

Notes Taken During Discussions at the Grote Club Meetings, February-November 1867

Alfred Marshall

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references

Introduction

After Henry Sidgwick's death, on August 29th 1900, his wife Eleanor M. Balfour and his son Arthur S. began to gather information for the memorial book they were to publish in 1906 (1). Marshall answered their queries by sending some notes he had taken during discussions at the Grote Club and accompanied them with a comment on the Club itself; this latter was extensively reproduced by the authors (2).. The full text of both comment and notes are here reproduced with editorial additions in square brackets (except punctuation) and Archive page numbers in round brackets on separate lines (3).

Scholars who are interested in any of the subjects dealt with in the notes – education at Cambridge, British philosophy in the 1860s, the 1867 Reform Bill, mesmerism – or any of the members of the Club – Sidgwick, Maurice, Venn and Marshall in particular – should have little difficulty in sifting through the text to identify the most pertinent elements. The footnotes have the limited aim of supplying bio-biographical information, especially on philosophical subjects.

The philosophical climate of the discussions is set by the contrast between Sidgwick's utilitarian leanings and the more traditional views held by Maurice and Pearson. It is interesting to notice that psychological issues have a bearing on many of the themes raised.

As far as the young Marshall is concerned, his talks on various issues, though of moderate interest, are worth exploring. On 5 February, after showing the evolutionist leanings that were later to become preminent (4), he clearly stated a problem that was to worry him throughout his life: for as Marshall was only too aware, "that course of action which chimed in with our present state was frequently preferred though conducive to less ultimate pleasure". On 29 May he spoke of Spencer's notion of "unconceivability", a subject linked to "a priori" knowledge that both Spencer and Marshall endorsed against Mill's empiricism (see Raffaelli 1994, p. 100, note 19). On 5 November the abrupt – and soon regretted – boutade on "Butler's Pyrrhonism" reveals Marshall's rejection of sceptical attitudes in practical life and of the simple Butlerian precept "Follow Nature", that noble ancestor to laissez-faire doctrines. Lastly, on the same day he made a cryptic proposal that can perhaps be interpreted as an attempt at explaining away the "ghostological" theories of both Sidgwick and Maurice.

Text

(1)

Extracts from a common place book begun in April 1866, and continued fitfully till the end of 1867.

All except the first relate to the Grote Club, founded by Prof. Grote (Knightbridge Professor and brother of the historian) (5) some years earlier: I fancy eight or ten years.

When I was admitted in 1867, the active members were Prof. Maurice (6), Sidgwick, Venn (7), J. R. Mozley (8) and Pearson (9). For many years Pearson was, after Sidgwick, the chief teacher of Moral Sciences. He was a devoted pupil of J. B. Mayor (10) and an earnest broad Churchman. He brought many worthy, but not always able, young men, chiefly from St John's, who were preparing for Holy Orders; and thus, while maintaining the numbers in the Moral Sciences Tripos, gave it a somewhat theological tone.

Venn seldom stayed long at a meeting, and was not often very active. Mozley was always eager when he came.

After 1867 or 1868 the Club languished a little; but new vigour was soon imparted to it by the advent of W. K. Clifford (11) and J. F. Moulton (12). For a year or two Sidgwick, Mozley, Clifford, Moulton and myself were the only effective members, and we all attended regularly.

(2)

By that time I had got to know a little about philosophy, whereas in 1867, I was quite a beginner (I had only begun to read it seriously towards the end of 1865, and had been teaching mathematics all the while). Clifford and Moulton were still beginners. They kept quiet for the first half hour, listening eagerly to what others, and especially Sidgwick said. Then they let their tongues loose, and the pace was tremendous. If I could get verbatim reports of a dozen of the best conversations I have heard in my life, I should choose two or three from among those evenings in which Sidgwick and Clifford were the chief speakers. Another would certainly be a conversation at tea before a Grote Club meeting, of which I have unfortunately no record (I think it was early in 1868) in which practically no one spoke but Maurice and Sidgwick. Sidgwick devoted himself to drawing out Maurice's recollections of English social and political life in the 30s, 40s and 50s. Maurice's force shone out bright, with its singular holy radiance, as he responded to Sidgwick's inquiries and suggestions. And we others said afterwards that we owed it all to him. No one else among us knew enough to keep on again and again arousing the warm latent energy of the old man; for he always looked tired, and would relapse into silence after two or three minutes' talk, however eager it had been, unless stimulated by someone who knew how to strike the right chord.

A. M. 7.X.1900

(3) (13)

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Feb. 5 Grote Club at Sidgwick's Present S[idgwick], P[earson] and V[enn].

S[idgwick] read a long and general sketch of the various systems of morality. I Absolute right. II Make yourself noble. III Make yourself happy. IV Increase the general happiness.

In the course of it he committed himself to the statement that without appreciating the effects of our actions on the happiness of ourselves or of others we could have no idea

of right and wrong. I objected that a being incapable of anticipating the effects of his actions might yet classify those which coincided and those which jarred with his instincts (hereditary or otherwise). We then, after V[enn] and P[earson] had gone, passed on to α aesthetic feelings β thence to Desire γ thence to Laughter. α S[idgwick] objected to the idea of the increase of "mental vis viva" as vague. This I was compelled to admit. He seemed also inclined to admit that something might be made out of it. β He says that Bain regards Desire as varying with the pleasure anticipated: whereas he regards desire as exercising some influence over pleasure. I suggested that that course of action which chimed in with our present state was frequently preferred though conducive to less ultimate pleasure. γ he preferred Bain on wit to Spencer on the Physiology of Laughter (14).

(5)

Feb 19 P[earson] ill: no meeting.

March 5 Present V[enn] S[idgwick] P[earson] A meeting in Venn's Rooms. No paper read owing to a mistake.

The conversation very general. S[idgwick] was strongly opposed to D. Stewart on the ground that no-one believed in him. He defended, in opposition to P[earson], Whewell's *Elements of Morality* in preference to it for the Moral S[ciences] Tripos on the ground that it was systematic and contained something (15) valuable about Political Philosophy (16). V[enn] thought Whewell's book dry: he could never make out what he was driving at. Nor can I but I have only read a few pages and did not speak. Sidgwick believes in Utilitarianism and positively refused to sign any report of the sub-syndicate on which he is (17) unless Mill and Bentham were to be recommended. In the same way he insists on either Brown or Bain. P[earson] totally denied that books ought to be chosen because men could be found to believe in them. He did not approve of "dogmatical teaching". As S[idgwick] would recommend books that different people agree in, this objection does not seem very valid. S[idgwick] spoke strongly on introducing mathematics up to the range of three days (Bar[?] Newton) into ye compulsory Little Go (18).

(6)

March 14. Grote Club in my Rooms. Present Maurice, V[enn], S[idgwick], P[earson].

Conversation at tea political. M[aurice] thought Mill would bring forward Hare's scheme, there being now no objection, no fear of injuring his own party. S[idgwick] had been told by a friend of his in the House that Bright was treated like a fierce bull-dog: cheered violently by the Liberals when he spoke in the House; but treated rather reservedly and unheeded when they were among themselves, as at Gladstone's meeting. M[aurice] said that the talk in London at present turned on the fact that Lord Cranbourne, who used to be on such bad terms with Gladstone, was with his wife at Mrs. Gladstone's party last week. S[idgwick] thought that everyone in the political world seemed as though he were trying to do everyone else (19)

cont. p. after next (20)

(7)

Maurice had heard that the Conservatives were opposed to Derby's Bill: but that he was so extremely, so unusually humble that they could not resist him. After tea I apologized for the fragmentary character of my Essay on the Law of Parcimony and read it (21). S[idgwick] interrupted to know on what grounds I concluded that Condillac's Image would not perceive any close similarity between ye sensation of pressure on foot and

one of pressure on hand. I had no grounds; I assumed it; if he denied it, the illustration would be but a little more purely hypothetical. At the conclusion he thought that in general he agreed with me. V[enn] asked whether there would arise any difference in Bain's arrangement if my method were adopted. I replied not much partly because Bain makes a somewhat analogous classification of Reflex, partly Reflex etc. actions. I quoted too Bain's answer to H. Spencer. I recollect no more.

Maurice was silent.

At the end Sidgwick thought he differed. Would like to take the paper; but forgot to do so.

March 27th (22)

(8)

May 21 Grote meeting at Maurice's. Present M[ozley], S[idgwick] and P[earson].

At tea discussion on natural science Lecturer and Sanskrit Professor (23).

Afterwards a paper by Maurice on the question "Is there any use in Psychology". He took the line that the "I" should not be divided into mind, soul etc., and each part considered separately. The discussion was vague and rambling: no one seemed to be talking from any one else's point of view. Thus there was an imparted air of confusedness and inconsistency in Maurice's apparent solution. Indeed, though generally he expressed approbation of Comte's attack on the psychologists, I could not discover at all clearly how far he agreed with his grounds, or how far he used the word psychology in the same sense.

See May 29th

67/5/29

(9)

May 29th Grote meeting at Mozley's. Present Maurice P[earson] and S[idgwick].

At tea discussion on alterations in Moral Sciences Tripos. In particular Ferrier's *Remains* (24) on the doctrine of strife as the formulation of Ethics was vigorously attacked by S[idgwick] as meaningless and defended somewhat vaguely by Maurice as containing important truths. S[idgwick] liked the feeling that all was going well; not so Maurice. Unless we felt that we were masters of our inclinations, that we were exercising a strong dominion over them, we were not to be satisfied. S[idgwick] had never before seen a man gravely told to "quarrel with his bread and butter". Maurice scarcely liked the levity. There was to be strife, but we were to be masters of the bread and butter, not it of us. Sidgwick did not reply that all this latter part was granted, the thing wanted being to know which way the strife, when there was strife, was going. S[idgwick] described Butler's *Sermons* as a hard nut with a small kernel (25). P[earson] of course thought the kernel large. S[idgwick] committed himself as he had done once before to the statement that his principle with regard to selecting books for the Tripos was that someone should be able "to lay his hand upon his heart and say: This represents more nearly what I feel and think than any other book on the subject". He argued that that was decisive against the Ancients. But Maurice was down on him with

(16) (26)

"I can say that of Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle represents what I really feel far more than many of the books which you have introduced". S[idgwick] did not care to defend himself, but Maurice could not say that these were *the* books to and for him.

On the subject to the Hare prize (27): "The influence and doctrine of Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonists as compared with that of Carneades and the later Academy", S[idgwick] thought it unsatisfactory and made his remarks of general application to such prizes. He thought the Greek Phil[osophical] history recorded one continuous grinding down of sharp edges and thought the transition from Pyrrho to the New Academy an instance. Both he and Maurice expressed a personal liking for Chrysippus. They agreed also in regarding the "finality" which Epicurus had been able to give to his system, and attributed this to the fact that his followers were in general too feeble to introduce important developments. Comte was brought forward as a parallel. S[idgwick] remarked on the probable personal influence of Comte; but the prima facie unattractiveness of the position of each of them was admitted. M[aurice] remarked that Harrison had accused Temple of plagiarising from Comte his idea of development of "the Colossal Man" after manner and in stages corresponding to the individual man (28). This and many similar charges were thought to be groundless. But "plagiarism" being started S[idgwick] remarked on the diversity among correspondence in certain passages in Isaiah and Jeremiah. As to the

(10)

promiscuous occurrence of certain striking phrases, M[aurice] accounted for them as the proverbs of the schools of the prophets. S[idgwick] had observed that in oral tradition (as in the Arabian Nights) for some lines two editions would correspond verbatim, then an alteration of a word, then two very similar lines, then differences for a few lines, then more correspondence, then an addition of an incident or description (sometimes obviously of set purpose to beautify and illustrate, sometimes not) and so on.

The paper, though it appeared to be an old one, was practically an answer to Maurice's Psychology: [it] was a history of the "Soul", this word [being] better than "Mind" because it included emotions etc. The historical and physiological methods or branches (for though pressed Mozley would not adhere carefully to one or the other phrase; yet maintained that "branches" was the right one) are those which are alone admitted by the Positivists (29). The historical is obviously the most definite, trustworthy and fruitful in clear and decided results. But even here – an eclipse is predicted. When it happens it verifies the prediction – but political or other social events are predicted and that very prediction alters the chance of their occurring: hence a difficulty to the *Science*. The historical branch, that of the direct study and analysis of the phenomena of the Mind: A gardener's knowledge of particular earths [in relation to]

(11)

that of a geologist with regard to the rocks which compose the globe; or as he might have said the one is superficial but thorough, the other thorough but superficial. Again he alluded to the earth as having undergone various changes and rechanges in plying [so] that probably most portions of matter have at successive times formed portions of many various rocks and kinds of rocks, and of many various beings and kinds of beings; but of those we have left now but a few strata, a few fossils. So of all the phenomena which have in its various stages attached to the mind those which remain are few and fragmentary. He talked about language, that of words and the more general of intercourse; and demanded a more careful examination of the relations between these two. His essay appeared to be very good and thorough, but S[idgwick] spotted an omission – that of logic and also of a priori truth. This latter M[ozley] said he had allowed for in metaphysics into which he had described the main branch of Psy[chology] as merging. Metaphysics he had defined as the exam[inatio]n of "the relation of mind to mind". S[idgwick] had thought they rather had for their subject $\tau\omicron\ \pi\alpha\nu$. Yes, but the beginning of $\tau\omicron\ \pi\alpha\nu$, not its end. Next H[erbert] S[pencer]'s

Inconceivability was talked about chiefly by me, but not satisfactorily. Afterwards we wandered much. I am sleepy, I may write more tomorrow.

67/5/29

N.B. Mozley told me afterwards that he had not intended it to be in any way an answer to Maurice's – that the subject matter was the result of thought in the Vacation but the essay itself was new.

(12)

Nov. 5 Diner at Venn's. At the discussion afterwards there were present M[auric]e, S[idgwick] and P[earson]. Venn had no paper on account of ill health.

Whewell's dogmatism and freespokenness was attacked by S[idgwick] who regarded him as a vigorous and energetic thinker who *would* put down whatever came into his head, without troubling himself to connect it with what came before or give reasons for it. Something being said about Butler I burst in with "the Pyrrhonism of Butler". The obscurities and difficulties of the outward world convinced both of the weakness of reason, they both sought in consequence for their ethical guide in Nature: "Follow Nature". I broke in somewhat abruptly and the connection of

(13)

Pyrrhonism with the name of Butler was offensive to M[auric]e (30). Moreover I did not play my cards well. I ought first to have said is not this the general method of Butler. Then is it not also that of Pyrrho, though the latter worked with such bad materials and made such miserable work. I did not even explain clearly that the difficulties I meant were of the practical kind, the mistakes that we make in our every day business etc.

It was remarked that it was strange that the systematic Whewell should have laid so much stress on the writings of the unsystematic Butler. P[earson] maintained that Whewell had evolved in order the idea of Ethics from that of Law. This Sidgwick denied and clenched the argument by saying that Whewell in his second ed[ition] had put Law last in order to prove to the world that his Ethics were independent of it (31). But he and M[auric]e agreed that he had not shewn this. P[earson] described Thomson's laws of thought as a weak attempt to reconcile the antagonistic systems of logic of Mansel and Mill (32). Afterwards we went upstairs and in the course of time M[auric]e spoke about Miss Martineau's servant who would cause her to be drenched whenever she wished it i.e. to have the feeling of trickling water down her back. Then S[idgwick] began to give some of his experiences. No one could have the least influence over him even when he did not resist. He had come across a

(14)

set of about 25 working men and women completely isolated from other spiritualists who met once a week to hold communication chiefly religious. The medium while he was there fell into a trance and preached to him.

He had never been able to find a case well authenticated in which clair voyance proper had been proved i.e. in which the subject had discovered facts not known to the operator. But M[auric]e said "I was present when a friend was mesmerised. He was carefully blindfolded and watched. He was a Frenchman and could scarcely, if at all, read English writing. I took hold of his hand and drew a letter out of my pocket. I knew its contents; but neither the subject nor the operator knew them. But he repeated the first two lines". Mrs. V[enn] would never be mesmerised "unless by a person in whom she

had perfect confidence" she added when pressed. S[idgwick] could mesmerise a very little; he could not send to sleep. But he could produce epilepsy; which has thus proved [:] – The subject held out his leg till the position became so painful as to be unendurable, than he (S[idgwick]) passed his hand two or three times down the leg and the subject was able to hold it out without inconvenience for a quarter of an hour longer.

I proposed a scheme which a little modified stands thus. Let a post be erected at every important corner throughout London saying how many miles, furlongs (and if necessary yards) it was N or S and E or W of say Nelson's Column. If then a person were told to go to James Smith corner King's Terrace and that the nearest post was marked 2m.3f N and 3m.5f.30y E it would be utterly impossible for him ever to go far out of his way.

- [Back to Homepage](#)
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Notes

1. Sidgwick A.S. and E.M., *Henry Sidgwick; A Memoir*, London: Macmillan, 1906.
2. Sidgwick A.S. and E.M., *cit.*, pp. 137-38. The notes have also been referred to by Whitaker (1975, p. 8), Schneewind (1986, p. 47), Raffaelli (1994, pp. 59, 64, 103) and Groenewegen (1995, pp. 111-112).
3. The original is kept in the Archive of Trinity College, Cambridge (Add Ms. c 104. 65). I am very glad to acknowledge the precious and kind assistance of the Librarian and staff of Trinity College Library and also to thank Dr. Elisabeth Leedham-Green, Cambridge University Archives, and Dr. Katia Caldari for their valuable help. Marshall and Marshall (1879, p. 153); Marshall (1920, p. 710).
4. Cf. below, [note 14](#).
5. John Grote (1813-1866), brother of George, Knightbridge Professor of "Casuistry, Moral Theology and Moral Philosophy", author of *Exploratio Philosophica* (1865) and other essays. His influence on Marshall is briefly discussed in Raffaelli (1994, pp. 65-66).
6. Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872) was one of the leading intellectual figures of his age, a Christian Socialist and a "Coleridgean" Idealist. After Grote's death, he was appointed Knightbridge Professor. His works in the history of philosophy – *Ancient Philosophy* (1861), *Medieval Philosophy* (1859), *Modern Philosophy* (1862) – were later remoulded into *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy* (1872).
7. John Venn (1834-1923), then Lecturer on Moral Sciences at Gonville and Caius' College, author of *The Logic of Chance* (1866).
8. John Rickards Mozley (1840-1931), mathematician and theologian, author of *Clifton Memoirs*, Fellow of King's College and from 1865 Professor of Pure Mathematics at Manchester.
9. Josiah Brown Pearson (1841-1895), Fellow of St. John's and author of *The Divine Personality* (1865). Soon after 1867 he asked Marshall to lecture on Political Economy because he did not like the subject (Whitaker, 1975, p. 7). In 1880 he became bishop of Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia. *Ibid.*, p. 593.
10. Joseph Bickersteth Mayor (1828-1916), Fellow of St. John's and later Professor of Classics in London. He married a niece of John Grote and became his literary executor. In a previous paper (Raffaelli 1994, p. 58) I mistook his brother John Eyton for Joseph.
11. William Kingdon Clifford (1845-1879), one of Marshall's closest friends, Fellow of Trinity from 1868 and later Professor of Mathematics in London. Author of many philosophical articles that were posthumously published by Frederick Pollock and Leslie Stephen under the title *Lectures and Essays*. Clifford's deep influence on Marshall's philosophical ideas is analyzed by Raffaelli (1994).

12. John Fletcher Moulton (1844-1921), Senior Wrangler in 1868 and later liberal MP and Lord Justice of Appeal.

13. "Addison on his deathbed sent for his nephew to 'see how a Christian could die'. Comte, when told that he could not live, remained perfectly silent for half an hour and then said 'c'est une perte irréparable'. Sidgwick mentioned these as developments of the same feeling, in very similar men, but under somewhat different circumstances. In each there is enough self-consciousness and arrogance to prove that even in the most intense ardour of their concern for their several religions, they could not separate their cause from themselves. 4/28/1866"

This is the only piece unconnected with the Grote Club.

14. This note is examined by Schneewind (1977) in relation to the development of Sidgwick's philosophy as witnessed by his article "Pleasure and desire" (*Contemporary Review*, 1872, 9, pp. 662-72), later remoulded into chapter 4 of *The Methods of Ethics* (1874), and changed again in the second edition (1877) to answer Bain's criticism. The relation between "pleasure" and "desire" was also present in Marshall's later writings (Raffaelli 1996).

Herbert Spencer's "The physiology of laughter" was published in *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1860, 1, pp. 395-40. Alexander Bain had published "Wit and humour" in *Westminster Review*, 1847, pp. 24-59 and took the subject up again, referring also to Spencer's theory, in *The Emotions and the Will*, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 2nd edn 1865, pp. 247-53. In a manuscript called *Meditanda*, almost contemporary with the notes on the Grote Club and consisting mainly of philosophical quotations, Marshall transcribes Hobbes's definition of laughter and refers to the entry "laughter" in Fleming's *Vocabulary of Philosophy* (1857). Laughter was one of the main issues in the debates on the relations between physiology and psychology which greatly interested the young Marshall. The idea that laughter is caused by an increase of mental force was maintained by Spencer and Bain. Marshall's opinion about their physiological approach is implicit in the words "I was *compelled* to admit [that the idea is vague]", while Sidgwick's opposite opinion is witnessed by his having "to *admit* that something might be made out of it".

15. "Somewhat" in Marshall's text.

16. Both Dugald Stewart's *The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man* (Edinburgh: Adam Black, 1828; other edn, Cambridge: Bartlett, 1851) and William Whewell's *The Elements of Morality including Polity* (London: J. W. Parker, 1845; 2nd edn, 1852) were on the list of books to be read for the Moral Sciences Tripos. These books, together with Whewell's *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, were suited to beginners (S[eeley] 1862, p. 147). For the changes that were then taking place, with the introduction of Ferrier, Bain and others, see S[eeley] (1874) and for Marshall's lists as Moral Sciences Lecturer in the late 1860s, see Groenewegen (1995, pp. 137-38).

Sidgwick's preference for Whewell as compared with Stewart had limited grounds, because his judgment of Whewell's ethics was always negative: "much of the *Methods* is an implicit critique of his [Whewell's] work" (Schneewind 1977, p. 112), and Sidgwick himself states that, while student, *Elements of Morality* gave him the impression "that Intuitional moralists were hopelessly loose in their definitions and axioms" (*Methods of Ethics*, preface to the sixth edition). In his *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, Sidgwick places Stewart and Whewell almost on the same footing. Like Mill, he had a far better opinion of Whewell's theoretical philosophy, which made him say that "it is to Whewell more than any other single man that the revival of philosophy at Cambridge is to be attributed" ("Philosophy at Cambridge", *Mind*, 1876, 1, pp. 235-46).

17. A committee selecting books to be set for the Moral Sciences Tripos. For Sidgwick's and Marshall's attitude towards this examination, see their letters to the *Cambridge University Gazette*, 1868. Marshall's letters are now reprinted in Whitaker (1996).

18. The "Little Go" or "Previous Examination" was a test that Cambridge students usually passed in their second year.

19. In 1866, the Reform Bill, introduced by Gladstone, was defeated in Parliament, and this provoked the fall of Lord Russell's Liberal Cabinet. On 18 March 1867 Disraeli, Minister in Lord Derby's Conservative Cabinet, introduced the new Reform Bill. Dissensions among the Conservatives were shown by the resignation of Lord Cranbourne – Robert Cecil, later Lord Salisbury – from his post at the Indian secretaryship on 4 March. In the following weeks, Gladstone managed to emend the bill and enlarge the franchise. Mill's support for Hare's scheme of "cumulative voting" had no success in Parliament.

20. This annotation was made in 1900. The page standing between this and the next is unrelated to the Club and contains a quotation from *Pendennies* which is not reproduced here.

21. The paper is now edited by Raffaelli (1994), where an explanation of the following discussion can also be found.
22. It is probable that 14 March (instead of 27, as usually given) is the date of the meeting where Marshall's paper was read while 27 is the date when the last sentence was added.
23. The Professorship of Sanskrit was established by grace of the Senate on May 16, 1867. Edward Byles Cowell was appointed Professor later that year (Tanner 1917, p. 100). The other appointment could be that of College Lecturer at St. John's.
24. Ferrier J.F., *Lectures on Greek Philosophy and Other Philosophical Remains of James Frederick Ferrier*, 2 vols, ed. by Sir Alexander Grant and E. L. Lushington, Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1866. Ferrier's philosophy is the focus of Marshall's second paper read at the Club (Raffaelli 1994).
25. Butler J., *Three Sermons on Human Nature and a Dissertation on the Origin of Virtue*, ed. by W. Whewell, Cambridge: Deighton; London: J.W. Parker, 1848. The book was listed for the Moral Sciences Tripos and considered one "the most important works" in Moral Philosophy, alongside Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Ethics* (Seeley 1862, pp. 146-47).
26. Page number 16 (the last of the set) is to be inserted here.
27. The Hare prize was instituted in 1861 by the friends of J. C. Hare, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, to be awarded once in four years to the best dissertation on subjects of Greek and Roman history or philosophy. In 1865 the prize, set on a subject of Latin Poetry, was not awarded. The next subject set was "The doctrine and influence of Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonians compared with those of Carneades and the Later Academy" and the prize was awarded in 1868 to Norman MacColl, later Spanish scholar and editor of *The Athenaeum*, for the dissertation on "Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus" that was published in 1869 (Tanner 1917, pp. 326-27 and Cambridge University Archives).
28. Frederick Harrison (1831-1923) was one of the leaders of the English Comtists and supporter of the Trade Unions. He wrote a book of *Autobiographic Memoirs* (1911). In a review of the famous book *Essays and Reviews* ("Neo-Christianity", *Westminster Review*, 1860, 74, 293-332; reprinted as "Septem contra fidem" in *The Creed of a Layman. Apologia pro fide mea*, London and New York: Macmillan, 1907, pp. 95-157), Harrison stated that Frederick Temple's theory "that the human race is a colossal man" and "the creeds and doctrines, the opinions and principles of the successive ages, are his thoughts" "is adopted from Auguste Comte, without acknowledging and possibly unconsciously" ("Septem contra fidem", p. 106).
29. The method here described "historical" is that of associationism and evolutionism which Marshall examines in "The law of parcimony" (Raffaelli 1994).
30. For Maurice's appreciation of Butler's ethics of conscience, see *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, 2nd edn, London: Macmillan, Glasgow: The University Press, 1882, 2 vols., vol. II, pp. 462-63.
31. "Them" in Marshall's text.
32. William Thomson, *Outlines of the Necessary Laws of Thought*, London: W. Pickering; Oxford: W. Graham, 1842 (5th edn, London: Longman, Green & Co., 1860). The book was on the list for the Moral Sciences Tripos.

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Note-taking is one of the most important activities for students. There are a variety of reasons for it but we only want to highlight the most important one here: Taking notes will help you recall information that would otherwise be lost. And we all know how crucial that can be when we're preparing for an exam. What's the essence of this figure again? Taking notes is about summarising core concepts as precisely as possible in your own words. One thing that most of the successful students have in common is that they use a note-taking method. It will help you to stay focused during the lecture to pay attention and actively participate. It will help you to organise your notes properly so that you don't have to worry about losing the overview once you get back to them to prepare for an exam. The discussions are very different - more polite and more about the making of the book and the author's approach to writing - than when the author isn't present. Every book club I've joined has been different from all the rest. The 'flavor' of the group depends on the individual members. Sometimes, the groups have morphed into social clubs, where very little reading gets done. Sometimes, they have been 'all business', with no off-topic discussion allowed during the allotted book-discussion time. My advice: read the book (take notes if something particularly strikes you) and go with an open mind. You'll know what to do when you get there. Don't be intimidated by others' opinions. You are the world's expert on your own opinion. If you hate a book that everyone else loves, say so.