 1).

⁴⁴ This perspective on the troubled and partly illusory state of democracy in Latin America is assessed extensively in Diamond (1996b, 52–104). This assessment closely accords with that of Freedom House's resident Latin Americanist, Douglas W. Payne, who warned in his 1995 annual survey, "Democracy is in the balance in Latin America and the Caribbean, but you would hardly know that from listening to the region's political leaders" (1995, 17).

Remmer 1990, 1991, and 1993.) Indeed, a number of democratic governments (in Southern and Eastern Europe as well as Latin America) have been able to make some considerable progress in economic reform during the third wave, and in one sizable sample of such reform experiences, “the party that initiated cuts in working-class income has been defeated in less than half the cases” (Geddes 1995, 67). This resilience and persistence of constitutional procedures are cause for hope about the future of democracy in Latin America. So are recent reforms that have decentralized power and opened up the electoral process in Venezuela and Colombia, instituted an independent electoral commission in Panama, and improved judicial functioning in several countries. But these positive signs and steps have been outweighed by conditions that render electoral democracy in the region increasingly hollow, illiberal, delegative, and afflicted. These trends, evident in the resurgence of authoritarian practices under elected civilian presidents in countries such as Peru and Venezuela and in a general erosion of the rule of law under pressure from the drug trade, confirm my thesis of a growing gap between formal and liberal democracy. Even with their rather different political orientations, Human Rights Watch and Freedom House thus come to remarkably similar conclusions:

Periodic elections and transfers of power have not automatically led to an improvement in the quality of democracy experienced on a daily basis by the majority of citizens. Impunity for serious human rights violations committed by state agents is still appallingly pervasive; for the most part, military and police forces are accountable to courts and to civilian authorities on paper only. The courts fail miserably in providing citizens with a fair and impartial forum for the resolution of private disputes, and even more miserably in protecting them from abuse at the hands of the state, or in redressing those abuses (Human Rights Watch 1992, 69).⁴⁵

The reality is that in the region today rule is still based more on power than on law. In a majority of countries the traditionally dominant sectors of society—political elites, the wealthy, armies, police—continue to enrich themselves at public expense, while the human rights of ordinary people are violated with impunity. Judicial systems are less about justice than providing protection for those who can pay for it and punishing those who cannot. Voters can chase presidents and legislators through the ballot box in most countries, but government remains a racket dominated by the powerful and the well-connected (D. Payne 1995, 17).

⁴⁵ Although this assessment is now three years old, the Human Rights Watch report for 1996 indicates that change has been marginal at best. “More than a decade of civilian rule has allowed for a blossoming of civil society, yet the limits of political space were still defined by torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions in 1995.” Such repressive practices still remained to be criminalized by the penal codes of most countries. Judiciaries remained timid at best in guaranteeing due process and individual rights and routinely accepted confessions obtained through torture. Military justice systems “continued to foster a climate of impunity for perpetrators of human rights” (Human Rights Watch 1995, 63).

TABLE 6				
Democratic Status of Latin American countries, 1987 and 1995				
Regime Type and Combined Freedom Score		Countries & Freedom Scores Political Rights, Civil Liberties)		
		1987	1995	
Liberal Democracies				
Freedom Score 2	Costa Rica	(1,1)		
	Trinidad & T	(1,1)†		
Freedom Score, 3–4	Argentina	(2,1)	Costa Rica	(1,2)#
	Uruguay	(2,2)	Trinidad & Tobago	(1,2)
	Jamaica	(2,2)†	Uruguay	(2,2)#
	Dom. Republic	(1,3)	Chile	(2,2)
	Brazil	(2,2)		
	Venezuela	(1,2)		
Freedom Score 5	Colombia	(2,3)	Argentina	(2,3)–
	Bolivia	(2,3)	Ecuador	(2,3)–
	Ecuador	(2,3)	Jamaica	(2,3)
	Peru	(2,3)	Panama	(2,3)†
	Honduras	(2,3)		
Electoral Democracies				
Freedom Score, 6	Guatemala	(3,3)	Bolivia	(2,4)
			Brazil	(2,4)†
			El Salvador	(3,3)
			Honduras	(3,3)#
			Venezuela	(3,3)–
Freedom Score, 7	El Salvador	(3,4)	Dominican Repub.	(4,3)
			Paraguay	(4,3)
Electoral and Pseudodemocracies				
Freedom Score, 8–9	Mexico	(4,4)	Colombia	(4,4)
			Mexico	(4,4)
			Nicaragua	(4,4)†
			Guatemala	(4,5)–
			Peru	(5,4)
Freedom Score, 10–11	Chile	(6,5)	Haiti	(5,5)†
	Haiti	(5,6)		
	Nicaragua	(5,5)†		
	Panama	(5,5)		
	Paraguay	(5,6)		
Nonoppositional Authoritarian				
Freedom score 12–14	Cuba	(6,6)	Cuba	(7,7)

Note: Excludes countries with less than 1 million population. Figures in parantheses are the Freedom House country scores (political rights and civil liberties, respectively). Each scale ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 being most free.

indicates rating was changed for purely methodological reasons.

– signifies a shift downward and

† a shift upward in the freedom score from the previous year or two.

– signifies a downward trend in the level of democracy, but not significant enough to have changed the freedom rating.

These symbols apply to the last year of change in the period 1993–95. Sources: Freedom House (1988 and 1996).

As I have already suggested, the trends of increasing (or persisting) disorder, human rights violations, legislative and judicial inefficacy, corruption, and military impunity and prerogatives have been evident in other third wave democracies around the world, not only major countries like Turkey and Pakistan but smaller ones such as Zambia and most of the electoral regimes of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, as one moves toward the former Soviet Union, Africa, parts of Asia, and the Middle East, elections themselves are increasingly hollow and uncompetitive, a thin disguise for the authoritarian hegemony of despots and ruling parties. "As recognition grows of the right freely to elect one's governmental representatives, more governments [feel] compelled to hold elections in order to gain [international] legitimacy" (Human Rights Watch 1995, xxv). However, in 1995 alone, these contests descended into 'an electoral charade' in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (not to mention Iraq, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria) because of intimidation, rigging, and constriction (or in the extreme, utter obliteration) of the right of opposition forces to organize and contest (Human Rights Watch 1995, xxv). Since the recent wave of democratization began its sweep through Africa in early 1991, at least ten civilian regimes have held multiparty elections so flawed that they do not meet the minimal criteria for electoral democracy.⁴⁶ In addition to electoral democracy, then, we are compelled to identify another category of sham or 'pseudodemocracies.'⁴⁷

We thus have two degrees of gap, between liberal democracy and electoral democracy and, more radically, between liberal democracy and its pale shadow of pseudodemocracy. Perhaps the most stunning feature of the third wave of democratization is how few regimes are left in the world (only slightly over 20 percent) that do not fit into one of these three categories of civilian, multiparty, electoral regimes. This growing contradiction—continued expansion of the form of electoral democracy (and even more widely, of multiparty elections), while levels of actual freedom within such regimes diminish—signals the ideological hegemony of 'democracy' in the post-Cold War world system but also the superficial nature of that hegemony. The United States, and the international community more broadly, demand real electoral democracy in Latin America

⁴⁶ These ten are Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

⁴⁷ In such systems, "the existence of formally democratic institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination" (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988, xviii). By my count, at the end of 1995 there were, in addition to the 76 liberal democracies, 41 electoral but nonliberal democracies, 34 (authoritarian) pseudodemocracies, and 40 authoritarian regimes that effectively banned opposition parties, if not elections altogether. (A few of the pseudodemocracies are transitional but most seem to have settled upon this state as an equilibrium that has endured, or figures to, for at least some years. Examples of such regimes include Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mexico, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Senegal, and Zimbabwe). See the Appendix for a classification of all states in the world at the end of 1995.

and the Caribbean but are not too fussy about human rights and the rule of law. For Africa a lower standard is set by the major Western powers: opposition parties that can contest for office, even if they are to be manipulated, hounded, and rigged into defeat at election time.

Five models of diffusion can help us to understand the spread of the electoral form of democracy but also its considerable shallowness. One is the power model implied above. With the demise of the Soviet-bloc Communist states, the power of the United States and of its wealthy democratic allies has increased significantly. Acting partly out of principle but also from the growing belief that more constitutional and accountable political systems will generally produce better governance and more legitimate and stable regimes, these powerful democracies have pressed the formal model of electoral democracy on the weaker states over which they hold sway. Huntington, in particular, attributes much of the responsibility for the third wave to the policies, pressures, and expectations generated by the United States and the European community and views the future of global democratization as linked in no small measure to the power, will, and capacity of the United States (Huntington 1991, 87–98 and 284–87). Economic and political rewards have been offered for democratization and democratic persistence, while attempts to overthrow democracy by military or executive coup (like the unsuccessful *autogolpe* in Guatemala in May 1993) or to repress domestic movements for democracy have often been punished with economic and political sanctions (Diamond 1995a and Barkan forthcoming). But historically, and still to some considerable extent in the 1990s, democracy promotion policies have tended to be dominated by a highly minimalist, electoral conception of democracy, and even then they have been hollowed out when other interests have come into play.⁴⁸

A second mechanism of diffusion has rested on richer, more expansive conceptions of democracy and of the conditions for sustaining it. This has involved increasingly concerted, sophisticated, and resourceful efforts on the part of established democracies, particularly Germany and the United States, and now increasingly international organizations like the United

⁴⁸ This has been particularly the case with France, whose initial flirtation with democracy promotion in Africa, in 1991, proved highly superficial and fleeting. For a more detailed treatment of democracy promotion in Africa, see Diamond (1995b, 250–77). It should also be noted that the more powerful (or strategically significant) the authoritarian state, the less inclined the established democracies have been to use their own power resources to press for democracy. Thus, the Clinton Administration abandoned any conditioning of favorable trade relations with China on the latter's human rights performance, and the Europeans have been even less inclined even to raise the issue. Britain deported a Saudi dissident rather than risk commercial retaliation from Saudi Arabia, and the Mideast coordinator of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights recently remarked, "Saudi Arabia is the only place where US officials have flatly told me that human rights and democracy are not an American concern" (*New York Times*, "At Hour of Triumph Democracy Recedes as the Global Ideal," 18 February 1996, p. E5). The major Western democracies have failed to impose serious penalties on the Nigerian military regime for fear of losing lucrative oil production concessions or otherwise disrupting the flow of Nigeria's highly valued 'sweet crude.' For critical historical perspectives noting the competing foreign policy goals that have created tensions and contradictions in previous US democracy promotion efforts, see Lowenthal (1991), Carothers (1991), and Smith (1994).

Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS), to assist the development of the political and social infrastructure of democracy: effective legislatures, judicial systems, local governments, political parties and elections, and all manner of nongovernmental organizations and media in civil society.⁴⁹ This proliferation of discrete assistance programs, involving not only official aid and democracy promotion organizations but hundreds of nongovernmental actors in the established democracies, is not only diffusing the technology and particular institutional structures of successful democracy but also in the process reinforcing the diffusion of democratic norms and values (model four, below), especially through its aid to civil society. Yet democracy assistance efforts have also spent a considerable—and arguably, disproportionate—share of their financial resources on the monitoring of elections.⁵⁰

A third model of diffusion involves a kind of imitation: the demonstration effects of some earlier democratic transitions upon later ones (what Huntington calls ‘snowballing’), or the more gradual political learning that may come from the emulation of political models that are perceived as highly successful, powerful, and prestigious. In the latter respect there is some overlap with the power model of diffusion, but the impetus for democracy in this case is internal rather than external. As with the first process of diffusion, democratization by emulation will depend on whether the world’s democracies continue to be seen as worth emulating—as the means to success in the world system (a point to which I will return in conclusion). This model, too, is not inconsistent with a wide but shallow spread of democracy. The more widely an organizational form is imitated by diverse actors, the more it is likely to be diluted and adapted to various local circumstances. Moreover, the diffusion of the third wave of democracy in more recent years has been primarily to countries, particularly in Africa, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East, where the socioeconomic conditions for democracy (relatively high levels of education and per capita income, low inequality, a bourgeoisie and a working class independent of the state, vigorous civil societies, limited ethnic diversity or conflict, a strong sense of nationhood) are much weaker.⁵¹ Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and I have explicitly rejected any view of these variables as ‘preconditions,’ preferring to treat them as ‘facilitating or obstructing factors.’ However, it would be absurd to deny that where countries have consistently unfavorable levels of

⁴⁹ For surveys and analyses of these various assistance programs, see Diamond (1995a) and Barkan (forthcoming).

⁵⁰ International observing of elections, particularly founding elections, in new and insecure democracies, is a crucial form of assistance and, in conjunction with the organization of domestic monitoring efforts and parallel vote tabulations, has been honed to a high level of technical expertise. (See, for example, Garber and Cowan 1993, 95–107). However, large teams of international observers are very expensive to organize and place, and after the founding elections funding is probably better invested in the strengthening of domestic monitoring groups which can also play an ongoing role in mobilizing for accountability and deepening democracy.

⁵¹ The literature on these facilitating factors is vast. For a recent brief overview, see Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1995).

these variables (particularly with respect to per capita income), the odds against democratic endurance are greatly lengthened.⁵² Moreover, where multiparty elections do take place in such conditions, they are less likely to take the form of liberal democracy or to persist in that status.⁵³

A fourth mechanism of diffusion is more purely normative: judgments about what is intrinsically good, right, and desirable. These may overlap to some degree with the emulation or imitation model but probably work more slowly in motivating elites, civil society groups, or both toward regime change. Normative change may come from contact with specific countries and cultures (especially powerful or successful models, which also creates some overlap with the first model of diffusion). But it also derives, increasingly, from cultural evolution at the level of the global system. Gradually, the world community is embracing a shared normative expectation that all states seeking international legitimacy should manifestly 'govern with the consent of the governed'—in essence, a 'right to democratic governance,' a legal entitlement (Franck 1992, 50). Already effectively implied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this right to democratic governance has been articulated more and more explicitly in the documents of regional organizations like the OAS and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and is affirmed by the growing interventions of those organizations and the UN in the internal political affairs of sovereign countries.⁵⁴ These declarations and interventions not only exercise power (model 1), they also reinforce change at the level of norms.

Finally, a fifth 'world society' model encompasses to some extent the other four but adds a distinctive mechanism. This is the general trend toward global standardization or 'isomorphism' in the structure of states. As John Meyer and his collaborators have shown, over time, and particularly since World War II, global "cognitive models defining the nature, purpose, resources, technologies, controls and sovereignty of the proper nation-state" have produced increasingly similar state structures with respect to education, science, the economy, the environment, health and welfare, and even constitutionally defined citizen rights, state functions, and ministries. If these models, pressed by world organizations, international consultants, and 'rational' expectations in world culture, have been able to generate similar state structures in all of these

⁵² For evidence of the negative effects of poverty and increasing income inequality on the likelihood of democratic endurance, see Przeworski et al. (1996).

⁵³ As I have not yet done any quantitative analysis, this assertion remains more speculative. But I believe such analysis would show that, among the roughly 151 countries where multiparty elections now occur, the greater the level of per capita income, the more likely liberal democracy. Certainly all quantitative analyses that have used the Freedom House scores have found them to be significantly positively correlated with level of economic development. However, a superficial review of the data suggests it may not be the case that countries with higher per capita incomes are more likely to be electoral than 'pseudo'democracies.

⁵⁴ For some evidence of these trends, see *Journal of Democracy* (1993, 3–69) and Diamond (1995a, 31–38).

other sectors, it should not be surprising that they now increasingly define the 'rational' or expected structure of state power as one that is selected through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal franchise. However, precisely because this standardizing force of world 'culture' involves principles of 'rational organization' much more than shared norms, the structural isomorphism that it produces is likely to be formal, symbolic, and 'ritualized' more than substantive; thus, policies and practices are likely to diverge.⁵⁵

Clearly, multiple processes of global democratic diffusion are at work. But as we have seen, at least some of these are prone to generate a gap between form and substance. As the pace of democratic diffusion has quickened in recent years, we should perhaps not be surprised that the gap has widened. The wealthy, established democracies, and the international institutions they dominate, expect other countries to have or move toward democratic institutions but seem willing to accept a low standard of empirical adherence to democratic principles. Thus, an excessive emphasis is placed on 'free and fair elections' as the key standard for democracy (or for Africa, simply 'multipartyism'), and interest in democratic conditionality wanes after that electoral hurdle has been scaled. But even when chicanery is prevented on election day, how free, fair, and meaningful can elections be when the civil liberties of individuals and associations are routinely violated; when the legislatures that are elected have little or no power over public policy; when state power remains heavily centralized and people have virtually no control over policy and resources at the local level; when the judiciary is corrupt, ineffective, and unable to provide a rule of law; and when elites who are not accountable to any elected authority—the military, the bureaucracy, local political bosses—exercise substantial veto power or direct control over public policy? In these circumstances, elections—however much they freely and accurately reflect the preferences among given options of those who turn out to vote on election day—cannot in themselves signal the presence of liberal democracy.

Is the Third Wave Over?

⁵⁵ See Meyer (forthcoming, the quote is from page 2 of the January 1996 typescript draft). As Meyer notes, however, world pressures not only induce formal adaptation of the state from above but also strengthen and legitimate efforts at state change by civil society groups from below, and to the extent these are successful, they are more likely to bring about substantive adaptation. With respect to democratization, models of global power, political learning, and normative change may prove more helpful than the 'world society' perspective in helping us understand the way that global factors inspire and enable these changes from below. Nevertheless, the world society model adds distinctive explanatory insights, according well, for example, with Charles Fairbanks's assessment that "[d]emocracy's prestige in the postcommunist world is not based on any lived experience of democratic governance, but rather on a widespread sense that democracy and the market are the normal way that civilized life is conducted" (Fairbanks 1995, 31). Here I believe 'normal' closely approximates 'rational.'

With the number of liberal democracies in the world now stagnating; with many third wave democracies deteriorating in their actual democratic performance; with human rights abuses persistent and even increasing in even longstanding Third World democracies; with the gap between the electoral form and liberal substance of democracy growing; with the percentage of the world's population living in free states having actually declined sharply over the past decade (due largely to India's democratic recession, to be sure); with democratic forces having taken a beating in the December 1995 Russian legislative elections; and with the world's most powerful and influential authoritarian states—China, Indonesia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—showing little or no prospect of democratization in the near term, the question arises: Is the third wave over?

In one sense, the evidence in the affirmative appears to be mounting. If we look beyond the form of democracy—a form that is increasingly expected by world culture and organizations—we see erosion and stagnation offsetting liberalization and consolidation. *Liberal* democracy has stopped expanding in the world, and so has political freedom more generally. If we take the liberal content of democracy seriously, it seems that the third wave of democratic expansion has come to a halt and probably to an end. We may or may not see in the coming years the emergence of a few new electoral democracies, but a further sizable increase seems unlikely, given that democratization has already occurred in the countries where conditions are most favorable. In the coming years movement to electoral democracy also seems likely to be offset by movement away from it, as some fledgling electoral democracies in Africa and elsewhere are either blatantly overthrown (as in Gambia and Niger), squelched just before birth (as in Nigeria), or strangled (more or less slowly) by deterioration in the fairness of contestation and the toleration of opposition (as in Peru, Cambodia, and some of the former Communist states). In these circumstances more and more countries may seek to satisfy ritually the expectation of 'democracy' through its most hollow form, some type of pseudodemocracy.

When expansion in the number of democracies and the overall level of democraticness in the world halts for a sustained period (say, five to ten years), it seems reasonable to conclude that a democratic wave has come to an end. At least, this marks the end of a 'short wave' of democratization. The second wave of democratization lasted about two decades. The current wave has lasted about as long. We probably should not expect that a short wave will last much longer.

Must this mean that we are on the edge of a third reverse wave of democracy? This more frightful prospect for democracy is not yet apparent and may well be avoidable. It is theoretically possible for a wave of democratic expansion to be followed not by a reverse wave but by a period of stagnation or stability, in which the number of democracies in the world overall neither increases or decreases significantly for some time and in which gains for democracy are more or less offset by losses. It is precisely such a period of stasis we seem to have entered.

Many of the new democracies of the third wave are in serious trouble today, and there are grounds for arguing that the erosion of democratic substance could be a precursor to the actual suspension or overthrow of democracy, whether by executive or military coup. President Alberto Fujimori's *autogolpe*, from which Peru has still not recovered even an electoral democracy, was preceded by years of steady deterioration in political rights and civil liberties. Historically, the path to military coups and other forms of democratic breakdown has been paved with the accumulation of unsolvable problems, the gross corruption and malfunctioning of democratic institutions, the gradual aggrandizement of executive power, and the broad popular disaffection with politics and politicians that are evident today in many third wave democracies (and a few of longer standing).

However, three things are different today and have so far prevented a new wave of democratic breakdowns:

1. Military establishments are acutely reluctant to seize power overtly, because of the lack of popular support for a coup (due in part to the discredit many militaries suffered during their previous brutal and inept rule); because of their sharply diminished confidence in their ability to tackle formidable economic and social problems; because of the "disastrous effects on the coherence, efficiency, and discipline of the army" that they have perceived during previous periods of military rule (Huntington 1995, 13); and, not least, because of the instant and powerful sanctions that the established democracies have shown an increasing resolve to impose against such democratic overthrows.⁵⁶ Thus, even where "the government cannot maintain civil order" and has been returned to power with such a low turnout, and with such "widespread vote-rigging, that its legitimacy is in doubt," as in Bangladesh this past February 15, the disgusted citizenry does not seem to want a coup, and the military surprises many observers by failing to seize power.⁵⁷ In addition, many of the democracies of the third wave have made significant progress toward establishing the conditions of "objective civilian control" that prevail in the industrialized democracies: high levels of military professionalism, constrained military role conceptions, subordination of the

⁵⁶ Unfortunately, the inhibitions against renewed military intervention appear to be considerably weaker in Africa than in other regions, because most African militaries have far less corporate professionalism and sense of mission and are riven with ethnic, factional, and personalistic divisions and motivations. And to repeat, the persistence of military rule in Nigeria, in the face of rhetorically strident but effectively mild international pressure, appears to have had its own demonstration effects, encouraging militaries in West Africa in particular to seize power (as in Gambia and Niger) or to abort plans to surrender it (as in Sierra Leone).

⁵⁷ See "Bangladesh's Reluctant Army," *The Economist*, 24 February 1996, pp. 35–36.

military to civilian decisionmakers, autonomy for the military in its limited area of professional competence, and thus “the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.”⁵⁸ (In the more fragmented and illiberal postcommunist states, different dynamics also appear to have inhibited military coups).⁵⁹

2. Even where, as in Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, progress toward democratic consolidation has been partial and slow and the quality of democracy has deteriorated in some respects, publics have shown no appetite for a return to authoritarian rule of any kind; culturally, democracy remains a valued goal.⁶⁰
3. Finally, and related to the above, no antidemocratic ideology with global appeal has emerged to challenge the continued global ideological hegemony of democracy as a principle and formal structure of government.

⁵⁸ I do not think the trends in civil-military relations in third wave (or pre-existing Third World) democracies are as broadly encouraging as Huntington (1995, 9–12) portrays them, however. Undeniable progress in a number of cases, such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Poland, is counterbalanced by stagnation or regression in some others, as discussed below. In particular, as Jonathan Hartlyn observes, the state of civil-military relations in Latin America “remains decidedly mixed for the fundamental reason that it is not obvious what an appropriate role for [the military] should be that would facilitate their removal from active involvement in domestic politics” (Hartlyn forthcoming, 17). Like many other students of Latin America, Hartlyn believes that the militarization of the drug war (supported by the United States) has impeded the transition to a more democratically responsible and professionally constrained military.

⁵⁹ The absence of military regimes in the postcommunist states of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia—where state authority is weak and fragmented and civilian multiparty regimes take the form of pseudodemocracy (or a very illiberal electoral democracy)—may be due to the radically antipolitical atmosphere, “the near total flight from the public world as such.” This, Fairbanks (1995, 28 and 30) speculates, produces leaders of militias and irregular armies “driven by the desire for money or raw power or by pointless grudges rather than by the ambition that builds states.” A major reason why the military has not seized power in Russia, in Huntington’s view, is that it is no longer capable of doing so, given the dramatic declines in its coherence, organization, professionalism, and morale since the break-up of the Soviet Union (1995, 14).

⁶⁰ Observers may discern contrary trends in the resounding re-election, in April 1995, of the personalistic, autocratic President Alberto Fujimori in Peru and in the strong showing of Communists and extreme nationalists in Russia’s December 1995 parliamentary elections. However, even with all the advantages of his emergency authoritarian control, Fujimori barely won the October 1993 constitutional referendum greatly strengthening and centralizing executive power, and his margin of re-election victory was greatly aided by “pre-election machinations” and fragmentation among opposition forces (Palmer 1996, 70–75). As for Russia, close analysis of the parliamentary voting for both the party lists and the single-mandate seats suggests that the overall balance in the electorate between proreform and reactionary (Communist or nationalist) forces may not have shifted much, or at least that voters are beginning to vote their ‘interests’ and do not appear to be searching for ‘a man on a white horse.’ For these interpretations, respectively, see McFaul (1996) and Fish (1996).

As a result, political, social, and economic stresses that induced the breakdown of democracy during the first and second reverse waves have brought, rather, its diminution during the waning years of the third wave. Instead of expiring altogether, democracy has gradually been 'hollowed out' in many countries, leaving a shell of multiparty electoralism, often with genuine competitiveness and uncertainty over outcomes, adequate to obtain international legitimacy and economic rewards (such as Turkey's recent admission to the European Customs Union and continued US security assistance to many illiberal Latin American regimes). Rather than topple or mobilize against the constitutional system, political leaders and groups that have no use for democracy or are what Juan Linz calls, in his classic study of democratic breakdowns, 'semiloyal' to the system, are more likely to choose and condone oblique and partial assaults on democracy, such as repressing particularly troublesome oppositions and minorities. Instead of seizing power through a coup, the military may gradually reclaim more operational autonomy and control over matters of internal security and anti-insurgency, as they have done in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, Pakistan, Turkey, and probably India and Sri Lanka.⁶¹ Instead of terminating multiparty electoral competition and declaring a one-party (or no-party) dictatorship as they did during the first and second reverse waves, frustrated chief executives (like Alberto Fujimori in Peru) will temporarily suspend the constitution, dismiss and reorganize the legislature, and reshape to their advantage a constitutional system that will subsequently retain the formal structure or appearance of democracy. Or they will engage in a cat-and-mouse game with international donors, liberalizing politically in response to pressure and repressing as much as they believe they need to and can get away with in order to hang on to power—as the former one-party regimes of Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, Omar Bongo in Gabon, and Paul Biya in Cameroon have done in Africa.

Is this, then, the way the third wave of democratization ends: death by a thousand subtractions?

⁶¹ For a trenchant analysis linking Colombia's democratic regression to murderous violence, wholesale impunity of state security forces for human rights abuses, and "a reassertion of military authority and autonomy," despite a succession of sophisticated reformist presidents, see Chernick (1996, 76–81). With the military's open defiance in 1995 of an agreement between the government and a guerrilla force to demilitarize a particular area and of a recommendation to retire a top general found guilty of a political murder, "it seemed that 10 years of carefully establishing an institutional framework for civilian control over the military had collapsed like a house of cards" (80).

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A P P E N D I X

CLASSIFICATION OF STATES BY REGIME AT END OF 1995

Liberal Democracies	Democracies			Electoral Nonliberal
1.0	1.5	2.0		
Andorra	Bahamas	Benin	Bolivia	
Australia	Cape Verde	Botswana	Brazil	
Austria	Costa Rica	Bulgaria	El Salvador	
Barbados	Czech Republic	Chile	Honduras	
Belgium	France	Estonia	Madagascar	
Belize	Germany	Greece	Papua New Guinea	
Canada	Grenada	Guyana	Philippines	
Cyprus	Hungary	Israel	Seychelles	
Denmark	Italy	Korea, South	Suriname	
Dominica	Japan	Latvia	Taiwan	
Finland	Lithuania	Nauru	Venezuela	
Iceland	Mauritius	Uruguay		
Ireland	Monaco	Vanuatu	3.5	
Kiribati	Palau	Western Samoa	Albania	
Liechtenstein	Poland		Bangladesh	
Luxembourg	St. Kitts & Nevis	2.5	Central African Republic	
Malta	St. Lucia	Argentina	Dominican Republic	
Marshall Islands	St. Vincent & Grenadines	Ecuador	Fiji	
Micronesia	Sao Tome & Principe	Jamaica	Guinea-Bissau	
Netherlands	Slovenia	Malawi	Macedonia	
New Zealand	Solomon Islands	Mali		
Norway	South Africa	Mongolia		
Portugal	Spain	Namibia		
San Marino	Trinidad & Tobago	Panama		
Sweden	United Kingdom	Slovakia		
Switzerland				
Tuvalu				
United States				

States are listed in order of their average Freedom House score at the end of 1995. For the scores, see Freedom House (1996, 15–16). All 'free states' are listed here as liberal democracies. Classification into 'electoral, nonliberal democracies,' 'pseudodemocracies,' and 'nonoppositional authoritarian regimes' is by the judgment of the author. I have recoded

Niger as a 'nonoppositional' dictatorship because of the January 1996 military coup and Taiwan a democracy because of the **successful** (March 1996) direct election for the presidency.

CLASSIFICATION OF STATES BY REGIME AT END OF 1995 (cont.)

3.5	Pseudo- democracies	6.0	6.5
Mozambique		Algeria	Burundi
Nepal	3.5	Angola	Gambia
Paraguay		Azerbaijan	Iran
Romania	Antigua & Barbuda	Cambodia	Laos
Russia		Cameroon	Liberia
Thailand	4.0	Egypt	Qatar
Ukraine		Yugoslavia	Rwanda
Zambia			Sierra Leone
	Armenia	6.5	Zaire
4.0	Comoros		
	Ghana	Indonesia	7.0
Colombia	Jordan	Kenya	
Congo	Mexico		Afghanistan
Croatia	Tonga	Nonoppositional Authoritarian Regimes	Bhutan
India			Burma
Kyrgyz Republic	4.5		China
Lesotho			Cuba
Moldova	Burkina-Faso	4.5	Equatorial
Guinea			
Nicaragua	Ethiopia		Iraq
Pakistan	Gabon	Uganda	Korea, North
	Malaysia		Libya
4.5	Peru	5.0	Niger
	Senegal		Nigeria
Georgia		Eritrea	Saudi Arabia
Guatemala	5.0	Kuwait	Somalia
Sri Lanka			Sudan
	Belarus	5.5	Syria
5.0	Morocco		Tajikistan
	Singapore	Chad	Turkmenistan
Haiti	Tanzania	Djibouti	Uzbekistan
Turkey	Zimbabwe	Swaziland	Vietnam
		United Arab Emirates	
6.0	5.5		
Bosnia- Herzegovina	Côte d'Ivoire	6.0	
	Guinea		
	Kazakhstan	Bahrain	

Lebanon
Togo
Tunisia
Yemen

Brunei
Maldives
Mauritania
Oman

